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Major decisions for public universities are often 
shaped by the political dynamics which function continuously 
inside the institution and within the larger external 
community. A persistent problem in the study of higher 
education is the need to better understand this complex 
external environment and to build adequate consideration of 
it into the planning and decision making process. 
This study examined a particular instance of planning 
and decision making for an urban public university; the site 
selection process for the Boston campus of The University of 
Massachusetts. It identified the major components and dynamics 
of this prolonged search and developed recommendations which 
can be generalized to similar institutions. 
Study methods included review of University archives 
and contemporary news media, interviews, and review of public 
records. 
iv 
The researcher first sought to describe the broader 
context in which Massachusetts public higher education 
developed during the decades prior to the sudden decision 
to create a Boston campus for the University of Massachusetts 
in 1964. Then a chronology was constructed describing major 
events and decisions reached during the site selection process. 
A particular effort was made to determine the nature and 
methodology of the University's planning process. The study 
then examined the internal organizational structure and 
political environment within the university and the broader 
political and economic environment in the external community 
in order to assess their impact on the final outcome. 
A key finding was that the immediate local political 
and economic context surrounding an urban public university 
will have a profound impact upon policy decision making for 
the university. Since the near neighbors of such an 
institution will tend to view its presence in terms of its 
immediate impact on their daily lives and not in terms of 
its broader long term benefit to society, this local context 
must be known and understood by the university's decision 
makers. 
Lack of adequate state-wide coordination of the 
development of public higher education in Massachusetts 
during the 1960's and the lack of an adequate public 
relations effort on the part of the University were major 
contributing factors which hampered the site selection 
process. 
v 
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Colony and retained independent status as a separately 
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is bordered on the southeast by Boston Harbor and on the 
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portion of the old town of Dorchester. An area of very 
densely developed residential neighborhoods, during the 
period of this case study South Boston was inhabited 
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the major inner belt connector of the interstate highway 
system surrounding Boston. 
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located approximately five miles south of Columbia Poin 
Woodland Country Club: An are 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT 
Statement of the Problem 
Contemporary public universities do not exist in a 
vacuum. What they are at any given moment and what they 
will become is often shaped by the political dynamics which 
function continuously both inside these institutions and 
within the larger community which surrounds them. They are 
also the product of a process of intricate planning and 
decision making which must find ways to balance the needs 
and desires of internal and external constituencies. This 
is especially true for the urban public university because 
of the unusually complex nature of these internal and 
external forces. A persistent problem in the study of 
higher education is the need to recognize and better 
understand this complex external environment and to build 
adeguate consideration of these factors into the planning 
and decision making process. 
Universities need to integrate into their formal 
planning and decision making an adequate recognition of the 
economic and political dynamics of the broader community in 
which they are seen as a "neighbor". It is of critical 
importance for a public university to seek and maintain 
strong support from within the external political 
environment during efforts to acquire resources and during 
consideration of public policy issues related to the 
operation of the university. The urban environment, with 
its unique characteristics and challenges, adds a degree of 
complexity to this task. When a planning and decision 
making process specifically encourages effective 
communication between university and community leaders 
there is a better opportunity for them to interact 
effectivly on resource and policy issues and attempt to 
insure congruence within their planning efforts. This will 
tend to reduce the negative impact of any serious 
differences between the interests and goals of the two 
groups. 
The site selection process for the Boston Campus of 
the University of Massachusetts provides an excellent 
opportunity to examine these issues in the context of a 
specific planning and decision making process. My research 
has revealed that during the campus' formative years the 
administration, faculty, and student leadership developed a 
concept of the optimum physical configuration and location 
of their new urban campus which differed considerably from 
the expectations and public opinions of many of Boston's 
political and community leaders. 
A significant level of conflict developed. Traumatic 
open confrontation took place between these two political 
systems as they began to disagree on the optimum site for 
the new campus. In the end the trustees of the broader 
parent institution, The University of Massachusetts, 
adopted the position of the external political leadership 
nd forceful objections of the internal 
over the strong a 
leadership at their Boston campus. Here is an instance of 
community/university conflict, and failure to adequately 
address external community issues during the early stages 
of a university's planning process, similar to those 
identified in the literature as important sources of 
difficulty for the urban public university. 
This study will seek to clarify why this happened in 
the case of the Boston Campus of the University of 
Massachusetts. During the prolonged site selection process, 
which stretched from 1964 to 1968, the campus leadership of 
The University of Massachusetts at Boston lived through 
some difficult and painful moments in open confrontation 
with the leadership of the client community which they were 
ostensibly serving. The question of to what extent the 
university learned and profited from this experience, and 
in particular modified its planning process so that it 
better considered community issues, can be best examined 
through a review of both the period of initial planning and 
site selection and the five years which followed. During 
this later period the university was engaged in efforts to 
gain acceptance on the part of their immediate neighbors 
as final planning and construction of the new permanent 
site progressed. Description and analysis of the process 
during these two separate stages in the university's early 
development provides a case study useful for those 
concerned with development of effective university/ 
and for those concerned with gaining a community relations 
better understanding of the difficult formative years of 
this particular Boston institution. The critical need to 
form a better understanding of the interaction between an 
urban public university and its constituency, as further 
developed in the review of literature which follows, 
provided the justification for this study. Similar studies 
have been conducted by Rosen and others. This form of 
inquiry is not unique or untested. It has provided useful 
results in the study of similar issues at comparable 
institutions. The conclusions may also be generalized to 
other site selection and community issues within the 
broader framework of urban government. 
Purpose and Significance of This—Stud^ 
The purpose of this case study is to examine in depth 
a particular case of planning and decision making for an 
urban public university. Particular emphasis is placed on 
identifying the impact on the planning and decision making 
process of political dynamics both within and outside of 
the campus. This study will add to previous research which 
has sought answers to these questions. Analysis of this 
period in the development of an emergent urban public 
. towards further understanding 
university will contriout 
c narHrular importance concerning 
of some basic issues of particular up 
the appropriate structure of the planning process for such 
an institution. The implications of the Boston experience 
were examined for their relevance and significance for 
other contemporary urban public universitie 
significance of this study lies in the fact that it will 
provide a framework and point of reference, based in an 
in-depth review of an actual experience, with which to 
address these questions. This can be used by contemporary 
urban public universities while designing or reviewing 
their planning process to insure adequate consideration of 
the external political process. A secondary purpose is to 
provide an historical chronicle of this important formative 
stage in the development of one of the nation's most 
prominent emergent public urban universities. 
This case study seeks to add to the work of Rosen, 
which deals with the site selection process for the Chicago 
Campus of the University of Illinois/ and other writers by 
examining to what extent their approaches to analysis of 
public decision making can be applied toward a better 
understanding of the Boston situation. A second major 
question is whether the Boston situation essentially 
duplicated the Chicago experience. My hypothesis is that 
while Rosen's classification of approaches to public decision 
making and the analysis of such decisions can be applied 
towards a better general understanding of the Boston 
situation, the Boston experience was in many ways unique. It 
reflected the particular economic and political environment 
within greater Boston and Massachusetts. The particular 
political and economic context within a given time and place, 
as well as the particular political environment within the 
university/ are, therefor, very critical considerations 
within the university's planning process. 
There has been no formal published research on the 
site selection process for the Boston Campus of the 
University of Massachusetts such as the work by George 
Rosen. The few contemporary media articles provide only a 
pa rtial answer. This study attempts to partially fill that 
gap. It is important to note that the site selection 
process for UMB was taking place in the midst of the 
intense debate on the proper role of institutions of 
higher education within the broader community. This was 
also a time of unusually intense debate on a number of 
major issues within American society. The site selection 
controversy reached its peak in 1968, the year of the 
King and Kennedy assassinations, the Tet Offensive, and 
the insurgent candidacy of Eugene McCarthy. Distrust and 
disillusionment with established systems was at a peak amid 
intense questioning of traditional values within the 
broader American society. This accident of timing caused 
the UMB site selection process to bring town/gown issues 
into even sharper focus. The common thread that is apparent 
in the writing of commentators within higher education 
during this period is the thinly disguised notion that 
those laboring within institutions of higher education know 
what is in the public's best interest and that it is time 
that they got on with their duty of bestowing the benefit of 
their unique insight on a waiting world. Absent is any idea 
of a need for consultation and dialogue with the public or 
\ 4 
community leaders before setting goals and directions for 
their institutions. Just how dramatic the difference can 
be, on occasion, between the way in which the university 
views its role in the community and the way in which the 
community perceives the university's presence is suggested 
by the following quotes. The nature of the conflict they 
reveal lies at the heart of the purpose of this case study. 
The first selection is from a formal statement of 
institutional purpose expressed at the installation of 
Chancellor John W. Ryan during the founding convocation of 
UMass-Boston on December 10,1966: 
Only by plunging into the heart of mass 
technological, urban society can the university hope 
to prepare its students and faculty for the future, 
and to take a leading role in shaping that future. As 
urban problems mount, many of the city's most able 
people flee to the suburbs and leave the oppressed, 
the weary, the overburdened to struggle alone. The 
urban university must stand with the city, must serve 
and lead where the battle is. 1. 
An ironic and dramatic contrast to this optimistic 
goal is provided by the following extract from an 
editiorial entitled, "The Strangling of a City", which was 
broadcast by Boston radio station WEEI during the heart of 
the site selection controversy in May,1967. Commenting on 
the University of Massachusetts' plan to locate its new 
campus in the commercial heart of Boston it stated: 
Such a plan is callous, selfish and dangerous. It 
disregards everything we have learned about the urban 
crisis since that crisis began... This university 
will stifle the New Boston in its tracks. It 
8 
will drive retailers farther into the suburbs. It 
will start a rush of real estate sales that might 
suggest that the Back Bay is sinking. We cannot 
permit this to happen. Whether you live IN the city 
or outside of it, you will be hurt, for the entire 
community will suffer. All of us must act forcefully, 
and we must act together. WEEI urges listeners 
wherever you are--study the plan, join groups that 
oppose it. 2. 
A more restrained, but still worried, view of the new 
institution comes from a formal statement presented to 
the Boston City Council by a spokesperson for the 
Dorchester -Columbia Point Task Force in 1972: 
Here is a great public university coming into our 
front yard, offering an education to those of our 
children who have already succeeded in getting a 
college preparatory education and the right 
examination scores. There has been little preparation 
made for our children to go to this University; there 
has been no preparation made to house or to transport 
the children of people who do not live close to 
Columbia Point... Students, even from Boston, unable 
to commute in a reasonable time to campus, will move 
into Dorchester, rents will go up, and long term 
residents will be forced out. Cars will be parked all 
over our neighborhood. And our community will bear 
the main cost of the education of the state's 
children. 3. 
Boston's mayor, Kevin White put it quite bluntly in 
1973: 
Boston is desperately in need of a university that 
will serve its interests, meet its needs, and help 
solve its problems. Boston is emphatically not in 
need of another higher education institution 
occupying land which might otherwise be tax 
producing, receiving city services at little or no 
cost, and serving the sons and daughters of suburban 
and out of state families. 4. 
Kevin White was simply continuing the viewpoint of 
his predecessor. Mayor John Collins, who, in commenting on 
Boston's colleges and universities in 1966, stated, 
...they have made a fantastically great contribution 
to scientific advancement and to the growth of our 
industrial know-how. However they have made precious 
little contribution to thi( improvement of our urban 
environment, and its perhaps because they have not 
been invited into the middle of the battle. 5. 
The final quote is from the Justin Gray Associates 
report which formed the basis for a new approach in 
community relations by the university, 
It is clear that the University saw itself as a 
public good and never adequately prepared the 
political case for its site choices. It is equally 
clear, however, that the state and the city were 
exceedingly ambivalent about the school's growth and 
future. 6. 
There is a need for further research which examines 
th.c impact of political and economic environments on the 
planning process for urban public universities. We need to 
better understand the basic causes of a conflict such as 
this so that it can be avoided or at least its impact 
lessened when it becomes inevitable. Each of the parties 
represented in the preceding statements was influenced by a 
political agenda and personal interests which reflected 
their place within the Boston community. This does not mean 
that the experience of the University of Massachusetts in 
Boston was a totally unique series of events. Conclusions 
drawn from the experience can be generalized to assist in 
designing the planning process for future stages of its own 
development and for that of other urban public institutions. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
During the pest decade much of the literature 
examining planning for public higher education has been 
concerned with power and authority issues and relationships 
between institutions and state boards of higher education. 
Earlier literature provides a greater concentration on the 
the public university and political environment. Since the 
more recent literature moves away from the focus of this 
study, much of the literature which is reviewed below is from 
an earlier period. 
Public Universities and Their Political Environments 
A review of the literature even from the earlier 
period indicates that scholarly research on the relationship 
between institutions of public higher education and their 
political environments has been rather sparse. Writing in 
1969 Michael First and Edith Mosher described this subject 
as a new and largely uncharted area of research. In 1972 
Eulau noted that a systematic empirical body of knowledge on 
2 
the politics of higher education did not exist. 
In 1976 Borgestad found that despite interest in 
legislative decision making, higher educational financing, 
and communication in general, there had been a paucity of 
research on the process by which a university system 
3. 
communicates its needs to a state legislature. Eliot 
noted this in a study in 1959 and suggested that it was 
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due to the wide variation in the makeup of the various 
state legislatures and related interest groups which 
hinders any generalized explanations and conclusions. 4* 
Writing on the state of research on higher education 
administration and policy in 1975, Gove and Floyd stated 
that, 
Research on the state govermental and political 
environment in which the public university operates 
is less well-developed than is research on the 
university as a formal organization". 5. 
The need for such research, for the development of a 
clearer understanding of how an institution fits into its 
political context, and of the potential harm which can result 
from the lack of such an understanding, was clearly 
identified by Goodall, Holderman and Nolan. In commenting on 
the current nature of university-legislative relations they 
stated: 
Unfortunately, the partnership has become seriously 
strained in recent years, each partner viewing the 
other with disdain and skepticism. There are certain 
perceptions that members of each community have of 
each other which, if not altered, may exacerbate the 
existing strained relationship with potentially 
severe consequences for all concerned. 6. 
Borgestad's research revealed a significant 
a's public university and 
As a typical example of 
ator is quoted as 
ty weighed seriously the 
1 interests to build 
ing one year later, noted 
communication gap between Minnesot 
legislature during the mid-1970's. 
this problem a prominent state sen 
questioning, "whether the Universi 
public interest versus the persona 
an empire". ^ ' Erika Pilver, writ 
virtually the same problem in the State of Connecticut. 
Pilver reported that, 
The constituent units in higher education, because 
of their own priorities, sometimes find themselves 
opposing community and citizen groups which might in 
other circumstances be expected to support them. 8. 
Rowland provides a more positive image of 
universities recognizing the importance of cultivating good 
community relations. He points to the partnership of Yale and 
the City of New Haven in seeking funding for downtown 
development as an example of such positive relations. Rowland 
warned that the consequences of neglecting community 
relations are unusually severe and long lasting. Aikman 
identified the sudden purchase of extensive real estate, 
intrusions into well established community patterns, and the 
perception on the part of the public that upper level college 
employees enjoy substantially higher levels of salary and 
fringe benefits than those ordinarily available to the average 
citizen, lengthy vacations and sabbatical leaves as sources 
for resentment of the presence of the university by other 
members of the community and as potential sources of trouble. 
Rowland adds the exemption from local real estate taxes and 
thus the perception that universities are not paying their 
g . 
fair share towards public services. * Rowland quotes from 
the Reports of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education to 
underscore the importance of community relationships, 
particularly for urban institutions, 
The university located in an urban setting is not 
only an educational institution that happens to be 
in a city, it's a physical entity and a corporate 
force that has diverse and major impacts on the life 
and environment of the city....It is within the 
context of the growing urban crisis, however, that 
these impacts have taken on new significance 
requiring more conscious efforts on the part of the 
institution to maximize positive aspects and control 
potentially negative effects. 10. 
The report lists some reasons why institutions 
generate ill will in their urban environments. 
Uncertain expansion plans of a university can 
adversely affect maintenance standards of 
neighboring areas as well as real estate values, 
requirement for parking facilities and increased 
traffic in the vicinities of the campus may place an 
excessive burden on the city; and student housing 
patterns, from the viewpoint of some inhabitants of 
the neighborhood, may have undesirable effects on 
otherwise attractive residential areas. 11. 
The literature suggests that many urban universities 
have been oblivious to the reactions of local inhabitants 
and community interest groups to their expansion plans. 
In a book entitled. The Urban University and-the Future of 
Our Cities, J. Martin Klotsche, former chancellor of the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, states that. 
Blight, obsolescence, deterioration, overcrowding, 
and traffic congestion are common in the areas 
surrounding many urban institutions. These have a 
stultifying effect on institutional growth and are a 
deterrent to those wanting to live in the immediate 
vicinity of the institution. Often the university, 
itself, has contributed to these conditions... Zoning 
violations and substandard living conditions have 
occurred...High-density land coverage and 
indiscriminate intermingling of residential and 
commercial use of properties have resulted in 
incompatible land uses. 12. 
Klotsche warns that while a primary concern should be to 
understand and serve the city, the university must not become 
so committed to the affairs of the city that the primary 
purposes for which it exists become compromised. He states. 
It would be fatal to its historic mission were 
problem solving and local politics to become its 
primary goals. 13. 
Seyffert warns that it is commonplace for local 
residents, particularly low income residents, to express 
fear and suspicion of university expansion projects, 
Physical changes often beget social changes which 
long time residents deem undesirable... many 
neighborhoods view universities as elements of the 
community power structure. 14. 
Clark Kerr warned in 1968 that. 
The support of the inner city inhabitants —the 
new neighbors of the institution—will also be 
very important to the success of the enterprise. 
That support should not be taken for granted. If 
the people of the community are not fully consulted 
and informed of institutional plans, if they do 
not believe they will stand to gain visible and 
important benefits in exchange for some upheaval 
in their neighborhoods, the results can be 
catastrophic... 15. 
Opposition to the location of a new university 
facility can be a function of a natural emotional reaction 
to change or "Negative Geography", which was identified and 
defined by Robert H. Stoddard. This author identifies 
Negative Geography as the automatic assertion by those in 
the neighborhood of a proposed "undesirable" public 
facility that any other site is preferable and who view 
with increasing favor any other proposals for alternative 
sites as these sites are identified at points which move 
outward in concentric cirles farther and farther away from 
their neighborhood. According to Stoddard, when Negative 
Geography is in play, the more rational approach of the 
professional geographer, consideration of variables such 
as proximity to transportation, amount of land available, 
and population density, are abandoned to an irrational 
emotional approach. This form of opposition will be 
present to some extent whenever a new public facility is 
proposed. This type of reaction needs to be separated from 
opposition resulting from the purely economic and 
political context. Negative Geography stems more from a 
basic emotional response to change in one's environment, 
plus a failure of adequate communication and understanding 
16. 
between the university and its community. 
Stoddard's work supports Rosen's conclusion that, 
within the early stages of the planning process, 
consideration of the political dynamics of the community 
can outweigh in importance careful scientific/technical and 
economic analysis. This literature suggests a public image 
of the university in some settings and circumstances not as 
a force for positive good in the community, bestowing the 
benefits of higher education and research to a grateful 
populace, but rather as a costly and confusing, "bull in 
the community china shop", encountering enmity and 
opposition at every turn as it pursues a particular course 
of action. It also suggests that the university may be at 
times isolated from the realities of the world which 
surrounds it. One can find this public perception reflected 
in early accounts of "town/gown" conflicts during the 
formative years of Medieval Oxford and, at a much more 
recent date, in commentary of the late 1960's and early 
1970's when this timeless issue of the relationship of the 
university to its larger community was being debated with 
17 particular intensity. 
Writing for The Saturday Review in 1969, Howard Zinn 
criticized colleges and universities for becoming too 
isolated from the realities of the world they allegedly 
served. His criticism is typical of a wide body of 
on the university 
ard E. Goodall's 
igher education 
icl e by Zinn which 
18, 1969 edition of was originally published in the October 19 iti f 
the Saturday Review, 
Like politicians we have thrived on public 
innocence, with this difference; the politicians are 
paid for caring, when they really don't; we are paid 
for not caring, when we really do...We were the 
first to learn that awe and honor greet those who 
have flown off into space while people suffer on 
earth...A catch phrase can become a stimulous for 
endless academic discussion, and for the 
proliferation of debates that go nowhere into the 
real world, only round and round in ever smaller 
circles of scholarly discourse. Schemes and models 
and systems are invented that have the air of 
profundity and that advance careers, but hardly 
anything else. 18. 
Providing for Adequate Consideration of the External 
Political Environment Within the Planning and Decision 
Making Process for an Urban Public University 
Although no major research has been done to date on 
the site selection process for the Boston Campus, formal 
studies have been done of similar proceses at other urban 
public universities during approximately the same time 
period. The work most closely related to this study of the 
Boston experience is George Rosen's book, Decision-Making 
Chicago-Style:The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus 
Rosen presents a case study of the location of a permanent 
campus of the University of Illinois within the City of 
Chicago during the period 1955 to 1965. There were 
similarities between the process in Chicago and in 
Boston. Rosen examined the decision making process from 
economic, social and political perspectives as well as the 
roles played by the city government, the university, the 
general public, the state legislature and the courts. Rosen, 
an economist, sought to explain the Chicago site 
selection process as the product of classic economic 
principles and ended up concluding that it could not be 
examined in this manner since it was the result of 
external political forces not economics. The 
author describes how the universitiy1s goals and long range 
plans interacted with those of the city government and how 
the city and university together worked to overcome local 
neighborhood opposition to the site selected for the new 
urban campus. Rosen is particularly helpful because he 
* 
provides a framework in which we can see how the external 
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political environment impacts on the planning process. A 
secondary purpose of his work was to provide an historical 
chronicle of the site selection process. Rosen identified 
four approaches which he thought might be used in making 
public policy decisions or in analyzing how such decisions 
were made for an urban public university. Rosen attempted 
to show to what extent each of these four theoretical 
approaches to planning and public policy decision making 
applied to the Chicago experience. The four theoretical 
approaches which Rosen proposed for this type of public 
decision making are: 
1. The Economic Approach 
This approach is embodied in such techniques as 
"cost benefit" or "systems analysis". Several alternative 
decisions are viewed simultaneously as potential 
investments of public resources and then traced through to 
their conclusion. A value is set on their likely outcomes 
in relation to their costs so that the course of action 
with the highest present value can be identified. This is 
a static technique which compares end results of several 
alternative decisions with an earlier state and with each 
other. It assumes that one single decision maker or a 
decision making group can at a given point in time examine 
a complete set of possible choices, identify the likely 
costs and benefits to the members of society from each of 
these alternatives and then pick the one best solution. The 
I 
problem with this approach to analysis of either future or 
past decision making is that in reality the decision maker 
seldom has the complete set of data which the process 
assumes will be available. In reality the rejection of one 
alternative choice changes the nature of all the remaining 
choices the full dimensions of which may not be immediately 
obvious to the decision maker at the time the decision is 
ma de to reject the first alternative. Rosen points out that 
the process may become more of a political struggle over 
who has the power to make the choice among the alternatives 
rather than an exercise in prudent choice among carefully 
articulated alternatives. Rosen points to the difficulty of 
identifying the economic value of the benefit of providing 
city officials and business firms with access to the 
intellectual resources of a university or of identifying 
the economic loss stemming from the destruction of a 
portion of a city neighborhood. It is sometimes difficult 
to identify at what point politics enter into and 
"contaminate" what is presented as a purely rational 
dispassionate "economic approach". Rosen found that while 
economic factors were underlying forces behind the need for 
a campus in Chicago, they played a secondary role in the 
actual choice of a site. Because of the availability of 
federal urban-renewal funding the city and the university 
were relieved of a major economic constraint on locating 
the new campus in downtown Chicago. The effect of this was 
to set aside market factors that would otherwise have 
influenced the site selection process. In the case of the 
Chicago 
serious 
placing 
another 
campus Rosen found that there were also very 
problems in measuring the economic benefit of 
the university in one location as compared with 
. Rosen stated, 
The deliberate replacement of the market as a device 
to allocate land by nonmarket factors would make any 
measure of optimality difficult. The nonmeasurability 
of the major external benefits and costs of the 
decision, whether economic or political, and the 
inevitable disagreement over weights to be given to 
the various benefits or costs make it impossible to 
determine in any remotely precise fashion the 
optimality of the decision reached or, even more 
important, which among the sites considered was 
optimal. 19. 
He further points out that while the process was 
going on the benefits and costs of the various possible 
choices were constantly changing, simply because time was 
passing. In reality a site which would have been ruled out 
as both undesirable and unavailable at the start of the 
process turned out for political reasons 
feasible alternative at the close of the 
finding was of particular significance to 
an economist he had hoped to measure the 
to be the only 
process. This 
Rosen because as 
impact of economi c 
factors on such a decision. 
2. Analysis of Organizational Structure 
This second approach stresses the organizational 
complexity of public decision making and the effect of 
organizational structure on the policy decision with 
emphasis on the interplay of the various elements within a 
decision making organization, or group of organizations, 
their relationships to each other and their respective 
interests, strengths and weaknesses. This approach does 
not assume a single decision maker or universal agreement 
on objectives or value rankings among the group of decision 
makers. Rosen saw this as a more flexible framework for 
studying the interests and influence of external groups 
interested in the outcome of the decision. A disadvantage 
to this approach, identified by Rosen, is that the 
organizational structure and mix of competing 
organizational units described may be unique to a 
particular time and place and not be capable of being 
applied to describe another decision making process in a 
different institution. Rosen felt that the organizational 
approach provided the best explanation of the decision 
making process in Chicago. The University of Illinois 
wished to safeguard its strong position in the states' 
educational system. Semi-independent metropolitan area 
governmental agencies intervened to prevent the location 
of the campus in certain areas. The railroads were able to 
use certain state laws to prevent the use of their 
terminals and yards as possible sites. On the positive 
side, support from some state legislators and particularly 
from the city's urban renewal administration lent support 
to the university's final decision to select the 
Harrison-Ha1stead site which was their ultimate choice. 
Mayor Daley used his considerable political power to 
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support a site which was based on his own personal 
preferences and goals for the city and which would yield 
political benefits for his administration. Rosen states, 
Economic determinants of choice were subordinated to 
political determinants, both from the very nature of 
the goals of the major parties involved, and from 
the institutional setting. 20. 
3. The Science and Technology Approach 
This approach to decision making argues that the 
application of science to a problem will result in a 
technically best solution superior to one based on 
economic analysis or one based upon political 
considerations. Rosen states that this approach has a 
natural appeal to scientists and academicians and is 
popular with the general public because of the prestige of 
both of these groups who appear to be above mere 
consideration of the dictates of market forces or partisan 
politics. Concerning this approach Rosen quotes Nelson 
commenting with scorn, "So now we return to squar 
Plato's philosopher king. 21' " Rosen adds that now the 
philosopher king is a scientist rather than the 
required by the first approach and points out that now 
there is no .ore reason to expect concensus among the 
decision maters on the scientists' go.is than there -as on 
the economists' goals. In considering the economic and 
scientific approach to decision mating Posen briefly 
introduced "The Principle of the hiding Hand" a. developed 
b, Albert 0. Hirschman in his boot, Peuelop.ent Projects 
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Observed. In this book Hirchsman defines the "Hiding Hand" 
principle as the expectation of some systematic 
association of providentially offsetting errors which 
result in a highly favorable if not certifiably "best" 
solution emerging from a prolonged planning and decision 
making process in which none of the decision makers are 
ever fully aware, at the time, of the network of 
offsetting errors which are occuring. He states, 
Since we necessarily underestimate our creativity, 
it is desirable that we underestimate to a roughly 
similar extent the difficulties of the tasks we 
face so as to be tricked by these two offsetting 
underestimates into undertaking tasks that we can, 
but otherwise would not dare,tackle...What we are 
trying to say can be well conveyed by taking up 
Marx's famous sentence, "Mankind always takes up 
only such problems as it can solve," and by 
modifying its wording slightly, but its meaning 
fundamentally,to read: "Mankind always takes up 
only such problems as it thinks it can solve. 
Indeed, people who have stumbled through the 
experience just described will tend to retell it as 
though they had known the difficulties all along an 
had bravely gone on to meet them...we find 
intolerable to imagine that our more lofty 
achievements, such as economic, social, or 
oolitical progress, could have come about by 
stumbling father than through careful planning, 
rational behavior, and the courageous taking up 
clearly perceived challenge. 22. 
In conducting his investigation Rosen also sought to 
determine whether the "Hiding Hand" was present in the 
Chicago experience. He found that selection of the site 
was the result of a sudden and unpremeditated choice, and 
there was no reason, from the decision process used in and 
of itself, for there to have necessarily been a favorable 
outcome. Yet there was a favorable outcome which pleased 
many of those who had long wanted to see an urban Chicago 
campus of the University. Rosen states, 
This experience may also support Hirschman's 
theory of a "hiding hand" in project planning, 
although, if so, it was more by chance than by any 
systematic tendency that I can determine. 23. 
Rosen found that the University of Illinois did use 
the scientific and technical approach in an effort to gain 
support from the city's private universities, the 
legislature, and to influence public opinion. It was 
important for the University to develop a strong technical 
case based on its own research and that of a consultant, 
The Real Estate Research Corporation. Rosen states, 
The University laid a good deal of stress upon the 
quality of its technical analysis and its prestige 
as the best public institution of higher education 
in the state. The various internal committees that 
were set up carried out technical analysis that 
developed a need for the campus, estimated the space 
required for that type of campus, and explored the 
relation between program needs and the use of space 
as well as other issues. Amoung the most important 
of these in their consequences for the choice of a 
site were the space studies. Both the analysis of 
costs of construction and maintenance and the 
examination of other urban campuses led to a 
conclusion that a low-rize campus of discrete 
buildings was the preferred type. The quality of 
the technical analysis, supported by the 
University's prestige as an institution, made it 
possible for the University to insist on and get 
what it considered to be adequate space, even in the 
inner city. Furthermore, its prestige and technical 
competence were undoubtedly significant factors.in 
eventually persuading the private universities in 
the city to accept as inevitable (although with 
varying degrees of reluctance) the construction of 
a city campus. 24. 
4.The Community Power Framework 
This fourth approach cited by Rosen argues that the 
dominant economic interest groups within a political 
community, here a city, determine the decisions of the city 
leaders. When conflict emerges between the interest groups 
then the dominant group will prevail. Rosen found that. 
This experience does not support those theories of 
decision-making that postulate a united business 
community dominating a city government. The business 
community was not united and the mayor was not weak. 
But it does support a picture of an important role 
for community influence groups; of conflict over the 
use of land; and of a willingness to sacrifice a 
weaker community group, in this case the Italian, 
Greek, and Spanish-speaking peoples of the near West 
Side, for the interests of stronger groups, in this 
case the University and the Loop business community. 
This sacrifice had in its support the prestige of 
the University, the technical expertise of the city 
plannner, and the long standing desire for a 
University of Illinois campus in Chicago. 25. 
Rosen concluded that, although each of the approaches 
formed part of the planning process and impacted on the 
final decision, the process was dominated by political 
factors particularly the influence and political strength 
and forceful action of Mayor Daley. He suggested that it 
would be interesting to explore, by means of further 
research, how such decisions had been made in cities other 
than Chicago to determine whether any general conclusions 
could be reached about the nature of such a planning 
process. 
Rosen's discussion of approaches to the analysis of 
internal decision making and planning does not, of course, 
stand alone in the literature. His thoughts are reflective of 
some commonly discussed conceptual models of organizational 
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decision making and to some extent of governance within the 
university including those of Chaffe, Pettersen, Corson, 
Lallette, Baldridge and Cohen and March. Chaffe chose to 
label these concepts as "The Rational Model: Decision by 
Reasoned Problem Solving, The Collegial Model: Deciding by 
concensus, The Political Model: Deciding Through Conflict 
Resolution, and The Bureacratic Model: Deciding by Stuctured 
Interaction Patterns". An additional model labelled by 
Chaffe as "Organized Anarchy: Deciding by Accident , 
suggests Hirchsman's "Hiding Hand". These writers all attempt 
to conceptualize approaches to the analysis of decision 
making by groups and individuals within an organization. To 
some extent this limits their relevance since this study is 
concerned primarily with an examination of the impact of 
external factors within the broader environment on 
organizational decision making. Michela Reichman's work is 
particularly helpful when we bring the scope of the inquiry 
into this particular focus. 
Reichman documented the planning process used by some 
universities to select new sites for operations within urban 
core areas. This study provides a review of the critical and 
initially unfavorable impact of the external political 
community on expansion planned by the Harvard Medical School 
in the Mission Hill area of the Roxbury District of Boston in 
. *1ar. pvnpriences by the University 
the 1970's as well as similar experiences r 
v. a university of California, San Francisco 
of Pittsburgh and the Univer y 
at approximately the same period. In concluding a lengthy 
description of the difficulties each of these institutions 
experienced Reichman stated, 
While the experiences of these three institutions 
were different in many respects, they show some 
striking similarities. The first is the extent to 
which large institutions are oblivious to their 
effect on the people living in their environs until 
it is called forcefully to their attention by legal, 
political, and community action. The second is the 
need for institutions to take neighborhood concerns 
into consideration when planning expansion of their 
physical facilities, no matter how beneficial those 
facilities may be to the institution and to the 
larger community. The third is the increasing 
sophistication shown by neighborhood residents in 
using the news media and public relations as well 
as legal and political processes to make their views 
felt by large institutions. The fourth is that when 
these messages get through, and institutions begin 
to pay attention, the compromises that are 
painfully worked out are not so destructive after 
all. 26. 
This 
inquiry by 
phenomenon 
University 
study seeks to add to this particular area of 
documenting the occurance of virtually the same 
during the site selection process for the 
of Massachusetts - Boston. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Study Design 
The research design involved the development of a 
case study which analyzes the planning process for a 
contemporary urban public university. Specifically it 
examined the process of permanent site selection for the 
University of Massachusetts-Boston and the planning 
process which led up to the selection of a permanent site 
for the new campus during the period of 1964 to 1968. 
The case study identifies the major components and 
dynamics of this prolonged planning process and develops 
recommendations for the planning process and for university 
relations which can be generalized to other urban public 
universities. It also identifies which of the factors 
identified by Rosen were present in the Boston site 
selection process 
Methods 
The study methods include a review of materials 
within the University of Massachusetts Archives, a review 
of contemporary news media, interviews with faculty 
representatives and campus and university administrators, 
and with community political leaders of the period involved 
as well as a review of relevant extant public records of the 
City of Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
On the basis of all of the above methods, the 
researcher first sought to describe the broader context of 
the development of public higher education in Massachusetts 
in this century in which the decision to locate a new campus 
of the University of Massachusetts within the Boston 
metropolitan area took place and then to construct a 
comprehensive chronological "Timeline" summary of the major 
events, decisions reached and turning points in the site 
selection and new site planning process. The researcher then 
used the same sources, to develop a more complete picture of 
exactly what occurred during key points in the process. He 
also attempted to determine the nature of the design of the 
planning process and its methodology. After developing a 
description, in depth, of the methodology of the internal 
planning process, and changes which took place in this 
planning methodology as events progressed, the study then 
attempted to place this process in its broader context by 
examining the internal political environment within the 
university. The next step was to place the university and 
its planning process within the context of the broader 
community. This presented the greatest challenge of this 
entire project. 
The nature of research using the kind of sources 
required by this type of study militates against a precise 
definition of a course of action during the research and 
information gathering phase. Information and understanding 
which are derived from interviews and review of archival 
materials tend to build 
directions and sources, 
used in this case study 
in part as the research 
research had yielded to 
upon themselves often suggesting new 
Out of necessity the methodology 
was evolutionary in nature, developed 
progressed on the basis of what the 
date . 
Interviews 
This study also included nine interviews with key 
participants in the site selection process during which 
they presented their insight into this episode from the 
perspective of 1988. A list of persons interviewed is 
provided in Appendix III. George Rosen provided a caution on 
the value of interviews in his study which is also quite 
appropriately added to this study. 
The value of the interviews is less for details, 
-memories of events that occurred almost twenty years 
ago have faded-than for interpretation. Obviously 
people differ in their interpretation of events, but 
it is possible to cross-check interpretation and then 
reach an independent judgement as to the reasonable 
one. 1 . 
I have found this observation to be correct after 
conducting a series of interviews related to the Boston 
experience. The recollection of the details of specie 
events by major participants in the selection of the 
site for the Boston campus has also faded after twenty 
years and yet they have no problem recalling the major 
thrust and outline of what happened and how they felt 
about what occurred. 
Limitations and Exclusions 
It is important to note that this study was not a 
discussion of the teaching and research mission of higher 
education as a catalyst for change and progress in society. 
Much has been written about this aspect of the university/ 
community relationship. Lynton and Elman,for example, in 
their book, New Priorities for the University urge that 
faculty become much more involved with their external 
environment and that institutions as a whole, "need to 
become considerably more flexible and nimble in their 
response to external demands". They state, 
The knowledge needs of modern society require that 
university faculty become more involved in broader 
areas of scholarship,in the aggregation,synthesis , 
interpretation, and application of knowledge,and 
in outreach and extension. In short,faculty must 
come to be in active contact with the world outside 
academia. 2. 
This study was concerned with the university more as 
3 neighbor than as a teacher. It examined the direct impact 
of the physical presence of a new university upon a 
community and the direct impact of the local political 
process within that community on the development of the 
university. 
Another factor which must be considered is that the 
events reviewed in this case study occurred during the 
late 1960's and early 1970's, an era which in some ways was 
quite distinct and different from the late 1980's. To a 
certain extent this is a limitation since not all of the 
events and conclusions within the study will be directly 
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applicable to contemporary urban public institutions. This 
time gap of some twenty years, however, is also a factor 
which strengthens the study since we can at this somewhat 
distant vantage point better understand the events 
described in terms of their broader context and long term 
outcomes. 
Ultimately a study can never completely reveal the 
motivation of participants in an event no matter how 
complete the record. It cannot completely recreate, for 
purposes of analysis, the total context within which a 
series of events took place some twenty years in the past. 
It can never fully document the genesis of a new idea or 
change of attitude among a group of decision makers. This 
study was limited by the necessity to work largely with the 
written and printed record and limited as well by the all 
too human tendency of participants to forget, to embellish 
or to misconstrue events in which they played a significant 
role. 
Sources 
Sources for this study included formal documents, 
reports, correspondence and related materials with particular 
emphasis on planning documents. More precisely the following 
sources were used: 
Contemporary News Media 
AH relevant news coverage of the decision to create 
a Boston campus as well as coverage of the site selection 
process, 1964 to 1968, was reviewed in the two major Boston 
newspapers, The Boston Globe and The Boston Herald Traveler 
as well as the Boston campus' student newspaper, The Mass 
Media, for the period 1966 - 1968. The extensive newsmedia 
scrapbooks of the University Archives at Amherst, 
historical files maintained at The Boston Globe's central 
offices, and microfilm of the Mass Media maintained at the 
Boston Campus library proved to be invaluable sources 
during this effort. The study also reviewed contemporary 
editions of local "neighborhood" newspapers for 
Dorchester and South Boston as well as The Boston Pilot, 
the official weekly newspaper of the Archdiocese of Boston 
which are maintained on microfilm at the main branch of The 
Boston Public Library in Copley Square. A great deal of 
material was obtained through this process and the task 
became one of presenting the most relevant items for 
purposes of illustration. 
University Archives 
The holdings of the University of Massachusetts 
Archives at Amherst as well as those of the Boston Campus 
were surveyed and reviewed through consultation with staff 
archivists at both locations. They were found to contain 
a rich source of information on the period. Numerous 
reference is made to this material throughout the case 
study. 
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Other Archival Sources 
The formal records of the Commonwealth's governors 
and of annual legislative sessions which are maintained 
in part at the state archives at Columbia Point in 
Dorchester, Massachusetts and in part at the state 
legislative library at the statehouse on Beacon Hill in 
downtown Boston also provided a rich source of information. 
The state legislative library is also a rich source of 
data generated in reports prepared by the state agenices 
of the Commonwealth. 
Research Questions 
A series of research questions was developed to provide 
initial focus and to guide the research. 
Questions Concerning Planning: 
What does this case study tell us about the nature of 
the planning and decision making process in urban public 
universities? 
How did the site selection process for the Boston 
Campus of the University of Massachusetts differ from that 
for the Chicago Campus of the University of Illinois? What 
were the similarities? 
To what extent can the Boston experience be better 
understood using the- approaches to decision making and 
analysis of decisions identified by Rosen in the Chicago 
site selection process? 
Did the university use the prestige of its own 
reputation and that of its consultants to win support for 
the findings and recommendations of these studies? 
Was there a new and different approach or dynamic 
which was not identified by Rosen in Chicago? 
If political considerations did play a leading role, 
then exactly what were these considerations and how well 
were they recognized and integrated into the planning and 
decision making process? 
Was there also an assessment made from the standpoint 
of the communities involved? 
Questions Concerning University Participants 
What was the nature of the political environment 
within the University during this period and how did it 
shape the University's approach to the planning process? 
Who were the major participants within the University 
during the site selection process and what was their role? 
To what extent do the views of the leadership of the 
University and the Boston Campus, as expressed in the 
period 1964 to 1974, appear to agree with or to digress 
from those of the local and state political leadership? 
How did the background and nature of the faculty and 
academic leadership influence their perception of the city 
and its needs? Were they in fact isolated from the reality 
of the City of Boston? 
What was the background and nature of the student body 
and their leadership? 
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Questions Concerning The External Community 
What were the concerns of the city administration 
regarding the new university? 
What concerns were expressed by local residents and 
community power groups? 
How effectively were these concerns recognized and 
addressed during the planning process? 
What was the impact of the contemporary external 
political environment of the period? 
Were there other political events of the late 1960's 
which had an impact on the selection process? 
What expectations did the external community have 
during this period regarding the potential benefits of an 
urban public university for the City of Boston? 
How were the extensive urban renewal and economic 
development programs of the City of Boston related to the 
decisions regarding the location of the Boston Campus? 
What was the influence of community power groups? 
To address these questions I have prepared a narrative 
providing the background and context within which the 
decision was made to create the Boston campus and a 
description of the long and difficult site selection 
process from the decision to create the new campus in June 
of 1964 to the point at which classes began at the new 
campus at Columbia Point in January of 1974. The answers 
to some of these questions will flow directly from this 
narrative while the answers to others will be developed in 
a final analytical chapter which will present findings and 
conclusions . . 
Chapter IV begins with a review of the early part of 
this century and moves forward through the decades to trace 
public attitudes in Massachusetts concerning support for 
public higher education and particularly for a public 
university in the Metropolitan Boston area. This chapter 
includes a description of public expectations and political 
support for such an institution immediately prior to and 
during the site selection process. Chapter V describes the 
initial planning effort for the new campus with particular 
emphasis upon the development of the initial mission 
statement for the campus. Chapter VI chronicles the long 
site selection process from 1964 to 1968 describing each 
major site considered by the University and the factors 
which led to their rejection. This chapter also describes 
the political situation in Boston and Massachusetts during 
the period 1964 to 1968 with particular attention paid to 
the pivotal mayoral race of 1967. The final section of this 
chapter describes the events leading up to the selection of 
Columbia Point in the fall of 1968. Chapter VII examines 
the process through which the University attempted to deal 
with concerns and opposition on the part of residents of 
the neighborhoods immediately adjacent to the new campus. 
It also demonstrates how this process shaped major 
decisions on policy for the new campus. Chapter VIII 
compares Rosen's findings regarding site selection for the 
Chicago campus to the case study's findings regarding the 
site selection process for the Boston campus with particular 
emphasis upon the role of key decision makers, the impact of 
the University's internal organizational structure, and the 
role of technical consultants. Chapter IX presents 
conclusions and implications developed from the case study. 
This final chapter is an assessment of how well the 
university integrated an adequate understanding and 
allowance for the external political environment into the 
planning process. It also attempts to describe the 
relevance of the case study for other urban public 
universities . 
CHAPTER IV. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORT FOR AN 
URBAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY FOR BOSTON 
The University of Massachusetts - Boston was born 
rather suddenly and at short notice in 1964. It was a 
"quick fix" solution to the political crisis created when 
its parent institution at Amherst could no longert absorb 
the flood of college bound students within the maturing 
post-war "baby boom" generation. The occasion called for a 
quick answer and the answer was legislation creating a 
second campus in the Boston area mandated to open its doors 
to students within 15 months. This event occured as part 
of a sudden reversal of decades of reluctance by the state 
to develop an extensive system of public higher education. 
A distinctly "Massachusetts" viewpoint had developed 
over decades regarding the need for public higher education 
in the midst of so many outstanding private colleges and 
universities. David Riesman commented on this viewpoint 
while speaking at the Boston Campus of the University of 
Massachusetts in 1966, 
Where the land-grant tradition is strong and where 
public higher education has hegemony, it seems clear 
that these institutions can rise rapidly in status 
and pride, perhaps surpassing before long their 
downstate older siblings. But the University of 
Massachusetts in Boston begins in this respect under 
the disadvantage or handicap of the traditional 
Eastern (especially in Massachusetts) prejudice in 
favor of private education. 1. 
The development of this "Massachusetts" viewpoint is 
traced in this chapter from the opening years of the 
twentieth century to the point at which planning began for 
the Boston Campus in 1964. 
In Chapter V this viewpoint is contrasted with that 
of the small group of faculty charged with formulating a 
statement of purpose to guide the development of the new 
university. This initial leadership group based their work 
on an emerging idea. The traditional "land-grant" mission 
of the great public universities of service to the 
agricultural heartland of America must now be extended. The 
expertise of the university should be brought to bear on 
the specific needs of the nation's cities in crisis. 
The Debate on a Public University for Boston, 1900-1945 
Evidence of interest and support for an urban public 
university for Boston can be found as far back as the 
first decade of this century. There was at that point a 
growing awareness on the part of some that higher education 
was still beyond the grasp of many young people from 
working class families. The basic problem was both a lack 
of money for tuition and the fact that working class 
students were often poorly prepared for college. Those 
few from this group who managed to acquire the necessary 
academic skills and a small cash reserve for tuition and 
books often found that they could not attend because their 
families could not spare the wages which would be lost if 
they attended college classes in the daytime. The 
dimensions of this dilemma are suggested by data from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1910. It 
reports that in 1910 only 7,592 Massachusetts residents 
were attending college out of a total population of 
653,189 young people ages 15 to 24. 
As early as 1909, Edmund Dana Barbour, a wealthy 
retired Boston businessman and philanthropist, presented a 
petition to the state legislature requesting the 
establishment of an institution of learning to be known as 
’’Massachusetts College”. This new institution would be. 
located in the City of Boston with branches in other cities 
and towns across the state. Under this plan students would 
enroll in evening course work to be conducted by faculty 
from the various private institutions in Massachusetts. 
Tuition would be only $42.25 per year. An important 
limitation was that Massachusetts College could not open 
until $600,000 had been subscribed by "bona fide and 
responsible donors to the satisfaction of the Governor and 
Council.” Another was that the college’s programs were to 
be supplemental to those already being offered by the 
state's private institutions. The legislature 
established Massachusetts College through enactment of 
Chapter 113 of the Acts of 1910. Despite widespread support 
among the public and the endorsement of sixteen of the 
state's private college presidents, classes were never held 
because of a failure to obtain the required minimum 
n 3. 
endowment of $600,000 from private aonors. 
The annual address of Governor Eugene Foss to the 
legislature in 1912 provides an example of the attitude of 
the period toward providing increased access to higher 
education, 
The Commonwealth cannot ignore the claims of higher 
education.... I therefor recommend the thoroughly 
democratic measure of free scholarships, awarded for 
superior merit and carrying free tuition in any 
college of the state, approved by the State Board of 
Education, which the applicant may desire to enter. 
An appropriation of fifty thousand dollars would 
provide four hundred scholarships of one hundred and 
twentyfive dollars each without unduly burdening the 
finances of the State. We should thus secure the 
practical results of a State university without 
needlessly duplicating the splendid educational 
facilities already at hand. 4. 
A Board of Education report to the legislature in 
1912 discussed whether there was a need to provide 
additional higher education and extension programs which 
would supplement what was already being offered in the 
Commonwealth. The report suggested that there were already 
enough colleges and universities to meet the needs of the 
young people in the Commonwealth and thus there was no need 
to create a state university. It suggested instead that the 
state consider providing state funded scholarships for 
students in need and create an agency to promote extension 
evening courses and other forms of cooperative programs 
between the private colleges and state government. 
Speaking during this period before a legislative 
hearing on a proposal for a Massachusetts state university, 
Harvard's President A. Lawrence Lowell warned that a state 
university would be a wasteful duplication of the many 
existing facilities and instructional staffs at the 
state's private institutions. Lowell warned that a state 
university would carry the stigma of a "poor boy's" 
college and advised the law makers that. 
It is much better that rich and poor should go to 
the same institution, for this enables them to know 
and appreciate one another's point of view. 6. 
A.E. Winship, editor of The Journal of Education, 
expressed similar advice in an editorial of the period. 
Winship stated, 
A poor boy can go to Harvard, can work his way 
through, can live on onions and cabbage if he 
chooses; but when he is through, his diploma is as 
aristocratic as that of any student. But if he went 
to a State University in Massachusetts his diploma 
would have blazened across its page, 'from a poor 
boy's college'. All education in Massachusetts is 
aristocratic...A State University in Massachusetts 
would always be the poor boy's college and poor boys 
would not go there. They would sooner do janitor 
work, live on stale food, for the sake of having an 
aristocratic diploma when they are through. That is 
the Massachusetts of it. Our western friends cannot 
understand it. They are democratic. They like the 
democracy of a State University. To them there is a 
heartiness in it that we cannot understand any more 
than they can understand the headiness of our 
Massachusetts ideal.7. 
Writing about the University of Massachusetts in the 
early 1960's, David Riesman and Christopher Jencks noted 
the survival of these attitudes toward public higher 
education. They observed, 
Few i 
' soci 
inher 
more 
educa 
is a 
those 
canno 
n New England seem ready to argue the. 
alist' doctrine that public sponsorship is 
ently more egalitarian, more efficient, and 
in keeping with the public impact of the 
tional system. The University of Massachusetts 
kind of educational New Deal, assuming only 
residual functions that the private system 
t, or will not, fulfill. It is hard to find a 
single area in which the University has entered into 
a serious competition with the private system when 
that system was doing a job adequately, or to find 
a single proposal that has been approved by the 
Legislature solely to make the University of 
Massachusetts an academically outstanding 
institution of which the State might be proud. The 
contrast with California or Michigan is obvious. 8. 
Despite this prevailing attitude there continued to 
be support among organized labor and other progressive 
political and community leaders for the establishment of a 
state supported university in Massachusetts. Their efforts 
resulted in passage of Chapter 105 of the Legislative 
Resolves of 1914 which required the Board of Education to, 
again, conduct an intensive review of the need for a state 
un iversity. The Board's report culminated in a bill filed 
in the 1915 session proposing the establishment of a 
state university located within the Metropolitan District 
of Boston on a campus of not less than three hundred acres 
located at a distance of not more than thirty miles from 
the state house of the Commonwealth. Tuition would be free 
for all students who had been resident in Massachusetts for 
at least one year prior to enrolling. Funding for the state 
university would be augmented by an annual state surcharge 
levied on all local real estate taxes collected in the 
_ 9. 
Commonwealth. 
This proposal failed to pass primarily because it 
was eclipsed by parralel legislation establishing a state 
department of university extension which enjoyed the full 
support of the new progressive Democratic Governor, David 
I. Walsh, and much of the leadership of the state's 
private institutions. Impressed by what he had seen on a 
visit to The University of Wisconsin, Walsh included a 
special section on education within his annual address 
delivered to the legislature on January 7,1915. In this 
section, Walsh proposed a total reform which would provide 
much greater access for the poor to all levels of 
education from grade school through the university, 
Massachusetts, also liberal to the point of 
extravagance in meeting the educational needs of the 
fortunate minority whose parents are in easy 
circumstances, owes no less to every child of the 
tenements, the factory and the farm, and to every 
adult whose early environment has been adverse, or 
who by economic conditions has been obliged to give 
to manual labor the years of childhood which should 
have been sacred to mental and physical preparation 
for civic usefulness and vocational success. 10. 
While not completely fulfilling this ambitious goal, 
the new system of university extension, essentially state 
funded night courses at the private institutions, did 
provide, to a certain degree, access to higher education 
for working class youth and took much of the steam out of 
the movement for a state university. Decades later, as a 
United States senator from Massachusetts, Walsh stated that 
his most important accomplishment as governor was "bringing 
college to the people" through what was essentially a state 
sponsored continuing education program drawing on the 
resources and facilities of the private institutions. Using 
the University of Wisconsin as a rough prototype, 
Massachusetts had discovered a means of bringing college to 
working class youth through extension of the private 
institutions which was politically satisfying to the 
majority for the moment. 
The state had been providing large annual subsidies 
to MIT and Worcester Poly Tech for several years with the 
provision that these institutions provide a certain number 
of free scholarships to be distributed to needy students 
through the state's board of education. It is quite 
possible that the new extension program, in concert with 
the further expansion of these state funded scholarships 
specifically for working class students at institutions 
such as Northeastern University, Boston University, Boston 
College, and Wentworth Institute, might have permanently 
met the need. 
But this was not to be. An amendment to the 
Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted by popular 
referendum vote in 1917, popularly titled the "anti-aid" 
or "non-sectarian" ammendment, prohibited the use of state 
funds for any institutions or programs which were not 
directly under the.authority of a department of the state 
government. This historic compromise, developed during 
debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1917, 
resolved a very old political conflict growing out of 
deep religious and cultural differences within the state. 
Generally, Roman Catholic leaders had favored the use of 
state funds in support of the various Catholic educational 
* 
and charitable institutions in the Commonwealth but were 
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opposed to the use of state funds for scholarships at 
private colleges and universities which they viewed 
as essentially "Protestant" and middle class Republican 
in orientation. It was felt that a working-class, Roman 
Catholic youth stood a poor chance of receiving a state 
scholarship. Non-Catholic leaders were generally opposed 
to the use of state funds in support of Roman Catholic 
institutions but had no objection to the extension of 
state funded scholarships at such institutions as MIT and 
Worcester Poly Tech which they considered to be non¬ 
sectarian in their orientation. 
The Roman Catholic leaders sense of alienation from 
the benefits of the state scholarship program may seem odd 
to us today in this post-ecumenical era. The concern that 
state funds might be used for religious institutions seems 
equally strange now that the provisions of the First 
Ammendment to the Federal Constitution have been extended 
by the courts to local and state governments. These were 
still very real and potentially divisive issues in 1917, 
keenly debated by the public and their political 
leadership. In speaking before the 1917 Constitutional 
Convention in opposition to the annual grants to M.I.T. 
and Worcester Poly Tech, Boston's famous Irish Democratic 
political boss, Martin Lomasney raised the issue of equal 
access for the working class and the possiblity of 
political tampering during the distribution of the 
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scholarships, 
It is a wrong thing, to have a private school of 
that kind in any county or in the state, where you 
may take the poor boy or the rich boy and give him 
an opportunity for advancement at the public expense, 
to which every young man in the state does not have 
access. To-day they have the power to dictate who 
shall go there to be educated, and the public 
contribute in part money that support the 
institution. That is all wrong....Why should the son 
of a poor mechanic toiling in the mills of Lowell be 
taxed so that the son of his uncle or brother could 
be educated as an engineer and always be capable of 
earning five or ten thousand dollars yearly, while 
the son of the mechanic never would get over one 
thousand? It is class legislation, it is improper 
legislation. 11. 
Later in the Constitutional Convention debates 
Lomasney raised the religious issue, 
...how can they sit there with their views and allow 
all of us in the state who are Catholics to be taxed 
to maintain institutions of learning that are just as 
Protestant in their educational purposes and in their 
control as our institutions are Catholic? It is 
taxation without representation, because it is 
impossible for a Catholic to live in some of these 
institutions that have been getting money from the 
State under private control and be treated as he 
should be. 12. 
These concerns, and a related orientation toward a 
network of private colleges and universities, free to be 
affiliated with a particular religious denomination or 
non-se non-sectarian as their trustees desired, seems to have 
persisted for several decades. In the early 1960's, 
Riesman and Jencks observed, 
the difficulty is that in Massachusetts much of 
of Catholic colleges. Hence, although 45% of the 
students at the University of Massachusetts are 
Catholic, their co-religionists in the State 
Legislature have not been very enthusiastic about 
supporting the University...both Catholics and 
Protestants are deeply committed to separate 
development, and are uninterested in efforts to 
provide a common meeting ground in a public 
institution. 13. 
The "non-sectarian" amendment put an end to the 
practice of state subsidies and state scholarships in 1917 
and no new state program emerged to take their place in 
promoting access to college for the working class. The 
measure was intended as a compromise to put an end to 
years of sectarian bickering as America closed ranks to 
prepare for its active entry into World War I. The concept 
implicit in this compromise was that the state should now 
do absolutely nothing to expand programs or access in the 
private institutions. This amendment which has long been 
seen as a watershed event in the development of 
Massachusetts local public school systems was also a key 
turning point in the development of its institutions of 
higher education both public and private. Colleges and 
universities in the Commonwealth would now be either 
totally public or totally private. 
Another study of the need for a state unversity, 
commissioned by the legislature in 1922, concluded that the 
state did not need a public university at the present time 
and could not afford the high cost. It called instead for 
the establishment of state supported junior colleges as the 
first step toward a possible state university in the 
indefinite future. 
14. 
Repeatedly during the Depression years, the Socialist 
Party introduced a bill requiring the Commonwealth to 
consolidate all public institutions of higher education 
into a new entity to be known as "The University of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts". This would be headquartered 
in Boston. Each year this measure failed to gather 
significant support and was withdrawn. 15. 
In the 1938 session a bill proposed establishment of 
a commission to investigate the advisability of a 
University of Massachusetts located in Boston. It, too, was 
withdrawn because of lack of support. 16. Representative 
Charles Kaplan of Boston introduced a bill in 1948 calling 
for the legislature to establish a University of 
Massachusetts in the City of Boston. 17. In the 1950 
session, House Bill 481 contained the petition of Wilfred 
Mirskey, William Sullivan and Meyer Pressman for, "the 
establishment of a branch of the University of Massachusett 
wi thin a radius of 15 miles of Boston" and another bill 
calling for, "The establishment of a free city college in 
18. 
Boston or elsewhere in Suffolk County". 
19. 
was back again in the 1953 session. 
Kaplan's bill 
Each proposal 
failed to be enacted due to a lack of adequate support. 
The Impact of World War II on the Development 
of the University of Massachusetts 
At the close of World War II, Massachusetts higher 
education faced a severe enrollment crisis due to the wave 
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of recently released servicemen eager to take advantage of 
the educational benefits provided by the GI Bill. The 
magnitude of this sudden growth is reflected in a 
comparison of data provided by the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States for 1947 and 1948. In 1944, Massachusetts 
colleges and universities had a total enrollment of 34,484 
students. By 1947 this enrollment had grown to'93,087 
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students of whom almost half, 46,250, were veterans. 
The Commonwealth's colleges, both public and private 
combined, were not eguipped to handle this huge influx of 
students. 
To meet this crisis, the legislature authorized the 
Massachusetts State College at Amherst to establish a 
branch annex for returning veterans through use of 
partially vacant training facilities and buildings at Fort 
Devens in central Massachusetts. As the largest public 
institution in Massachusetts, the State College Amherst 
was the logical choice to spearhead this project despite 
its relatively remote location in the western part of the 
state. The state normal schools were too small and highly 
, . ^ , 21 . 
specialized to handle this task. 
Not satisfied with this temporary solution, a 
coalition of student veterans and alumni at Massachusetts 
State College at Amherst, began a campaign to convince the 
legislature to raise Amherst to university status. Concern 
with the educational needs of veterans, the return of 
relative prosperity in the post-war years, increased public 
interest in the new technologies which had been developed 
during the war, and a growing recognition of the need for 
college preparation for professional careers all combined 
into greatly increased support by the public for a decision 
to expand the state college into a university. 
The temporary annex at Fort Devens had an interesting 
parallel in Illinois. The University of Illinois decided 
to respond to the same pressure brought about by the G.I. 
Bill by setting up, in the fall of 1946, a temporary campus 
for returning veterans at Navy Pier in downtown Chicago. 
This annex offered a two year program following which the 
veterans could go on to other institutions to complete 
their degree requirements. The original plan was for the 
Navy Pier operation to last for only four years. Instead 
the program continued for almost twenty years and did not 
close until after the new permanent Chicago campus of the 
University opened its doors in the early 1960 s. Rosen 
states that, 
The establishment of a permanent campus in Chicago 
was considered by the University administration of 
the period, as well as by very influential groups 
within the state and the University faculty, as 
Dossibly competitive in the legislature with the 
Urbana campus - a step that would divert necessary 
funds from the improvement and expansion 
main campus in the short run. 22. 
To a certain extent this is what happened in 
Illinois. Rosen states, 
The existence of this temporary campus established a 
heightened the demand for a permanent 
campus. In addition, with such a campus even on a 
temporary basis, it would have been psychologically 
and politically difficult for the University to pull 
out of Chicago. This foothold also gave the 
University first choice of refusal in deciding 
whether or not to place a campus in Chicago-a 
political advantage for the future. 23. 
In Massachusetts the same scenario took place with 
some local variations. The administration at Amherst moved 
quickly at the close of the war to ensure that a rival 
public institution did not emerge in the state's capital 
city. This was accomplished through the formal recognition 
of The State College at Amherst as the state's public 
un iversity and by setting up Massachusetts' temporary 
response to the G.I. Eill "overflow" at an obscure rural 
site with a built in guarantee of a limited and temporary 
status since Fort Devens remained an active Army 
installation. 
Legislation which transformed Massachusetts State 
College into the University of Massachusetts was signed 
24. 
into law by Governor Robert Bradford on May 6,1947. 
Very little was accomplished by this simple name change. It 
would take many more years of development before the new 
University of Massachusetts could begin to rival the long 
established public universities of such states as Michigan 
and Wisconsin. But an important precedent had been 
established. The state university would be locatea at 
Amherst not Boston. It would take another enrollment 
crisis, this time created by college bound children of 
the state would begin another World War II veterans, before 
rapid expansion of its public higher education facilities. 
The Impact of the Post-War "Baby Boom" on 
Massachusetts Public Higher Education 
The beginning of the 1960's saw renewed interest in 
the establishment of a Boston branch of the University of 
Massachusetts. A bill introduced by Representative Gerard 
Doherty in the 1960 and 1961 sessions called for the 
creation of a branch of the University in the City of 
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Boston. # In the 1963 session Representative John J. 
McGlynn introduced a bill calling for a branch within ten 
miles of the City of Boston but once again the bill failed 
for lack of adequate legislative and popular support. 
These bills failed as others had for decades before them 
for one basic reason, the lack of a generally perceived 
need to supplement the programs already provided by the 
private institutions. 
Suddenly,in 1964, this would all change. By the fall 
of 1963 Massachusetts' colleges and universities were 
being swamped again by a tidal wave of enrollment. 
The impact of the post-war "Baby Boom" was being felt in 
full force. In response to this development the 
Legislative Research Bureau commissioned a study by 
Dr. Norman Greenwald of the Golding Center at Brandeis 
University on the need for and feasibility of providing 
additional higher public educational opportunities in the 
metropolitan Boston area. Greenwald wrote to University 
of Massachusetts President John Lederle and to the 
University's Director of Institutional Studies, Leo 
Redfern, asking for their imput. In this letter Greenwald 
outlined three possibilities, the expansion of Boston State 
College into a university, the establishment of a totally 
new metropolitan state university, or the establishment of 
a branch of the University of Massachusetts in the Boston 
metropolitan area. 
Lederle had been president of the University since 
1960 and had been looking for ways in which to expand its 
operations into the Boston area. In an interview in 1975 
Lederle stated, 
Very shortly after I arrived, I came to the 
conclusion that we had to get into Boston. This is 
obvious; it is the Hub...This was one of the major 
cities in America that did not have a quality public 
university. Inevitably there would be one there; and 
the University of Massachusetts ought to be 
programming its development. As we thought about 
that, we asked ourselves how do we get into Boston? 
One alternative would be to recognize that Boston 
State College is already there, and by the way, 
there'd been bills introduced from time-to-time to 
change Boston State College to Boston State 
University. These had never moved. Inevitably, 
pressures would have developed to make it a 
university. So, do you take them over--which would 
have required some doing—or do you go in there 
independently? I kept broaching this to the 
leadership of the Legislature. I think particularly 
of Bob Quinn and Maurice Donahue....I decided that 
it would be better to go in there independently 
rather than to invade the state college system by 
snipping off Boston State College. I did this for 
two reasons...we would inherit a faculty 
fundamentally teacher college oriented and very 
difficult to re-direct along university lines....I 
had visited the Boston State College campus and never 
in my life had I seen a physical location more 
impossible. It was located on one city block. The 
only way to go was up. 27,. 
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A meeting of Greenwald, Lederle and Redfern took 
place at Amherst on January 10,1964. Lederle and Redfern 
were presented with a semi-final draft of Greenwald's 
report on February 4. In a letter to Lederle dated March 4, 
Greenwald thanked the president for his extensive comments 
on the draft and noted that, 
Our major problems relevant to establishing a 
University of Massachusetts branch in Boston will be 
Northeastern University and Boston College. 28. 
As part of the growing concern with expanding higher 
education opportunities, the Legislature had passed 
Chapter 429 of the Acts of 1962 which provided for the 
establishment of an advisory board on higher education 
policy within the Massachusetts Department of Education. 
The new board consisted of the state's Commissioner of 
Education, the President of the University of 
Massachusetts, the President of the Lowell Technological 
Institute, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the 
Southeastern Massachusetts Technological Institute, the 
Director of the Division of State Colleges, the Chairman of 
the Board of Regional Community Colleges, and five other 
persons appointed by the governor. 
The role of the board was to review the total higher 
education program supported by appropriations of state 
funds and to submit a report to the governor and 
legislature by December first each year. The annual report 
was to include a recommendation on the allocation of state 
funding among the various state supported institutions for 
the coming fiscal year. In their Second Annual Report, 
issued in January of 1964, the Advisory Board of Higher 
Education Policy noted that while there had been 54,745 
Massachusetts High School graduates in 1960, this number 
was projected to increase to 86,575 by 1973. The state's 
institutions of higher education were not prepared to 
absorb this increase. The Board suggested that the state's 
public institutions adopt a year-round calendar of 
operation similar to that being used successfully by 
29 
Northeastern University. 
In his annual message to the state legislature on 
January 2,1964, Governor Peabody echoed this recommendation 
in calling for a special study of the feasibility of year 
round operation of the state's public institutions. He 
stated, "Rather than build costly new facilities, we first 
should make full utilization of our existing higher 
education facilities." 3°* The governor made no mention 
of the possibility of a new branch of the University in 
Boston. 
In a Boston Globe interview in late January, President 
Lederle predicted that by 1970 Massachusetts would be short 
47,000 places in public and private institutions of higher 
learning and predicted that this challenge would be met 
primarily by the state's public institutions including a 
new "University of Massachusetts in Boston" which would 
eventually enroll 15,000 students. He noted that Boston 
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was the only city of its size in the nation without such an 
institution and stressed the great need because of the 
large number of Boston commuter students who worked 
part-time. Lederle stated that, because of a serious lack 
of space at the Boston State College campus, his preference 
would be to build on a totally new site rather than merge 
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the existing state college with the new Boston campus. 
On April 6, during an appearance before the annual 
Senate Ways and Means Committee budget hearing, Lederle 
stated that the University had received more than 12,000 
freshman applications for the upcoming fall semester and 
that about 8,000 of these applicants would have to be 
turned away due to a lack of space. In response to this, 
on April 7, Representative Robert Cawley of the West 
Roxbury District of Boston introduced a bill which would 
have created a special legislative commission to study the 
feasibility of a branch of the University in the Boston 
area. Cawley cited the relatively high cost of the area's 
private colleges, the fact that Boston was the only major 
urban center in the nation without a state supported 
university and that about half of the student population at 
the Amherst campus came from the Boston area. 
Reacting very quickly the following day, Lederle 
announced through the news media that, "If the Legislature 
was to decide that it wanted to expand the University by 
creating a branch in Boston, we are prepared to come into 
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Boston and organize a branch there." 
32 . On April 9, The 
Boston Globe published an editorial in which they repeated 
Cawley's arguments/ and noted that/ "The task is rapidly 
slipping beyond the capacity of the private colleges..." 
and endorsed the study.33. On April 13/ The Massachusetts 
Legislative Research Council release Dr. Greenwald's 
report on public higher education in the Boston area 
stating that Greater Boston must have a state university if 
the growing number of qualified students in eastern 
Massachusetts were to receive higher education. 
In reviewing the quality of programs at the 
Commonwealth's state teachers colleges the report stated 
that / 
...none of them, however... have yet achieved 
standards or quality in their arts and science 
offerings comparable to most private Massachusetts 
liberal arts colleges or the University of 
Massachusetts...Boston State College officials 
appear receptive to proposals to expand their 
mandate to that of a university; realistically, 
however, they apparently accept the lapse of a 
considerable period of time, perhaps a decade o 
more, before the institution can become_a university 
in fact as well as in name...The academic standing of 
the University of Massachusetts is demonstrated by a 
varietv of criteria.... University officials appear 
receptive to the idea of establishing a second campus 
in Boston to service eastern Massachusetts. In 
formulating their expansion projections, they have 
c^smIkS the creation of such campuses in a number 
It metropolitan centers of the Commoneea1th• 34. 
The report acknowledged the existence of the peculiar 
Massachusetts higher education environment, 
The concentration of private colleges and 
• •l•DC an Massachusetts creates special 
universities 1 concerned with studying the need 
for additional public higher education opportunities. 
In most states, higher education, especially at the 
university level, is primarily a public 
responsibility and the appropriate authorities have 
considerable freedom in providing for overall 
direction and coordination. In this Commonwealth, 
the public sector must augment rather than duplicate 
services provided by well established and nationally 
recognized private institutions....More specifically, 
a public university in Boston would not likely attain 
the necessary public support, faculty or standing in 
the academic world unless its offerings were 
approximately on a par with those of Boston College, 
Boston University or Tufts. Moreover its better 
graduates would have to qualify for acceptance into 
the graduate programs of nationally eminent 
institutions such as Harvard and M.I.T. 35. 
Since it was not charged with making specific 
recommendations, the report concluded by identifying four 
possible alternatives for the Boston area, 
(1) Establish a 'Commuting1 Campus of The University 
of Massachusetts In Greater Boston. 
(2) Establish a 'Commuting' Campus of the University 
of Massachusetts In Greater Boston,and 
Incorporate into it, as Components of the 
University, The Massachusetts Bay Community 
College, The Boston State College, And The 
Massachusetts College of Art. 
(3) Provide Express Bus Service to and_from The 
University of Massachusetts Campus at Amherst for 
Qualified Greater Boston Students. 
( 4 ) Expand Prof essional, Technical and Vocational. 
Programs Of Existing State Institutions In 
Greater Boston. 36. 
In 
accept a 
March, Senate President John E 
position in the state judicial 
Powers resigned to 
system. His 
successor, Senator Maurice Donahue, spoke at the annual 
Newman Club communion breakfast at the Amherst campus on 
May 3. A number of reporters attended since it would be 
Donahue’s first public address since becoming senate 
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president. In the midst of a talk on religious themes 
Donahue called for the creation of a new branch of the 
university in the Boston area to meet the need of the great 
number of students being turned away from the university. 
Donahue did not call for an urban location for the new 
campus. He suggested, instead, that it be located in the 
Blue Hills area of the Boston suburb of Milton since, 
Any Greater Boston location for a second state 
university must include a minimum of 100 acres 
for at least 20 high rise structures housing a 
wide variety of specialized schools of liberal 
arts, fine arts, engineering, business 
administration, science, law and medicine." 37. 
Donahue stated that the matter would be coming up 
soon for debate in the legislature. 
jn response to previous suggestions that Boston 
State College might be expanded into a state university 
for Boston, Donahue suggested that this would only be a 
temporary and unsatisfactory solution since their plant 
was already. 
Hemmed in and overshadowed by Northeastern 
University, Simmons, Harvard University and Emmanuel 
College. It would be unable to expand and would pose 
an insoluable automobile parking problem. It would 
not provide one single additional desk for a student 
since it is already overcrowded and turning away 
proportionately as many students as the University at 
Amherst. And it cannot seize land for expansion 
without serious additional loss of valuable tax 
paying property to a- city already being_nibbled to 
financial despair by tax exempt foundations. 
Donahue listed four essential conditions for the site 
of a new Boston area public university; a minimum of 100 
acres, proximity to public transportation, extensive 
off—street parking, and a site which was already state 
owned and exempt from local property taxes. 38 * During an 
interview conducted as part of this case study, Senator 
Donahue provided a copy of the full text of this speech 
and stated that the portion suggesting the possibility of 
a new Boston campus had been drafted by his friend, Daniel 
O'Leary, president of Lowell State College and a native of 
Boston. Donahue said that he was very surprised-by the 
strong favorable interest and support and so the following 
day he asked two colleagues in the legislature to begin 
drafting appropriate legislation. 
The Debate on the Need for a Boston Campus 
of The University of Massachusetts 
On May 4 President Lederle issued a statement stating 
that the university was ready to move to establish a high 
quality program in the Boston area if support was 
forthcoming from the governor and legislature. On May 13 a 
bill. Senate 849, was filed in the legislature by Senate 
President Donahue, Senator George Kenneally of Boston, and 
Representative Robert Quinn of Boston calling for the 
establishment of a branch of the University in Boston. 
A late May marathon six hour public hearing on this 
bill by the Joint Senate House Education Sub—Committee 
brought forth both strong support and strong opposition. 
More than 300 persons attended resulting in the moving of 
the hearings to Gardner Auditorium. Senate President 
and Senator Kevin Harrington, chairman of the Donahue 
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Massachusetts Education Commission; led the support 
citing the great increase in unsuccessful applicants for 
fall;1964 admission to the University. The University's 
dean of admissions, William Tunis, underscored this problem 
by pointing out that even highly qualified students from 
"prestige" high schools in Greater Boston such as Newton, 
Lexington and Brookline had been turned away in large 
numbers. Less than half of the applicants from the elite 
Boston Latin School had made it. 
Also appearing for the University were President 
Lederle and University trustee Hugh Thompson who was also 
New England Director of the A.F.L.-C.I.0. Thompson 
attributed the dramatic increase in applications to an 
economic squeeze on the middle and lower income families. 
President Lederle stated that the new campus could be 
opened by September of 1965 for 1,000 freshman and would 
require from $750,000 to $1,000,000 for its first year of 
operation. 
Among sites mentioned for the new campus were the 
tract of land adjacent to the Blue Hills area of Milton, 
which had been mentioned earlier by Senator Donahue, and 
an abandoned army hospital facility in the suburb of 
Waltham. 
Reaction was mixed from representatives of the 
Commonwealth's other colleges. Education Commissioner Owen 
Kiernan, representing the State Board of Education as well 
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as the State College Board of Trustees, spoke in favor of 
the bill. Kermit Morrissey, Brandeis Dean of Students and 
Chairman of the State Regional Community College Board, 
also expressed support for the bill. However, nine of the 
ten state college presidents voiced opposition. The one 
exception was President Daniel O'Leary of Lowell State 
College who spoke in favor of the bill. O'Leary, it will be 
recalled, had earlier provided Senator Donahue with 
assistance in drafting the original proposal for the new 
campus. When asked about the reasons for this support by 
O'Leary, Senator Donahue attributed it to the fact that 
O'Leary was originally from Boston and thus fully 
understood the critical need in the Boston area. 
State College Director, John Gillespie criticised 
the bill as "woefully inadequate, hastily conceived, and 
providing unplanned duplication". * He argued that the 
state colleges could provide space at half the cost and 
that a majority of the Boston area students, rejected for 
admission to Amherst, obviously wanted to live away from 
home and would not apply to a commuter institution. 
President Looney of Boston State College, suggested that 
the most economical way to solve the applicant growth 
problem was to expand the state colleges until they 
eventually became state universities. President Harold 
Case of Boston University called the bill premature and 
suggested that it be considered on the basis of "hard 
logic and un-feeling fact, not emotion and 
40. 
sentimentalism". He cited 
92% of the 9,000 freshman appl 
recent year had eventually gai 
accredited colleges. 41 * 
a study which showed 
icants rejected by BU 
ned admission at other 
that 
in a 
Case's suggestion that the local private institutions 
could provide solutions to the growth in college applicants 
had a parallel in the Chicago experience five years 
earlier. Rosen states that. 
As late as March,1959 the president of Loyola 
University had written to the mayor and President 
Henry opposing a city campus,especially a 
central-area campus, favoring instead a state 
scholarship program for the private schools. 42. 
The Massachusetts League of Women Voters voiced 
strong support for the bill at the hearing. Those speaking 
against the the bill also included Frank J. Zeo, Executive 
Director of the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers 
Associations. Zeo stated that while the associations 
recognized that there might be a need for such an 
institution, their current position of opposition was 
based upon the following points, 
Massachusetts has suffered from the lack of 
perspective in its planning for public and private 
higher education. Historically our public system has 
developed into its present form largely through an 
irrational system of political preferment...To bring 
sense out of this chaos, an Advisory Board of Higher 
Education Policy was created in 1961 to study, 
recommend, and mediate between institutional 
interests. But now, on a crash basis, a Boston 
extension is proposed without reference to this Board 
and a quick political decision is being sought 
directly from the Legislature...We assume that 
matters fall well within the objectives of the 
these 
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Massachusetts Education Study, and that the 
recommendations of this body should be known 
before the University launches a branch operation... 
It seems obvious that to provide the Boston resident 
with an educational opportunity equivalent to that on 
the Amherst campus does not necessitate establishment 
of a University branch in Boston....In other words, 
the private commuting college in Boston may be the 
economic and educational equivalent of the 
low-tuition university at Amherst. Available to the 
Boston resident at even lower cost are the local 
state colleges and the work-study programs of at 
least one local private university... Considering the 
years of study and planning that go into the plant, 
program and staffing of new university campuses in 
such states as California, it seems to us that the 
new Boston campus is being launched with absurd 
speed and casualness—a sort of blind launching, 
with hardly sixteen months from the first public 
proposal to opening day and perhaps half that to the 
receipt of the first applications. Perhaps plans and 
cost projections do exist. If so, where are they? 43. 
In his presentation at the hearing President Looney 
voiced the opinion of the majority of the state college 
presidents, 
The University of Massachusetts in the Boston area 
■will compete not only with Boston State College, but 
also with the state colleges at Framingham, 
Bridgewater, Salem, and even Worcester. Money spent 
on these colleges to give them just a few more 
buildings and educational equipment will enable them 
to do in the Boston area what the University wishes 
to do...They can do equally well on an undergraduate 
level anything that the University of Massachusetts 
can do. To expand them to meet our educational 
crisis is the most practical and economical procedure. 
It can be done at less cost to the Commonwealth... . 
Another proposal is to do here what has been done in 
New York State. Organize the state colleges as a 
second state university independent of the University 
at Amherst. Each state college campus will be ^ a campus 
of this new university and will have opportunity to 
develop at its own rate —some rapidly, some. more 
slowly—all finally into the status of a university 
campus. These state colleges can thus easily 
the needs for more opportunity in publ^g_supported 
higher education in the Commonwealth. 
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Looking back during an interview a decade later. 
President Lederle described the day of the hearing as an 
experience which was "reaily out of this world", 
To begin with, there was a whole series of state 
college presidents who got up and opposed it. And, I 
don't want to say this with too much derogation, but 
I can t help saying it because I had been with these 
people for a long time and I've never said it 
publicly. Pam asked me,'Are those really college 
presidents?' Harold Case, the then-president of 
Boston University, got up to speak, and he was just 
cut to pieces. He was arguing that there was no need 
for the University of Massachusetts, that Boston 
University could do all that was necessary, etc. Well, 
the members of the committee had been properly 
provided with backstopping questions on this one and 
they proceded to ask what was the Massachusetts 
student enrollment of Boston University five years 
ago and what was it now. etc. this showed it had 
dropped down below 50%....1 really felt sorry for 
Harold Case... People were running in and out all day. 
But, basically the legislators, obviously, were on 
our side, and they were cutting up the opposition. 
They listened with respect to what I had to say, and 
I'm always proud of the fact that we had the kind of 
rapport with the legislature at that time which led 
to this bill going through in about a month. 45. 
Shortly after the end of the hearing the joint 
committee filed a favorable report. 
Debate on the New Campus by the Willis-Harrinqton 
Commission 
Two years before the proposal for the new Boston 
campus the state legislature had established a special 
commisison to study education in Massachusetts through 
enactment of Chapter 108 of the Resolves of 1962. The 
Commission consisted of three members of the State Senate, 
seven members of the House of Representatives, and eleven 
persons to be appointed by the Governor of whom two were to 
be elementary school teachers or administrators, two with 
similar experience at the high school level, and two 
college faculty or administrators. They were specifically 
charged with, 
...making an investigation and study of the laws of 
the Commonwealth pertaining to education, of the 
educational institutions of the Commonwealth and 
their organization, of the various school systems 
therein, and of the educational laws, programs, and 
school systems of other states with a view to 
elevating educational standards in the Commonwealth, 
reorganizing the scope of the various educational 
boards and administrators of the Commonwealth, 
revising and modernizing the organizational and 
financial structure of the schools and school 
systems, extending the facilities, curricula and 
educational goals of the schools and colleges of 
the Commonwealth, and providing increased financial 
aid for education. Such commission shall consider 
the entire educational system from primary grades 
through college. 46. 
On May 24,1964, the Boston Globe reported that at a 
meeting of this special "Willis-Harrington" Education 
Commission two prominent members had entered into a sharp 
debate over the merits of the proposed Boston campus. 
Strong opposition was expressed by Northeastern 
University's president, Asa Knowles. Knowles stated that a 
branch of the University of Massachusetts which was within 
commuting distance of Boston, with its low tuition of only 
$200 per year, would be likely to draw off students from 
the area's private institutions and end up being a 
greater expense to the state's taxpayers than if the state 
paid to send the same students to private colleges, 
rebuttal the Commission's chairman, Senator Kevin 
In 
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Harrington, stated that, 
... it would be less of a burden to both taxpayers 
and parents to put the new campus outside of the 
expensive real estate and traffic clogged area of 
downtown Boston. 48. 
Harrington expressed the belief that there should be 
no further expansion of higher education institutions, 
public or private, in Boston proper since this would be 
very costly and would remove even more land from the 
city's tax roles. In reporting on this debate between 
Knowles and Harrington, the Globe observed that, 
A new trend in legislative leadership thinking is 
to put a second University of Massachusetts out 
somewhere near the junction of Rte. 128 and the 
Massachusetts Turnpike where commuters could come 
easily from downtown Boston and from south, north 
and west of Boston...The spector of 5,000 or more 
University of Massachusetts students arriving in 
downtown Boston by automobile in the already 
nightmarish morning rush hour will provoke a lot 
of thinking about this idea of a west-of- Boston 
suburban university, beginning in rented 
quarters. 49. 
Media Reaction in the Western Part of Massachusetts 
Concern was expressed by the media in the Pioneer 
Valley area surrounding Amherst at the prospect of the 
creation of a new potential rival in Boston. An editorial 
in the Greenfield recorder Gazette suggested that Franklin 
County legislators should- oppose the new branch for the 
reasons put forth by the Massachusetts Federation of 
Taxpayers and because it would be the likely cause of the 
withholding of needed resources from the Amherst campus and 
the watering down of its programs. The editorial concluded 
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by stating, 
If this plan was the recommendation of qualified 
study groups it would be authoritative and deserving 
of respect. But it appears to be a political sop to 
legislators from the metropolitan region. 
Massachusetts cannot afford to make college education 
a political plum. 50. 
An editorial released by Television Station WWLP, 
Channel 22, in Springfield,Massachusetts suggested that the 
proposal for a Boston campus was being rushed through the 
legislature for political reasons during an election year 
and proposed that Massachusetts higher education adopt the 
trimester system as the answer to meeting increases in 
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enrollment. 
Final Debate and Passage of the Bill 
As debate neared an end the University Trustees, who 
had been largely silent until now, decided to take a public 
stand. In a letter to members of the legislature on June 3, 
Trustee Chairman Frank Boyden re-emphasized the fact that 
the University had been forced to turn down nearly two 
thousand qualified applicants from the Boston area and 
rebutted those who were stating that the problem needed 
further study by making a personal recollection that, as 
far back as 1941, a report to the General Court had 
pointed out the need for the Commonwealth to start 
planning for expanded educational facilities to serve 
the Boston area. 52. 
By the time the bill reached final debate in the 
Senate, Kevin Harrington had departed from his previous 
position of support and begun to argue that the measure 
should not be given further consideration until after his 
commission filed its report later in the year. Senate 
President Donahue continued in strong support of 
establishing the new campus and charged through the media 
that there was an "undercurrent" of persons out to kill the 
bill led by officials at Boston State College and some of 
Boston's private institutions. Harrington led support for 
an amendment requiring that the campus be situated in a 
suburban location arguing that the branch should not be 
established in the City of Boston since the city could not 
afford another tax exempt institution. Donahue replied that 
he had been told by an aide to Mayor Collins that the mayor 
53. 
had no objections to the new campus being in Boston. 
An unsuccessful amendment was offered during final 
debate in the House which would have sent the measure to 
the Willis/Harrington Commission for further study. 
Another would have placed the branch under the 
administrative control of Boston State College rather than 
the University of Massachusetts and a third would have 
eliminated Boston State College and merged it with the 
university. Although Robert Quinn, the majority whip from 
the Dorchester section of Boston, led the support for the 
bill during the debate in the House, support was far from 
unanimous among the Boston delegation. James Kelly from 
the Boston neighborhood of Jamaica Plain, and a member of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, charged that the 
proposal, "wasn’t given any deliberation and must have been 
drafted on a restaurant table somewhere." He stated that 
the Ways and Means Committee had reported unfavorably on 
the bill because its members felt that final action should 
await the final report of the Willis-Harrignton Commission 
due out later in the year. 
The general membership ignored this advice and ru'shed 
to take action. On June 15 the bill passed the House by a 
majority voice vote and the Senate by a roll call vote of 
33-62. An initial appropriation of $200,000 in start up 
funds was passed along with this bill. 
On June 18 Governor Peabody signed the bill creating 
the University of Massachusets - Boston. In a press release 
Lederle stated that the campus would be opened by 
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September,1965 with an initial enrollment of 1,000. 
Reflections on the Debate by Two Key University Leaders 
Looking back on the 1964 campaign for a Boston campus 
from the perspective of 1970, Leo Redfern emphasised that 
the sudden support of Senate President Donahue for a Boston 
campus caught many people by surprise and was one of the 
reasons for strong opposition from some of the private 
institutions, 
I think their (the private institutions) concern 
with a public university in Boston would have been 
much less if it had been a case of the change of 
Boston State College into a university, or something 
of this order. But to have UMass, which had now 
proven beyond doubt it could build a quality, rapidly 
expanding kind of operation in Amherst, build a 
Boston branch, gave them some cause for real concern, 
I think. Somehow we failed to effectively communicate 
to them the kind of viable relationship we sort of 
believed could exist, with the development of a 
Boston campus and the continued existence of the 
private institutions. 
In discussing the effort to convince other key groups 
and the Legislature to support the campus Redfern stated, 
I think that the struggle for the Boston campus was 
as much trying to convince alumni and some Trustees 
and others that it could develop without real injury 
to Amherst than convincing anybody it was needed of 
and by its own intrinsic merit. Everyone seemed to 
agree on the need; the difference came on how to do 
it. What it did, of course, was to throw a great many 
of the largest delegations, such as the Boston area 
delegation, in the legislature behind it, with the 
only exceptions being those who felt a parental pride 
in a particular public institution, like Boston 
State, which resisted, as did Salem State. Senator 
Harrington, the self-proclaimed father of education 
in the legislature, of course went off the ranch 
again on this one, as he did on many when the 
interest of public higher education happened to.not 
particularly promote Salem State College at a given 
moment...." 55. 
In an 
Crowley, an 
impetus for 
legislative 
interview ten years later, Trustee Dennis 
influential Boston attorney, recalled that 
the Boston campus seemed to have come from 
leadership, not the Trustees, 
the 
the 
"Isn't it strange that, as we talk here today and as 
j try to recall the various reactions of people to 
the creation of UMass/Boston, that I believe our 
Board as a board did not operate to try to create 
such a thing as the branch in Boston? I have the 
feelinq that it was legislatively-inspired and that 
we can't give much of the credit to either the Board 
or the administration." 56. 
CHAPTER V. 
THE FORMATION 
FOR THE 
OF A MISSION STATEMENT 
NEW URBAN CAMPUS 
———— ^New Departures and Nev Concepts Committee 
In late August of 1964 the Hampshire Gazette quoted 
the University s Dean of Administration, Leo Redfern as 
saying that the new campus would be only a supplemental 
operation to the Amherst Campus although in years to come 
it might develop programs specifically tailored to the 
Boston urban environment. 1 * In a 1970 interview Redfern 
stated, 
I was personally of the belief that my approach 
would be to involve the Amherst faculty in a close 
relationship to bind the two faculties into a 
close-knit family approach; but John Lederle on the 
basis of certain Michigan experiences as well 
as observations of other similar kinds of coordinated 
systems in the country was very certain that the best 
approach would be that of maximum autonomy within the 
University system and utilizing the Amherst campus 
only in supportive kinds of roles which the young 
institution in Boston could not very well provide for 
itself during an interim stage of development... So 
this was the basic kind of policy which evolved in 
respect to the Boston campus. I think this found 
a warm reception among some members of the 
Trustees, and because the President endorsed this 
approach, the entire Board concurred with it. 2. 
The academic leaders who were charged with the task of 
building this new institution from the ground up had much 
broader notions than Redfern of what it was that they were 
about to undertake. To them the new institution was an 
unusual opportunity to develop a totally new university 
specifically designed to serve the peculiar needs of an 
urban area and its people. It would be a model for other 
urban universities which might be created in the years to 
come. Reisman and Jencks provide a contemporary description 
of this group of University of Massachusetts faculty and the 
environment in which they were about to attempt to build the 
new campus, 
Many in the faculty at the University who have come 
in since the Second World War feel themselves 
missionaries for the cause of public education in the 
state, and, despite frustrations, remain in the hope 
that better things will come. The most visible 
frustration is the hostility of many in the 
legislature to scholars and intellectuals, and more 
specifically to public education. Not only does 
Massachusetts make higher education accessible to a 
tiny minority but also it insists on treating 
educators like middle-echelon civil servants and on 
running the University as if it were a prison or 
department of public works (not that these departments 
should be run that way either!), accountable for every 
action and penny....Yet despite such problems there is 
complete academic freedom... 3. 
Their concept of what a new urban public university 
for Boston might be was close to the decription of the ideal 
of an "urban-grant university" described by Clark Kerr in 
1968, 
Ours is a meritocracy--a society based on merit 
rather than on inherited status or economic class or 
political ideology. In such a society the university 
must assume the prime responsibility for finding and 
training the talented individuals...Now, for the 
continued well-being of our society, the university 
must intensify and broaden the initial search for 
talent, especially among the presently untapped source 
of the inner city and the minorities. The urban-grant 
university can locate in the inner city, at once 
removing the barrier of geographic distance and 
helping to bring about a familiarity with its 
existence, its purposes and its activities. It might 
be able to use a run-down area already slated for 
urban renewal. It might locate adjacent to or in air 
space over a central rapid transit station, to enhance 
its accessibility to a larger city area. Whatever its 
precise location, careful planning and design can 
greatly add to the sense of accessibility and 
community-oriented concern. 4. 
A discusion of the new campus took place at a meeting 
of the University's academic deans and provost in mid-August 
of 1968. Excerpts from the minutes reflect expectations of a 
totally new departure which would ultimately result in a 
truely great public university for Boston. 
The provost next presented a series of tentative 
ideas for the University of Massachusetts/Boston for 
the purpose of discussion. Our ultimate plan"is to 
create a great urban university, something like New 
York University, the University of London, or the 
University of California at Los Angeles. It will be 
of the highest guality in every aspect...This will be 
a commuter institution, initially with no frills, 
dormitories, fraternities, sororities or 
intercollegiate athletics...The important point is 
that this is a new institution and hence presents a 
rare opportunity for innovations and bold 
experimentation in curriculum, course content and 
methods...Special attention must be given at Boston to 
faculty-student contacts to avoid the subway concept 
with briefcase professors. We must develop special 
mechanisms and devices to bring students and faculty 
together to increase contacts. 5. 
In September President Lederle appointed an 
additional subcommittee of the task force charged with 
planning for the new Boston campus to be known as the "New 
Concepts and New Departures Committee" for the further 
planning of the new Boston Campus. It consisted of a chair, 
Leo Redfern, the director of the Office of Institutional 
Studies, and ten members of the Amherst faculty representing 
the disciplines of English, History (two members). Physics, 
Education, Forestry, Engineering, Home Economics, Sociology, 
and Physical Education. Among the faculty was Paul Gagnon, 
who would later become the first Academic Dean of the new 
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Boston campus. The committee was charged by Lederle with, 
...the responsibility of proposing, evaluating, and 
recommending new and imaginative ideas that may be 
considered in the development of the Boston campus. 
The scope of its charge should be broadly interpreted 
to encompass philosophy, principles and practices 
that may provide new dimensions to public higher 
education, particularly in an urban-oriented 
institution. 6. 
At the first meeting of the Committee on New Concepts 
and New Departures it was decided that, "since the Boston 
operation would be a fresh experience without traditions, 
past history, or procedural guidelines, no relevant idea 
would be passed over and all suggestions would be given 
careful deliberation." 7. Any member could prepare a 
position paper which would be debated, voted on, and then 
sent to the appropriate University officials and other 
planning committees for the new campus. Any member could 
include a dissenting minority report. The committee met 
bi-monthly at the faculty club at Amherst and during its 
first several meetings dealt with the role of faculty, a 
variety of curriculum issues, and the possible development 
of a center for urban studies and urban affairs. The 
commi ittee called in as consultants David Boroff of New York 
University, Champion Ward of the Ford Foundation, and 
Chancellor Lorentz Adolfson of the University Center System 
University of Wisconsin. 
By the spring of 1965 the committee had prepared a 
formal Statement of Purpose for the new campus. This was 
formally presented to President Lederle on July 21,1965. 
78 
Much of it reflects input from the consultants and makes 
reference to Boroff's recent book, Campus U.S.A., and the 
book, The American College, edited by Nevitt Sanford. The 
Statement of Purpose put forward major goals for the new 
campus which reflect the thinking of most of the founding 
faculty and academic administrators. These concepts would 
guide them in the early years of campus development and 
shape their thinking on a permanent site location. A rather 
thorough examination of these guiding principles is helpful 
because they indicate so well why this group was at a later 
point so strong in their insistence on an urban core 
location for the new campus. 
The new university must adhere to traditional academic 
standards, 
The first aim of the University of Massachusets at 
Boston must be to build a university in the ancient 
tradition of Western civilization, to gather an 
academy of scholars devoted to intellectual freedom 
and integrity, to preserving and extending knowledge 
and wisdom while teaching both as well as they can. 8. 
The new university must realize that most of its 
students would be economically deprived and thus poorly 
prepared for college level work. 
A public university must offer education to students 
who cannot for economic or social reasons ordinarily 
go beyond high school. This is a special burden. A 
public university hoping to graduate people able to 
compete in work and thought with the graduates of 
private universities must be more effective than the 
latter. Its freshmen so often arrive with indifferent 
home preparation, with inferior prior schooling, and 
with rather lowly visions of themselves and their 
destinies. They reguire of us not less but more 
concentration on the art of teaching, and a faculty, 
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a curriculum, and a working intellectual atmosphere at 
least equal to those of the best private colleges. 
Unless a public university offers these, it will 
perpetuate a class system of education according to 
income and social advantage. 9. 
The new university must make a special effort to reach 
minorities and the underprivileged. 
Now we must seek out, and support, those young people 
whose race, or recent immigration, or depressed 
economic status, denies them higher education and even 
the expectation of it. 10. 
The new university should become involved in a 
partnership with the local urban public school systems. 
The academician must know what is going on in the 
lower schools and what his teacher colleague faces. 
Only then can they help each other to educate new 
teachers, to develop curricula and to set standards 
from first grade to graduate school. Nowhere is this 
more urgent than in the urban schools, whose problems 
and opportunities are enormous. 11. 
The new university will have unique problem solving 
abilities and so must become involved with and lead in the 
struggle to overcome all of the many problems of urban 
society. 
No cluster of problems is so critical to our future 
as a civilization than those of the city. Only by 
plunging into the heart of mass technological, urban 
society can the university hope to prepare its 
students and faculty for the future, and to take a 
role in shaping that future. As urban problems mount, 
many of the city's most able people flee to the 
suburbs, leaving the oppressed, the weary, the 
overburdened to struggle along. The urban university 
must stand with the city, must serve and lead where 
the battle is. This is what the University of 
Massachusetts must do, wherever its campus is 
ultimately built. 12. 
The faculty and students of the new university must 
be immersed in the urban environment. 
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Both faculty and students must know the city as well 
as it can be known. Our program of urban studies ought 
not to be a sideshow, but a central and constant 
concern of the entire faculty and curriculum. The 
historian, the biologist, and the artist have as much 
to learn and to give as the economist, the 
sociologist, the psychologist or the political 
scientist...The public, urban university has the duty 
to transform and apply the great idea of agricultural 
extension and research to urban problems....Who among 
us will have nothing to do about poverty, crime, 
apathy, ignorance, ugliness and decay? About human 
degredation, humiliation and isolation? This is the 
hard, demanding side of the University of 
Massachusetts at Boston... Truth, beauty, joy and man's 
capacity for grace under pressure will survive in 
urban society, or they will not survive at all. 13. 
This statement of purpose reflects the increased 
concern of the mid-1960's with urban problems. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger Jr. expressed the same sentiments, typical of 
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, within an address 
delieverd at the installation of Boston Campus Chancellor 
John Ryan in December,1966, 
As more and more Americans live in cities, the city 
will increasingly become the battleground where the 
great issues of American society will be fought and 
resolved.... The urban university promises to be a 
central agency in the national response to the urban 
challenge. The battle to rationalize and humanize our 
cities has only begun. It is a battle between our 
accumulated national sloth and fatalism, on the one 
hand, and' our awakened national mind and purpose on 
the other. And it is more than a battle for the 
future of the American city: it is a.battle for the 
possibility of civilized life in an industrial 
society. 14. 
The statement of purpose also reflects the writings 
of David Boroff, one of the consultants employed by the 
committee. Boroff closed his book, Campus U-S_.A^, with the 
same call for universities to lead the way in a new 
renaissance of the American character. 
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Higher education is a creature of our society, but it 
cannot escape its obligation to transcend it. We live 
in a dangerously easeful time. There is a lack of 
roughage in our national diet. Should not our colleges 
and universities provide a countervailing tendency to 
the fat, sleek materialism of American life? Shouldn't 
they provide something hard and lean and spiritually 
purposeful? The press of students at our college gates 
may give us just the opportunity we need. In the past 
our fear of the idea of the superior few pushed us 
into shoddiness and hypocrisy. We are now in position 
to try the leap for excellence. 15. 
Another book cited in the committee's records is the 
anthology, The American College, edited by Nevitt Sanford. 
In one of the essays within this book Frank Pinner discusses 
"The Crisis of the State Universities: Analysis and 
Remedies" and ends with the same sort of militant spirit 
towards society and its problems, 
Let us close our gates. For the academic community 
needs to be protected from the dictates of the 
multitude. Let us first of all be masters within our 
walls. Only then can we shift from a posture of 
defense to one of offense, which is our proper 
posture. For our misson is, after all, to see that the 
best of human achievements in the realm of truth and 
beauty come to conguer the world: not only to dominate 
the lives of our students inside our walls but 
ultimately those of the multitude outside as well. 16. 
The formal statement of purpose did not directly 
address the question of campus site location other than to 
state that the new campus must make a major commitment to 
the city regardless of its ultimate location. The committee 
had, however, been discussing this question at some length 
for several months. An indication of their thinking can be 
found in a lengthy position paper submitted to the committee 
1964 entitled, "Why Build UM/B by Paul Gagnon in November, 
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In The Middle of Downtown Boston?". Gagnon argued this 
position by stating, 
Because UM/B can come quickly to maturity, excellence 
and a sense of its own high adventure only insofar as 
it is plunged into the life of a great and reviving 
city. It can do more for Boston and her people if it 
rises in their midst, and—even more obviously--Boston 
can do much,much more for the University. 17. 
Gagnon proposed that the question of site selection. 
as well as other key planning issues, be approached from a 
very broad, very long term perspective with full awareness 
by 
of 
that the university's decisions in 1964 would be critically 
examined and judged by the many ages to come, 
Why not act as though we cared what men would think 
eight centuries from now, as they read: 'The 
University of Massachusetts at Boston was founded 
after the great pre-atomic wars, in the mid-1960's, 
a tough band of men with great hopes for a new kind 
university and what it could do for human life in the 
middle of the mass technological, urban growth that 
was then churning up American society. Boston at that 
time was experiencing its great revival...'As we build 
must we let our work be determined by allegedly 
practical considerations without first examining them 
to see if they are in fact practical in any but 
temporary ways? Without balancing the costs of 
ignoring them against the greater good? Must we, for 
example, let the site and style of a university be 
determined by slide-rule calculations of temporary 
transportation problems, of temporary population 
distribution, even of present financial and tax 
difficulties? Or can we build according to a vision 
of what Boston and its public university can do for 
each other in the decades and centuries to come? 18. 
Gagnon offered a variety of reasons why a downtown 
site would be essential for the new campus and beneficial to 
the City of Boston. It would be much easier to develop 
cooperative programs with the many existing private colleges 
and universities in the area and travel back and forth to 
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them on the subway network in Boston and 
faculty would feel keenly and respond to 
building something new under the eyes of 
academic and research center in America, 
the city as their classroom and, 
Cambridge. The UMB 
the "challenge of 
the greatest 
" Students could use 
...need only cross the street to see theater, 
architecture, ballet, sculpture, music, painting, 
Journalism, politics, publishing, trade and industry, 
law .. medicine, science and engineering at work in 
their natural, professional settings, not 'on tour' or 
in slide lectures. With all the best intent, the 'trip 
into town' is simply not made very often by students 
or faculty members on a self-contained suburban 
campus. 
The faculty, argued Gagnon, would be provided with, 
...a closer look at the settings in which their 
students live, and at the world they will work in 
after graduation, so that, in David Riesman's words, 
they will not be "donnish professors who cannot 
communicate with students who are not going to be like 
them. 19. 
During 
David Riesman 
of Social Rel 
Moynihan, lat 
York, was act 
the formative years of the new Boston campus, 
was a member of the faculty in the Department 
ations at Harvard University and Daniel Patrick 
er United States Senator from the State of New 
ive at Harvard in the Joint Center For Urban 
Studies. On occasion both acted as mentors to the academic 
dean of the UMass.-Boston campus offering advice, 
encouragement and suggestions on various matters. In the 
section guoted above Gagnon was making reference to an essay 
by Riesman and Christopher Jencks entitled "The Viability of 
the American College" which was included within Sanford's 
anthology. The American College. Much of Gagnon's position 
paper reflects this book in a gene 
quotes. Gagnon borrowed heavily fr 
against the supposed opportunity f 
ral way or borrows direct 
om this work in arguing 
or maturation and 
development of independence provided by residential colleges 
in non-urban settings and the proliferation of non-academic 
student activities. Gagnon stated, 
Universities have themselves proliferated their 
directors of student activities, their deans and 
sub—deans of student life, their counsellors and 
organizers of fun and games. They have sponsored, 
subsidized and exalted a cult of extra-curricular 
activity of 'dreadful sameness from coast to coast' 
which betrays students, especially those from 
non-college families, into supposing that the 
university looks upon these things as indispensable 
to the intelligent life.A rural or suburban 
university is bound to seek its identity in this way. 
The pressures to reproduce everything that State U. 
has, from fraternities to 'weeks' and queens and 
carnivals, from varsity athletics to Student Union 
bowling leagues is overwhelming. 20. 
Gagnon cited a 1964 survey by ETS which found that 
51% of entering freshmen in 1964 indicated that social life, 
extracurricular activities and athletics was their major 
interest in college. He suggeted that, 
A state university, paid for by the citizens, could 
best begin by encouraging that 51% to go elsewhere, 
but only in a downtown institution, explicitly 
concentrated on academic and professional aims could 
this plausibly be done. 21. 
Here Gagnon seems to have been drawing on his own 
experience and that of his coleagues at the Amherst campus 
and also by the words of Riesman and Jencks concerning the 
University of Massachusetts in their essay on the viability 
of the American college. 
For many years, the University has been known in 
some circles as a party school, whose fraternities 
were reputed among the hardest drinking in New 
England. 22. 
The reference to a "dreadful sameness" originated in 
Boroff's, Campus U.S.A. In this book, Boroff stated, 
Under the influence of a distorted progressivism 
colleges have pushed into areas in which they don't 
belong. The brash imperialism of personnel services 
and student activities strives to dominate the 
students' private and social life. In contrast with 
today's organized fun, there was something innocent 
about the horseplay of the twenties. At least the 
hell-raisers were autonomous. Their infantilism 
wasn't sponsored by the administration, which these 
days lays down the ground rules and acts as the umpire 
for the nursery games. There is a dreadful sameness 
about campus activities from coast to coast, for the 
personnel technicians are quick to import wholesome 
nonsense from other campuses. 23. 
According to Gagnon, Boston had no existing public 
university and it needed one. An urban campus could work 
more closely with the Boston Public School System and help 
it to revive "a glorious past". The university would be in 
a better position to, "scout the entire Boston school system 
for promising students from underprivileged races, 
nationalities and economic classes", and then encourage and 
guide them along the way towards college with special 
programs. The university would be in a better position to 
engage in urban neighborhood projects similar to Hull House 
in Chicago and to develop cooperative efforts with the 
city's museums, parks, libraries, social services, 
educational radio and television, and offices of city and 
state government. The campus could more easily develop 
institutes related to various unique aspects of the city 
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such as port development, public transportation and 
labor-management relations. An urban setting would provide 
the best location for evening extension programs and could 
add a new dimension to the city's cultural life in the 
evenings by providing its own lecture, concert, drama and 
art programs in the heart of the city. The campus would 
bring added patronage to downtown business establishments 
and might enhance real estate values. Gagnon suggested that 
the university not pretend that this added business would 
make up for the loss of taxable property to the city, 
Especially if we draw to UM/B the kind of students we 
should draw, many downright poor, who will bring their 
lunches in brown paper bags, drink from public 
fountains, read the library's magazines and 
newspapers, buy their books third or fourth hand...24. 
He suggested minimizing this negative impact on the 
tax base through the indefinite use of rented taxable 
property in the heart of Boston, by the use of high rise 
buildings on minimum sized lots whenever it became necessary 
to build rather than rent, and by eliminating consideration 
of "playing fields, gymnasia, swimming pools, student 
unions, R.O.T.C. drill halls, dormitories, fraternities, 
sororities and the whole cluster of extras that are thought 
to be necessary to higher education in this country." The 
tax expense saved by the state in cutting out these extras, 
suggested Gagnon, ". . .might well be turned into a formula of 
payments to the City of Boston in lieu of taxes". Gagnon 
took a strong stand against the creation of the typical 
"student activities" found in most colleges, 
A university in a city of Boston's richness needs no 
artificial diversions. Life and art and talk are all 
around to be seized....A campus school (in the 
suburbs) would feel itself deprived if not allowed to 
copy all others. A downtown university could more 
easily dare to be different, to seek excellence 
through concentrating its energies on the academic 
task alone. 25. 
A Warning Against Planning in Isolation from the Community 
In a speech delivered during the installation of 
Chancellor Ryan, Daniel Patrick Moynihan identified an 
apparent dichotomy between public planners who were deeply 
involved with what they identified as a "Crisis in the 
Cities" and the perceptions of the general public. 
While an articulate, vocal and visible group of 
persons in the country is very conscious of the 
'Crisis in the Cities' and has raised this issue and 
given it its term, crisis, it is also fairly clear 
that the great majority of the American people think 
nothing of the sort. If they think about the subject 
at all, they think about it in quite different terms 
than the so called, 'Crisis in the Cities.'...The 
foundations of disbelief are varied but convergent. 
The principle one is that for a solid quarter century 
the great mass of Americans has experienced a steadily 
rising level of living, in a measure without parallel 
in history. This rising level of well-being has been 
accompanied by, and in large measure has consisted of, 
improvements in housing, transportation, education, 
health, recreation and other 'urban' amenities which 
are now said to be in a state of crisis, but which 
most persons know to be in a vastly better condition 
now than in-times past. 26. 
Moynihan also warned about the danger of university 
planners walling themselves off from the larger community 
they were supposedly serving, 
The usual whispered argument, of course, is that to 
be candid about public policies that don't produce 
much progress is to give a weapon to the enemies of 
progress. This is an unworthy argument; there are 
never grounds for concealing truth about public 
matters. When we in universities, now so deeply 
involved in the problems of cities, adopt this 
attitude that we can, or must, disregard facts 
without reasoned self-criticism, we are building up in 
this nation a level of disbelief about our competence 
and our sincerity and the genuine possibility of 
sustained social change which may lead us to a greater 
crisis than anything we now have; and in the cities it 
will become, in effect, a certain crisis of intellect, 
a certain crisis of confidence across American social 
and intellectual lines which has not until now existed 
but which has always been there as a potential source 
of discord and deep concern. 27. 
By this point in late 1966, Moynihan's warning against 
planners isolating themselves from their community could 
quite appropriately be applied to the specific instance of 
the initial planning and site selection processes for the 
Boston campus. His warning stands in stark contrast to the 
rhetoric of the other papers delivered at Chancellor Ryan's 
installation and to that of the campus leadership. A state 
which had long been skeptical about the need for extensive 
state supported programs of public higher education had 
rather suddenly, in response to an enrollment crisis, 
authorised the creation of an extension or annex to its 
state university programs to better serve young people in 
the Boston metropolitan area. Nothing in the enabling 
legislation, or in the rhetoric of the legislative or 
University leadership who created and guided this 
legislation through to enactment, speaks to an "urban 
crisis" or of the need for the university to specifically 
address the many faceted needs of the inner city. The 
legislation and rhetoric speak instead merely of the need 
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to essentially duplicate the educational programs of the 
Amherst campus somewhere in the Boston area as quickly as 
possible so that more students could be accommodated. 
Thus, there was a considerable difference between the 
perceptions of the two groups who would be responsible for 
creating the new campus. The members of the Committee on New 
Concepts and New Departures, some of whom would' form the 
initial leadership group for the new campus, assumed that 
the Boston campus should be designed primarily to meet the 
unique demands of the "urban crisis" and to be a bold new 
experimental institution fully integrated into the life and 
environment of the inner city. Legislative leaders and many 
of the local community officials within the metropolitan 
Boston area assumed that the university would now move 
quickly to create within the inner suburb of Boston a second 
campus which would essentially duplicate programs at Amherst 
to serve the "overflow" in enrollment demand coming from the 
heavily populated eastern portions of Massachusetts. This 
difference in perceptions set the stage for the conflicts, 
frustrations, and long delays which developed during the 
site selection process. This problem was seriously 
compounded by the fact that very little analyisis regarding 
actual possible site locations and of public preferences for 
a site location had taken place prior to the adoption of the 
enabling legislation. 
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While Gagnon was drafting his eloquent case for an urban 
university located in downtown Boston, Dean Tunis, Dean of 
Admissions and Records for the University met with the Task 
Force to report on the results of his initial visits with high 
school teachers, students and guidance personnel in the greater 
Boston area cities and towns. Dean Tunis reported that. 
Those communities of high economic level have less 
interest in the Boston operation than cities and 
towns with less economic advantages and lower average 
family income... where interest in the UMass-Boston 
exists it is strongly, even preponderantly, in favor 
of a suburban campus type of institution rather than 
a centrally located urban, high rise, type of 
institution. 28. 
Initial Admissions Policies and Process 
In September of 1965 classes began in temporary rented 
buildings in the Park Square section of downtown Boston. 
University records indicate that during Academic Year 
1964/65 the University decided to admit 3,300 freshman 
students at the Amherst campus and 1,000 freshman at the 
Boston Campus for the fall semester of 1965. In this initial 
year the admissions process for both Amherst and Boston was 
directed and controlled by Dr. William Tunis, Dean of 
Admissions at the Amherst Campus. The Boston campus 
admisions office did not achive complete autonomy from 
Amherst until 1971. During the start up academic year, 
AY 1964/65, Dr. Tunis' staff made a special effort to visit 
311 of the Boston suburban high schools to acquaint them 
with the new U.Mass. option which, would be available closer 
to home in the coming September. A special effort was mace 
to redirect qualified applicants from the Boston area who 
were unsuccessful in gaining acceptance to the limited 
number of spaces at the Amherst Campus back to the new 
Boston Campus. Approximately 500 Boston area students who 
had been denied admission at Amherst, because of lack of 
space not because of academic deficiencies, were contacted 
and offered acceptance at the Boston campus for the fall 
semester of 1965. Approximately 300 students from this 
group enrolled for the first semester of the new 
29 . 
campus. 
During the initial years a deliberate policy decision 
was made to apply the same admissions standards to both 
campuses and thus restict admission to only well qualified 
students. In February, 1966 the Admission Committee for 
Boston adopted a policy that restricted admission to 
students who had either been in the top 1/3 of their 
graduating class or who had achieved a combined score of 
1000 in their SAT's including a score of at least 500 on 
the verbal aptitude test. 
Admissions policy at the new campus gradually began 
to reflect the special role envisioned for the campus in 
its initial mission statement. A small experimental special 
admissions program for less qualified disadvantaged 
students began with the admission of 25 students at the 
Boston campus for the initial fall, 1965 semester. This 
number was increased to over 100 students in AY 1969/70. 
In January of 1966 the Admissions Committee for the Boston 
campus adopted the following policy further defining this 
target group of disadvantaged students: 
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We have a major commitment to the City of Boston and 
its schools and that in reviewing folders, we should 
give preference--other things being more or less equal 
--to the disadvantaged students from Boston rather 
than to the student from the suburbs, whose 
difficultiies we may presume are personal rather than 
social in origin. 30. 
The results of initial admissions efforts are indicated 
by Table I which provides data on the distribution of students 
by home of record during this period. It provides an indication 
of the origins of the clientele being served by the new campus 
during the first six years and the degree of success which it 
31 
achieved in reaching disadvantaged inner city students. 
It appears, upon review of this data, that the new campus was 
more nearly meeting the original purpose for which it was 
created in 1964, providing room in eastern Massachusetts for 
the enormous spill-over of qualified applicants who could not 
be accommodated at Amherst because of a lack of space, rather 
than the role suggested by the evolving self perception of a 
special mission for the campus to students among the 
disadvantaged residents of the inner city. From the very 
first semester, enrollment was largely suburban in origin 
consisting of a wide distribution of students throughout 
metropolitan Boston. This pattern of dispersed enrollment 
demand and a large precentage of commuting students might 
have been expected to have provided the campus with a 
strong incentive to pursue a site location at a convenient 
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TABLE 1. 
FALL SEMESTER ENROLLMENT DISTRIBUTION BY HOME OF RECORD 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON 1965-1970 
I. CITY OF BOSTON 
II. COMMUNITIES 
SHARING A COMMON 
BORDER WITH THE 
CITY OF BOSTON 
III.OTHER COMMUNITIES 
WITHIN 10 MILES OF 
THE CITY OF BOSTON 
IV. OTHER MASS. 
COMMUNITIES 
V. OUTSIDE 
MASSACHUSETTS 
TOTAL 
1965 1966 1967 
377 689 768 
33% 32% 30% 
289 503 508 
2 5% 23% 2 3% 
284 611 721 
25% 28% 28% 
189 333 476 
17% 15% 18% 
0 14 21 
0% 1% 1% 
1139 2150 2575 
100% 100% 100% 
1968 1969 1970 
945 1203 1482 
27% 34% 35% 
769 877 962 
22% 25% 22% 
882 1008 1120 
25% 28% 26% 
829 447 736 
24% 13% 17% 
25 15 0 
1% 1% 0% 
3450 3550 4300 
100% 100% 100% 
suburban location popular with a ready made network of 
suburban based students and community leaders eager to 
lend their support in lobbying for resources. Because of 
their perception of the new campus as a new, experimental, 
uniquely urban institution, the campus leadership were, 
instead, firmly committed from the first to a core city 
location 
CHAPTER VI 
THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE UNIVERSITY 
OF MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON: 1964 -1967 
This chapter begins presentation of the complex story 
of the site selection process for the University of 
Massachusetts - Boston. This was a long process spanning 
1964 to 1968 and involved several players, both persons 
internal to the University and representatives of Boston's 
political, business and residential communities as a 
number of potential sites were examined in depth and then 
rejected by the University. The process was affected 
by a complicated dynamic stemming from traditional 
attitudes toward public higher education in Massachusetts, 
intense competition for the very limited space in the core 
city, and positions taken by the city's political leaders 
in reaction to tensions created by the urban renewal 
process and concern with the loss of property tax base 
to tax exempt institutions. This story is presented 
chronologically beginning in 1964. Subheadings will be 
used to note the major contectual themes as the story 
unfolds. 
The Problem Presented by an Initial Lack of Resolution 
of the Issue of an Urban vs. Suburban Location 
During the rush to gain legislative support for the 
new campus during the spring of 1964 there had been far 
too little attention given to the question of just where 
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the campus would be located. Related questions of the 
total size of the new campus, type of architecture to be 
employed, proximity of highway systems and public 
transporation, and relationships with local municipal 
governments and immediate residential, institutional 
and commercial neighbors were also paid scant attention. 
The main focus by the University and its legislative 
supporters during this struggle was that of securing for 
the University of Massachusetts the sole right to create 
and control the new public university for the Boston 
metropolitan area for which political support had now 
suddenly emerged in responses to the college enrollment 
surge. This exclusive right had to be secured quickly in 
order to prevent public competitors such as Boston State 
College or private institutions such as Boston University 
or Northeastern University from shutting the University of 
Massachusetts out of the important greater Boston student 
market and the key strategic position of proximity to day 
to day political decision making at the state capital. 
What seems almost incredible in hindsight is the 
apparent fact that nobody from the University appears to 
have engaged in serious prior discussion of the possibility 
of a Boston site for the new campus with the mayor of 
Boston. Much of the legislative debate on the proposal for 
the new campus and much of the media coverage during and 
immediately after this debate either ignored the issue of 
a specific site or suggested that the campus would probably 
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be located in the suburbs. Boston's mayor and other 
business and community leaders within the city demonstrated 
a marked lack of interest and involvement in the debates 
and a general lack of enthusiasm towards the new campus, 
especially once proposals surfaced to locate it within 
> 
Boston's commercial core. 
The University's leadership seems 
that their new campus would be welcomed 
to have assumed 
with the same 
enthusiastic support shown by 
political leadership of other 
the development of their new 
the mayor of Chicago and the 
major American cities towards 
urban universities. The 
University was due for an unpleasant surprise. This major 
oversight is reflected in President Lederle's memoirs 
which he dictated in 1975. Lederle recalled, 
We got the authorization, and then the question was 
where are we going to be located?...We expected the 
Boston campus to be a different kind of institution, 
with a heavy urban emphasis which appealed to the 
Legislators. Maybe we'd get the University to worry 
about the city now, I thought, and not be the farm 
college way out west...One of the things I learned 
was that Boston couldn't care less whether it had a 
public university. It felt that private higher 
education is superior anyway, which, of course, 
coming from a 'Big Ten' school, I thought was an 
anathema. 1. 
An earlier Globe article by Ian Forman in June,1964 
reflects the confusion brought on by inadequate 
consideration of the site location issue prior to passage 
of the enabling legislation. Forman reported, 
Two factions are now battling both within the UMass 
Board of Trustees and outside it, as to what kind of 
state university Boston will get. It will be chiefly 
a commuter university, everyone agrees on that. 
Terrific 1964 and 1965 enrollment pressures and 
tightening family budgets demand guick expa ision of 
less costly non—dormitory education. But one group 
wants a cut-rate institution with only the barest 
faci1ities—no athletic fields, no student union or 
extracurricular activities. They foresee this either 
in a rented downtown Boston office building or on a 
limited urban renewal site in Roxbury or the South 
End. The other group attacks this concept which 
might have been suitable 30 or 40 years ago but is 
now out of touch with the 1960's. They want an 
institution modeled on the concept of the Amherst 
campus in every way, except dormitories, though a few 
of these will be needed eventually as the graduate 
schools grow as expected. Top UMass administration 
officials privately concede they could never build a 
campus comparable to the Amherst university in 
downtown Boston office buildings or on either of the 
two separate 40-acre urban renewal sites which Boston 
has available. This second group advocates a large, 
attractive suburban site such as the 93-acre former 
Murphy General Hospital in Waltham. Both Sen. Edward 
Kennedy and Cong. Bradford Morse (R-Lowell) are 
working to have it made available on the Federal 
surplus list for a possible UMass site. 2. 
The Work of the Planning Task Force 
In July President Lederle appointed a task force to 
develop plans for the new campus consisting of Leo Redfern 
(chair), Dr.William Venman, Assistant to the Provost, 
Robert Brand, Associate Treasurer, and Donald Cadigan, 
Director of Planning at Amherst. The Boston Globe suggested 
that this group's greatest task would be finding a site 
large enough and otherwise adeguate for the new campus and 
noted that although Amherst officials were calling the new 
institution the "University of Massachusetts-Boston" its 
location might ultimately be anywhere within the Greater 
Boston area. 3. 
Initial Site Review 
Site selection was identified as a top priority at 
the first meeting of Redfern's task force. They decided 
that a temporary site should be selected first and then a 
permanent site capable of housing 20,000 students. 4' By 
their fourth meeting they were ready to discuss possible 
approaches for location and site studies. It was agreed 
that members of the task force would provide the director 
of planning with suggested criteria for decisions on site 
locations. The director would then prepare "unscreened" 
lists of consultants and sites that had come to the 
attention of the Task Force thus far. He would also start 
accumulating aerial maps, transit maps, study reports and 
5 
other data relevant to the Boston area. 
At their ninth meeting, held at the end of July, it 
was noted that an initial contact had been established with 
the Boston office of NASA in an attempt to obtain access 
to the information they had accumulated in their search for 
a site and that the Metropolitan Area Planning Coucil had 
furnished maps, transportation and population data 
6 including information about possible sites. 
At a meeting on August 21 Cadigan reported on visits 
to look at limited office space and check the prevailing 
prices of rental space in the Boston area, a visit to the 
local office of the Federal General Services Administration 
to identify surplus federal property and contacts with the 
realtor agent for Boston's Hotel Madison and a nearby 
factory building. 
In recognition of the critical nature of the time 
schedule for obtaining and renovating a building in time 
for the opening of classes, the Task Force prepared a 
preliminary list of steps to be accomplished and set dates 
by which these steps must be accomplished: 
1. September 1,1964 - Trustee consideration of site and 
obtaining an architect. 
2. October 1,1964 - Approval of the building by University 
officers. 
3. November 1,1964 - Completion of preliminary drawings. 
4. January 1,1965 - Completion of working drawings and 
7. 
specifications. 
On September 1 Mr. Hugill and Mr. Cadigan reported 
on their examination of 12 sites within Boston and its 
immediate suburbs. These sites included the former Murphy 
General Hospital in Waltham, the Watertown Arsenal, the 
Raytheon Corporation Plant in Waltham, various old 
buildings on Commonwealth Avenue in downtown Boston, the 
Hotel Madison and a warehouse in the North Station area of 
Boston, and the former Walter Baker Chocolate plant in the 
Dorchester Lower Mills section of Boston. 
The Murphy General Hospital Site 
A lengthy discussion took place on the desirability 
of the Murphy General Hospital site in Waltham. It was 
determined to be the only completely satisfactory site out 
Of the group of twelve sites initially identified as 
possibilities. The Murphy Hospital site was located 
adjacent to the Fernald State School on 150 acres in the 
suburb of Waltham. It offered an attractive open area 
along with the added advantage of several abandoned 
hospital buildings which could be readily converted to 
temporary use by the University while the permanent campus 
was under construction. 
Development of the site would require no dislocation 
of residents or businesses and the loss of no taxable land. 
One major disadvantage was that it was far from any 
available or planned rapid transit lines. During the 
meeting a call was placed to officials controlling the site 
and the committee was told that it would probably not be 
available in the near future. It was dropped from active 
o 
consideration. 
Criteria for the Temporary Site Location 
At their meeting on September 11, the Task Force 
adopted some broad criteria to guide them in selecting a 
temporary site location: 
A. Taxability - Property not to be removed from the city 
tax rolls. 
B. Leasability - Renovation to be conducted by the lessor 
in order to expedite completion. 
C. Accessibility - Site to be accessible to students and 
faculty by rapid transit, bus, automobile, and should be 
near parking facilities. 
D. Presentability - Site to be commensurate in appearance 
and location with the fine quality of education the 
University proposes to bring to Boston. 
E. Adequacy - Site or facility to provide adequate space 
for the normal development of a curriculum and to allow for 
i 
the development of an enrollment within this curriculum for 
a minimum of 5 to 7 years. 
F. Availability - Site to be available from the point of 
view of leaseholds recognizing the time required for 
renovation, so as to provide for the development of the 
institution for a period of five or more years and yet 
permit the accomodation of 1000 students by September 
g 
1965. 
Selection of a Temporary Location 
In September 1964, Robert Heller Associates, 
Consultants, based in Cleveland,Ohio, began a study of 
possible temporary site locations for the new campus. Their 
report back to the trustees in November stated that the 
need to serve qualified students in the Boston area was 
real and immediate. It was judged unwise to wait for 
completion of long-range plans before opening the Boston 
branch. They recommended, that no commitment should be made 
to a particular site at the present time but that the 
University consider acquiring a location in downtown Boston 
through a lease which would be suitable for the first five 
to seven years of operation. 
Here,another comparison can be made with the 
University of Illinois-Chicago. Since in Chicago a branch 
of the University of Illinois had existed in the core city 
for almost two decades at Navy Pier, there was no real 
impetus to establish a "temporary” site for the new four 
year campus while a search for a permanent site progressed. 
The securing of a temporary site for the Boston campus in 
the core city tended to push future thinking about the 
permanent site toward a location within the core city. The 
consultants stated that a suburban location would be best 
because it would provide easy access and plenty of parking, 
the opportunity to create a traditional campus environment 
and uncongested surroundings. After reviewing several 
possible temporary locations in the suburbs, however, they 
determined that nothing was available on a short term basis 
which would meet the University's needs and recommended 
that the University consider, instead, acquiring a 
temporary site in downtown Boston. 
Alternatives suggested were the Houghton-Dutton 
Building at One Beacon Street, the former Boston Gas 
Company building near Park Square or the Boston Edison 
building complex at the intersection of Tremont and 
Boylston streets near the edge of the downtown commercial 
district. 
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The consultants suggested that the former Boston Gas 
Company building, which was owned by the John Hancock 
Insurance Company and currently under lease to Boston Gas, 
would, because of its excellent condition, be the best 
choice from the standpoint of creating a quality image for 
^ 10. 
the new campus. 
> 
On December 6,1964 the trustees authorized 
negotiations for lease with an option to buy a downtown 
Boston site and engaged the services of the architectural 
firm of Drummey-Rosane-Anderson to conduct a cost 
feasibility study of the suitability of each of the three 
sites recommended by Heller Associates. On February 16 the 
University announced that they had reached agreement on a 
lease of the former Boston Consolidated Gas Company 
Building at 100 Arlington Street in the Park Square area of 
Boston as the temporary site of the new campus. The 
facility would be leased with an option to buy. 11 * 
Reached that evening by the press, Boston Mayor John 
Collins stated that he welcomed the new campus on a 
temporary basis but that a permanent intown location would 
, 12 . be "devastating" to traffic and thus most unwelcome. 
During the weeks which followed debate developed in the 
Legislature over the proposal to allocate $1,600,000 for an 
initial period of lease of the building from its owners, 
The John Hancock Company. Some legislators argued that it 
would be better to purchase rather than lease and this 
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ended in a provision that the University purchase the 
building by January 1,1966. During this debate, Senator 
Kevin Harrington offered an ammendment to the appropriation 
which would have transferred control of the building site 
for the new campus from the University's trustees to the 
State Department of Education who would then lease it back 
to the University for $1.00. The amendment was defeated by 
l ? 
a roll call vote of 18 to 6. 
The Appointment of John W. Ryan as Chancellor 
On February 12,1965 Dr. John W. Ryan, Academic Dean 
at Arizona State University, was named chancellor of 
U. Mass.- Boston. Ryan had served as Assistant to the 
President and Secretary of the University of Massachusetts 
14 before leaving for Arizona in 1962. * One of the most 
important tasks facing Ryan was the securing of a permanent 
location for the new campus. His frustration in not being 
able to accomplish this task would be a major contributing 
factor in his later decision to resign. The campus would 
now begin a search which, after more than three years of 
continuous effort, would leave its leadership exhausted, 
discouraged and still without a site in the spring of 1968. 
The basis of this problem can be seen in the fact 
that at this point in 1965 there was still considerable 
confusion over whether th‘e campus would be located in the 
core city or in one of its suburbs. The campus had not yet 
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clearly defined its mission to its constituents and to the 
legislature as that of a unique, urban oriented, experiment 
in public higher education. Much of the public, including 
the mayor of Boston, still seem to have been anticipating 
the creation of a something quite similar to the 
University's campus in Amherst at a location in the 
suburbs, 
Reflections of Public Confusion Over the Mission 
of the New Campus 
In accordance with the mission statement which was 
now being finalized by the faculty membership of the New 
Directions task force, the new campus leadership began 
immediately to consider a permanent location in the 
core city. One of the first in-town sites which they 
chose to consider was Madison Park. The Madison Park 
neighborhood was located in the southern part of the 
Roxbury District of Boston bounded approximately by 
Tremont Street, Shawmut Avenue and Ruggles Street. 
The area had begun as a new fashionable upper-middle 
class housing venture in 1875 but by the Depression of the 
1930's had declined into an urban slum of abandoned and 
decaying houses. In 1961 the city took the land parcel for 
back taxes from realtor Maurice Gordon and put it up for 
sale at public auction. No buyers were interested. A study 
by the Boston Redevelopment Authority in 1964 envisioned 
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the area as a potential site for planned development on a 
very large scale which would be enhanced by the fact that 
a new inner city artery and a rerouted MBTA rapid transit 
line, now in the final planning stages/ would pass nearby. 
In an article published on April 4, reviewing the 
history and present sorry state of Madison Park, the Boston 
Globe stated that the site was being considered by the BRA 
as a possible location for the new University of 
15 Massachusetts Campus. * A Madison Park location was quite 
consistent with the concepts being developed by Paul Gagnon 
and his faculty colleagues. 
Meanwhile, hQwever, in an article appearing in the 
Boston Globe on May 9,1965, Ian Forman was still referring 
to the new UMass campus as, "the Greater Boston 
institution" and predicting that, "Five to 10 years from 
now it probably will be sitting on a big permanent suburban 
campus near commutable Rte.128 with 25,000 students and a 
diadem of graduate schools." ^* The article carried a 
picture of the former Murphy Army Hospital in Waltham 
describing it as a "hot prospect" for UMass Boston's 
permanent campus". Forman also noted that several 
scientists joining the UMass-Boston faculty were being 
loaned laboratory space and facilities at Harvard and MIT 
to continue their advanced research because the facilities 
17 
at the converted Boston Gas building were inadequate. 
Expression of Concern by the Collins Administration 
Chancellor Ryan stated in an August 11,1965 memo to 
President Lederle that he had met with BRA officials during 
the past few weeks and found that they were upset that they 
had not been extended the courtesy of discussion and 
information regarding the University's plans for a 
temporary site. Acting on its own the BRA had given some 
consideration to the question of a permanent site and had 
not yet arrived at a definite position but seemed to be 
leaning toward Madison Park. Ryan closed with the news 
that, 
Mayor Collins, today, informed me that he hoped 
we did not consider an "in town" campus, but did 
consider desirable an "in town" building. His 
preference for the latter is a West Roxbury site 
currently being considered for a campus-high 
school. 18. 
On September 10,1965 classes began in the Boston 
Gas Building with 1,227 freshman students. 
Faculty Sentiment Favoring a Core City Site 
In a letter sent to John Ryan in early December, a 
group of faculty provided the chancellor with their 
thoughts on the desirability of an urban versus suburban 
location. They stated that a suburban site would be a 
serious obstacle to achieving the goals for which the new 
campus had been established. An urban location, they 
argued, would provide better accessibility for commuting 
students, a more attractive site with which to entice 
excellent faculty, a more intellectually stimulating 
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environment for a university and a better location from 
which to address the special problems of the city. They 
expressed a strong fear that in the suburbs, 
...it almost certainly would become an institution 
like the University at Amherst - one overwhelmed with 
fraternities and sororities, athletic teams, and 
other extracurricular groups and activities which 
threaten the integrity of an intellectual center. 19. 
In December the State Auditor publicly questioned the 
wisdom and propriety of leasing rather than purchasing the 
building at 270 Stuart Street since the University seemed 
to be paying about $55,000 more per year in rent than 
Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates was in turn paying for 
their lease of the building from its owner the John Hancock 
r ^ 20- Insurance Company. 
On March 15,1966 a public debate was held in front of 
a group of about 150 students and faculty at the Boston 
campus on the topic of an urban vs suburban site location 
between two teams, one consisting of Professor Glen Tinder 
of the Political Science Department and a student speaking 
in favor of an urban campus and the other team consisting 
of a faculty member and a student arguing in favor of a 
suburban location. No definite conclusion was reached as 
to the desirability of one location over the other each 
side seems to have left the debate convinced that they 
had carried the day. I make reference to this debate 
to illustrate the fact that at this late date there 
was still a lack of definite resolution on this issue. 
21 
Review of the First Major Site Proposal: 
Highland Park in Roxbury 
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In May of 1966 the University announced that it was 
considering the Highland Park area of Roxbury, adjacent to 
the Madison Park site which had recently been chosen for 
the new location of Boston English High School, as a 
• 2 2 possible site for the new campus. 
Highland Park was located on a prominent hill within 
the ring of hills surrounding the downtown Boston area. 
The hill, consisting of 164 acres of land, rose by a grade 
differential of 135 feet from its base on Columbus Avenue 
to its crest. The western and southern edges of the site 
consisted of precipitous and rocky cliffs. It was located 
at the juncture of a proposed new Southwest Expressway and 
Inner Belt and close to two major rapid transit stations. 
The hill commanded magnificent views of Boston harbor and 
the Boston area. Any structures located on this site would 
make a strong impact on those who entered the City via the 
new highways. 
An Early Warning About the Impact of the Local Boston 
Political Context 
Sasaki and Associates presented the University with a 
confidential report on May 9 which warned of the difficult 
social and financial problems which the development of the 
Highland Park site might present to the City of Boston. 
Ill 
These centered on the 
reduction in property 
tax-free institutions 
people were living in 
increasingly serious issue of the 
tax base caused by the growth of 
and on the fact that over 7,000 
the Highland Park area and might 
face dislocation if the University went ahead with its 
plans. The consultants warned that, 
Over 40% of the real property in the City of Boston 
does not pay real estate taxes by virtue of its tax 
exempt status. The educational institutions 
constitute the largest bulk of this property. To a 
city such as Boston which relies heavily on the 
real estate tax for income to finance its municipal 
operations, the prospect of another 150-200 acres of 
land and buildings removed from the tax roles would 
indeed be disquieting. A location of a large 
university in Highland park would generate a need for 
additional city services, including police and fire 
protection as well as continued maintenance of 
streets and public open spaces. Yet, the presence of 
the University would reduce significantly the City’s 
ability to finance these sg^vices by removing 168 
acres from the tax rolls. 
They warned that an even more troublesome problem was 
presented by the political situation in Boston, 
The University's appreciation of and answers to the 
financial and social problems that its presence in 
the Highland Park Area will create for the City of 
Boston will probably be the principal determinant in 
the City's approval or disapproval of the site. 
Both the financial and social problems are 
politically sensitive issue within the City. It 
should be noted that the mayor of Boston under whose 
aegis urban renewal has had its greatest impact and 
strong support is running for United States senator; 
and that the City Development Administrator, Edward 
Logue, has a part-time consulting job to the mayor of 
New York City after turning down Mayor Lindsay's 
offer of a permanent position. The entire urban 
renewal program has been under heavy fire fire from 
several quarters. At least two of the present Boston 
Councilors were elected on an anti—urban renewal 
program. Serious doubt can be raised about the status 
of urban renewal under succeeding administrations. 
Many institutions have found it extremely useful to 
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hire public relations consultants when extremely 
sensitive public issues are involved. The University 
should consider the feasibility of utilizing a ^4 
competent firm which knows the City of Boston. 
The consultants recommended that the University 
should not expect Boston to accept the total clearance of 
all buildings on the site. It should either plan on a 
total integration of its new campus within the existing 
local Highland Park community or it should select a site 
at a different location, 
A planning approach with its emphasis on total 
clearance similar to that used for the University of 
Illinois Chicago Campus would not be appropriate for 
the University of Massachusetts on the Highland Park 
site. If for some reason the University does not wish 
to take this approach of selective clearance and 
rehabilitation, working with the residents of the 
Hill and finding solutions to the financial problems 
that its presence creates, a larger suburban site 
should be selected. 25. 
Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates presented the 
University with a formal report on their site evaluation 
of Highland Park in June. They stated that while some 
limitations existed, the site could satisfy the 
University’s requirements for a centrally located in-town 
campus and that they were therefor recommending its use. 
The consultants anticipated that difficult and unique 
architectural problems would be presented by the unusual 
topography of the site but that these difficulties could 
be solved. Much of the site was intensively developed 
with decrepit multiple unit low-income housing although 
some open space existed where buildings had recently been 
cleared, the land was excessively steep and rocky or land 
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had been held open as part of the neighborhood park. About 
1,100 families consisting of about 5,000 people lived 
within the 800 assorted buildings on the site. 26‘ 
Use of the site would immediatey remove property 
paying approximately $500,000 per year to the City in 
property taxes and would put an end to BRA plans to develop 
i 
the site to the point where it would be paying about 
$1,000,000 in property taxes. The consultants recommended 
i 
that the University plan on an annual payment in lieu of 
i 
i 
taxes to Boston of approximately $1,000,000 in either a ! 
i 
direct cash allocation or its equivalent in other indirect 
i 
forms. The consultants warned that, 
In Amherst, the community and the University have 
been able to co-exist and grow separately with 
relative ease. In Boston, the surrounding environment 
of the Highland Park site typifies the older sections 
of urban America. The urban renewal process in which 
the University will be involved gives rise to a whole 
set of new concerns and challenges and the City of 
Boston will have a continuing and substantial review 
capacity over the University's plans. While 
utilization of the Highland Park site will require 
new programs, techniques and attitudes, a more 
appropriate site to meet the goals of the Boston 
campus will not be easily found. 27. 
Highland Park Compared With Other Alternatives 
On June 10 Chancellor Ryan provided President Lederle 
with a formal recommendation that the University give first 
preference to Highland Park. Ryan said that he preferred an 
inner city site over a suburban site because the inner city 
site would be more accessible for students and faculty, 
permitted greater advantages to be drawn from the cultural 
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facilities of Boston, identified the University as a 
participant in the study of urban life and problems, and, 
finally, because there did seem to be adequate space 
available in the core-city. Ryan stated that the objectives 
of the new campus could be achieved even if an inner city 
site ultimately was not made available.28. 
On August 1,1966 the Sasaki and Associates, 
presented the University with a report on alternatives to 
the Highland Park site in response to a request which had 
been made by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The BRA 
had suggested that substantial portions of the existing 
housing and other structures at Highland Park could be 
retained and rehabilitated to solidify the community spirit 
which was beginning to become evident in the area. The 
University's land requirements for a new campus were so 
large as to require nearly a total clearance of all 
buildings in the area. This would destroy the emerging 
community spirit. 
The study compared the relative advantages of 
Columbia Point in South Boston, Highland Park, Wollaston 
Golf Course in Milton and an unspecified "typical location" 
along or near the metropolitan area's outer beltway, Route 
128. It described these sites as providing three 
alteratives; an urban core site represented by Highland 
Park, semi-urban sites represented by Columbia Point and 
Wollaston Golf Course, and suburban sites represented by a 
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Route 128 site. The location of these sites and others 
given serious consideration during the site selection 
process can be identified on the map entitled, "Greater 
Boston Proposed UMB Sites: 1964-1968 which is included 
among the appendices. 
The consultants viewed the two semi-urban sites as 
least desirable since they did not offer the urban 
environment which the University was seeking or the 
convenient parking, easy access and space of suburban 
locations. The report stated emphatically that, "Highland 
Park presents the University with their only choice if an 
in-town, urban campus is deemed desirable." They pointed 
out that Highland Park was adjacent to existing public 
transportation and the planned location for a new inner 
city beltway which would connect it easily with the region s 
highway network. Such institutions as the Boston Fine Arts 
Museum, Harvard Medical School, Northeastern University and 
Simmons College were within a mile and the Boston Public 
Library could be reached by students via a five minute ride 
29 . 
on the nearby rapid transit system. 
The consultants warned about the one important 
negative factor, 
The liabi 
the urban 
unless re 
at times, 
must cons 
economic 
Attempts 
likely to 
lity of the site is also its chief asset- 
character. The asset can be destroyed 
spected, but this implies a difficult and, 
frustrating development since.the.program 
ider the existing social organization and 
status as well as physical characteristics, 
to coordinate with community groups are 
be trying, yet accomplished could be richly 
rewarding.... The question remains are the University 
land requirements incompatible with the desire to 
retain Highland Park as a community or will the 
presence of the University provide the solidifying 
element and become a part of the neighborhood. 30. 
They viewed Columbia Point as a poor choice because 
of potential development costs, and the lack of easy 
access to the region's highway and public transit systems. 
They suggested that on the other hand it would be the best 
site in terms of political feasibility since the city would 
gain a major institution without having land removed from 
the tax rolls. They pointed out that a campus at Columbia 
Point would be visually striking and provide a pleasing 
campus environment. 
The principle advantage of the Wollaston Golf Course 
site would be its proximity to an interchange directly on 
the major north-south commuting route into Boston, the 
Southeast Expressway. The major disadvantages would be the 
site's limited size, lack of convenient access to public 
transportation and the fact that it was more suburban than 
urban. 
A Route 128 site would be a disadvantage if 
day-to-day contact with the city was viewed as essential 
but it could offer excellent highway and rapid transit 
access which would allow students to make a far quicker 
trip into the heart of Boston than would be possible at 
31 . 
either Columbia Point or Wollaston Golf Course. 
Formal Objections Raised by the Collins Administration 
Shortly after this report was released, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority Administrator, Edward Logue sent a 
letter to Chancellor Ryan stating that Mayor Collins was 
strongly opposed to locating the campus at the Highland 
Park site or in any other residential area of the city. 
Logue stated that he was currently checking on the 
availability of land at Columbia Point as a potential 
26. location. 
The 1966 Democratic Primary Race for U.S. Senator 
On Tuesday, September 13,1966 the second academic 
year began with 1,175 new freshman and a total enrollment 
of 2,151 students. This same day, primary election day in 
Massachusetts, saw the climax to a bitter contest between 
former governor Peabody and Mayor Collins for the 
Democratic Party nomination for the United States Senate. 
Collins, posing as a conservative law and order candidate, 
had attacked Peabody throughout the campaign for his 
opposition to the death penalty and strong support of acts 
of civil disobedience by civil rights activists, Peabody 
had capitalized on Collins' growing unpopularity within 
Boston because of disenchantment with urban renewal and a 
growing sense that his administration was no longer 
primarily focused on the needs of Boston's residential 
neighborhoods. Both candidates had appeared on a local 
televised debate tbe Sunday evening before the election. 
In closing Peabody lashed out at Collins stating, 
During his term the mayor has been concerned with 
building development, which has literally and 
figuratively bulldozed many of the citizens of Boston 
out of their homes. I think it's nice to have 
insurance centers, bank buildings and luxury 
apartments but what of the people? 27. 
Peabody easily secured the nomination. In Boston, he 
obtained 71,052 votes to Collins' 48,523. 34‘ This 
devastating defeat was widely regarded as a repudiation of 
Collin's urban renewal programs and a reflection of a 
desire on the part of the voters of Boston for a more 
people oriented city administration. 
Rejection of the Highland Park Site 
On October 7,1966, with the approval of the 
legislature the University purchased the Boston 
Consolidated Gas Company Building for $1.5 million. 
In November of 1966 Dr. Paul Gagnon was appointed as 
Dean of Faculty. At the same point the Faculty Committee on 
Planning and Development completed working papers stating 
that a core city site would be both feasible and highly 
desirable and suggesting that the Highland Park area, 
"would provide a location that would enable the University 
to fulfill admirably its mandate to afford greater Boston 
residents with an excellent education at low cost to the 
individual." 35 * 
On November 10,1966 the Faculty Senate at the Boston 
Campus passed a resolution calling for Chancellor Ryan to 
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appoint a committee to meet with community representatives 
in each of the sites under consideration to explore with 
them the implications of the location of the new campus in 
their community. In a memorandum to President Lederle dated 
November 30, Chancellor Ryan endorsed the idea and told 
Lederle that unless he had objection, such a committee of 
i 
the faculty would be appointed. In a response eight weeks 
i 
later, on January 16,1967, Lederle replied to Ryan stating 
that the Trustees Committee on Buildings and Grounds 
disapproved of the idea. According to Lederle, i 
< 
1 
They felt that at this stage it would be 
inappropriate to have any group roving around 
making contacts on behalf of the University.... It 
is simply that the Trustee committee feels that now 
is not the time to be stirring things up, for we seem 
to be too far away from a clear idea as to the likely 
site. 36. 
Lederle's letter arrived too late. Ryan had already 
accepted an invitation to a mass meeting with the community 
to discuss the University's plans at Highland Park. 
On December 13, Mayor Collins had asked the Highland 
Park Council for their reactions to the possibility of a 
fifty acre campus site for the University at Highland Park. 
The Council responded stating that,"Our immediate reaction 
is in the negative." They raised concerns that the 
University would expand until the campus eventually included 
the full 165 acres specified by Sasaki and Associates. This 
would put an end to plans to revitalize the residential 
character of their neighborhood. They asked Collins to 
120 
take action to stop the University. A copy of their 
response was sent to Chancellor Ryan inviting him to 
attend an upcoming public forum. The strength of community 
opposition at this meeting and at other open forums caused 
the university to reject the Higland Park site. 37‘ 
Opposition by Mayor Collins played an important part in 
the rejection of Highland Park by the Trustees as a site for 
the new campus. In 1974, Trustee Dennis Crowley, a member of 
the Trustee Building and Grounds Committee during the site 
selection process, recalled the Highland Park episode, 
I had another great disappointment there on the site. 
We had thought it out, and I had succeeded in 
convincing a few Trustees on the value of an area 
known as Highland Park, in Roxbury, which is just 
outside of the Fenway area, a run-down area, but a 
very desirable one for a college location. The Boston 
representatives on the Board went to Mayor Collins 
and asked for that location. Our administration asked 
for an acreage that Mr. Collins could not guarantee, 
and even smaller acreage he was uncertain about. As 
he was a holdover as mayor, had run and been defeated 
by Endicott Peabody for the nomination for the United 
States Senate, he said facetiously, 'I don't know 
enough about politics to know how I could get this 
City Council behind me on that location.' So, he 
refused to recommend Highland Park as the location 
for the University of Massachusetts. 38. 
Review of the Second Major Site Proposal: 
The Copley Square-Turnpike Site 
At this point the new leadership 
had spent the better part of a year in 
to secure a core city site at Highland 
of the Boston Campus 
an unsuccessful effort 
Park. The University 
was still presenting a public posture of ambivalence 
regarding an urban vs. a suburban site and does not seem to 
have fully grasped the warnings which their consultant, 
Sasaki, had raised concerning the difficulties presented by 
the political climate within Boston. 
Speaking before the Greater Boston Council of the 
AFL-CIO on February 8,1967, Chancellor Ryan stated that if 
no acceptable site was found within eight weeks, the 
trustees might have to look outside of the city. He 
suggested that the most favored urban site was Columbia 
Point because of strong community opposition to Highland 
Park and that in any event a new site would have to be 
found within 60 days since the present temporary Park 
Square site was too small to admit a new freshman class in 
39 September. 
A New Proposal to Merge Boston Public Higher Education 
A hearing took place on March 8,1967 before the 
Joint Education Committee of the legislature on House Bill 
516 which provided for the merger of the University of 
Massachusetts, Boston State College, and The Massachusetts 
College of Art at a site, just outside of Boston, in the 
Chestnut Hill area of the City of Newton. The bill was 
opposed by all three institutions. A hearing took place on 
the same day before the Joint Education Committee on House 
Bill 1978 providing for the creation of a special 
commission to study the issue of a location for UMB. 
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Chancellor Ryan and Leo Redfern appeared for the University 
and stated that their current timetable called for a 
definite decision by the trustees in June or early July. 
Leo Redfern came away from this hearing with the impression 
that he had bought time for the University and later told 
Lederle that the Joint Education Committee seemed reluctant 
to act if the trustees actually were close to making a 
final site selection. Neither bill was enacted. 
The Consultant's Proposal 
On April 18,1967, consultants Sasaki, Dawson, DeMay 
Associates, Inc. presented a report to the University 
Planning Office on their preliminary evaluation of the 
Copley Square-Turnpike Site. The site they proposed would 
have encompased approximately thirty five to forty acres on 
both sides of the Massachusetts Turnpike and the Boston and 
Albany Railroad right-of-way situated between Huntington 
Avenue and Berkeley Street in the general vacinity of the 
Copley Square section of downtown Boston. 
About 40% of the proposed site would be on "air 
rights" over the turnpike and railroad tracks. The area 
north of the "air rights" within the proposed site was 
presently being used by a variety of commercial enterprises 
while the area to the south consisted of row-house 
residences and small retail and light manufacturing 
operations. Prominant neighbors on land immediately 
adjacent or close to the proposed site included the Boston 
Public Library, The Prudential Insurance Company's new 
center, the New City Auditorium, the Christian Science 
Mother Church and the site of a proposed Christian Science 
Church development, the John Hancock Company headquarters 
and the site of Hancock's proposal for a new 60 story 
office building. 
In recommending the site Sasaki pointed out that it 
would be near access to four of the major subway lines as 
v»ell as a commuter rail station. It would also be near the 
major arteries used by automobile commuters. The site was 
closely related to the City's cultural, educational and 
commercial resources such as the Boston Public Library, 
Symphony Hall, the Museum of Fine Arts and the 
Massachusetts State House and many others. A major 
university complex on this site would bridge the existing 
barrier between the Back Bay and South End areas which was 
presently created by the railroad-turnpike depression. The 
university complex could be physically integrated into the 
areas surrounding it rather than focusing inward on itself. 
Faculty and staff would find housing prospects available in 
the nearby Back Bay, Prudential Center, Christian Science 
Center and South End townhouses. This would further 
integrate the University into the community. 
The consultants estimated total project costs at 
$389,540,000. They projected that 192 buildings would have 
to be demolished in the area and 1,272 residents relocated 
to new housing. They glossed over this significant concern 
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by noting that the present renewal plan called for 
clearance in the area regardless of the University's 
actions and that substantial increases in vacancy of both 
land and buildings had occured in the eight years since the 
1960 Census on which their population estimates were based. 
They also noted that their estimates of acquisition costs 
assumed that the entire area would be obtained immediately 
in order to negate the possibility that land values would 
rise as the result of speculation once the university's 
41 . 
acquisition plans became public. 
The Boston Business Community's Concern About A Shrinking 
Tax Base 
The University, a tax exempt institution serving 
primarily non-residents of Boston, announced the choice of 
a site in the heart of the city's commercial and cultural 
district at a particularly difficult time. Boston Magazine 
had been running a series for the past year on "The Plight 
of the Institutional City". This was a frank discussion of 
the negative impact of too many tax-exempt institutions on 
the shrinking property tax base of Boston. Boston Magazine 
was h popular monthly published by the Greater Boston 
Chamber of Commerce which featured articles aimed primarily 
at Boston's young professionals. 
The series began with an article in June,1966 which 
described the ambitious expansion plans of the Christian 
Science Mother Church ‘adjacent to Copley Square. The 
writer praised the Church because, 
In blessed contrast to its sister religious groups, 
it voluntarily picks up its share of Boston's 
staggering tax burden, and last year paid out $1.1 
million on assessed property valuations of $13 
mi11ion.42. 
The next article in the series which appeared in the 
September issue charged that the city's universities, 
...regard themselves as simple business 
establishments taking advantage of laws set up to 
allow a maximum return on investments. Institutional 
money, like any other money, lacks social 
consciousness.43. 
The article claimed that schools, because of their 
special tax exempt status, were in a much more competitive 
position than business firms to bid for real estate while 
each of their acquisitions caused the city's property tax 
base to shrivel a little more. The article warned that 
Boston's residents were beginning to become concerned, 
With the Back Bay's schools threatening to make 
one vast campus out of the once proud area, with 
Boston University acquiring, as it were, the entire 
left bank of the Charles River as its very own 
precinct.44. 
The article pointed to the contrast between Boston 
University's claim that its new Metrocenter study group was 
dedicated to bringing the university and metropolitan area 
together in solving urban problems and the fact that BU s 
tax exempt property holdings in the city had increased by 
$6 million over the past eighteen months to a total holding 
45 . 
of over $31 million. 
As the University unveiled its plans for Copley 
4 
Square in April of 1967, the magazine was turning up the 
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heat. An editorial in the May,1967 edition reminded readers 
that during the past year it had, 
...opened its pages to a discourse on tax exempt 
institutions, stressing the fiscal hardship their 
exemption causes a city which supplies public 
services to over 40 per cent of its property without 
recompense, and the social and structural unrest that 
institutions are leaving in the wake of persistent 
expansion. 46 
The magazine cited statistics indicating that Boston 
suffered more severely than any other urban area in the 
nation from this problem since it hosted within its city 
boundaries 25 colleges and universities, 26 junior 
colleges, and 150 business, trade and other private 
schools which together enrolled more than 110,000 students 
including 50,000 who lived within the city in dorms or 
apartments. The BRA, it warned, was projecting an increase 
of another 70,000 more students by 1970. The city would be 
expected to provide municipal services for this influx even 
though it was confronted with the "shocking fact" that its 
property tax base in 1967 was $77 million less than it had 
been in 1915. Dr. Case of B.U. was quoted as suggesting 
that the time had come to establish positive, realistic 
school-city programs to meet these problems, perhaps 
through a joint development corporation. 47. 
The final item in the series, an editorial, appeared 
in the June edition. It stated, 
With the site of a Boston branch for the University 
of Massachusetts still a subject of controversy as 
this issue goes to press, we are rather forcefully 
reminded of the need for the * establishment of a 
meaningful dialogue between the city's educational 
institutions and the agencies responsible for 
planning Boston's orderly development. With 
enormous commitments for construction and renewal, it 
would seem even more pressing than ever that 
voluntary guidelines be established for the mutual 
benefit of the community and its institutional 
components. 48. 
Among the ill effects of the influx of college 
students cited by the editorial was a study showing that 
during the months of April and December,1966 more than 86% 
of the services of the Boston Public Library went towards 
assisting college students. The editorial also reported 
comments by Boston Police Commissioner McNamara on the 
apparent indifference of the colleges and universities 
toward the devastating impact of the growth in student 
49. 
commuter vehicles on Boston's traffic problems. 
The editorial called for the creation of a master 
plan for Boston and the surrounding metropolitan area 
through which both private and public higher education 
might expand without jeopardy to the City and its finances. 
A principle purpose of such a planning mechanism would be, 
...to select desirable areas for future growth, in 
both the core city and the suburbs, and channel 
educational development into such areas. A dual 
result of this pre-selection would be to aid the 
general growth of all institutions and 
simultaneously protect existing neighborhoods from 
excessive school development which to date has shown 
little sensitivity to the problems of business or 
residential zoning. 50. 
Regarding the planned development of a public 
community college and the Boston branch of the University 
of Massachusetts the article suggested. 
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The availability of a roaster plan to guide the 
placement of these institutions within the city 
would,of course, be of great value. 51. 
During the first week of May, City Councilman 
Christopher Iannella capitalized on the developing 
controversy over the Copley site proposal during an 
announcement of his entry into the 1967 mayoral race by 
reminding voters of his long standing opposition to an 
in-town campus for the University of Massachusetts. 52‘ 
Collins' poor performance in the September primary had now 
inspired a number of local politicians to consider entering 
what had previously been viewed as an impossible contest 
against a popular incumbent. 
The following Monday, City Councilman William Foley 
introduced a resolution stating that the Council, "deplored 
the intention of the trustees of the University of 
Massachusetts to pre-empt 30 acres of land in the Back 
Bay." Foley's resolution passed unanimously. Iannella then 
seized the occasion to attack the plan and indirectly the 
mayor. "If the Copley Square acquisition were to become a 
fact", Iannella stated,"...it would do more to destroy the 
character of this city than any other single activity in 
the last ten years." Inannella introduced a resolution 
calling on Collins to meet directly with the University 
trustees to find a more suitable site within the Greater 
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Boston area. This too passed unanimously. 
Coucilman Peter Hines, who would soon announce his 
candidacy for mayor, was not about to be outdone by 
Iannella. While Hines strongly criticized Mayor Collins 
and Logue and voted for both resolutions, he never the less 
endeavored to support education, stating, "The people are 
not so damn anti-education as you make them out to be." 
Hines reminded the Council that the low-income working 
families of Boston still wanted an opportunity to send 
their children to college and that he was not at all 
convinced that they would not be willing to give up some 
tax producing land to provide low cost educational 
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opportunities. 
Internal Opposition To A Core City Location 
On May 1,1967 Dr. J.P. Anselme, Assistant Professor 
of Chemistry at the Boston Campus wrote to President 
Lederle in an attempt to present the perspective of the 
science faculty on the question of site selection. Anselme 
stated that, 
...the sciences are in the ridiculous position of 
having to provide tangible and convincing arguments 
for a large site while the opposition only has a 
nebulous 'feeling' that the choice of an 'intown' 
site is the right thing to do. Although I am 
speaking for myself, I am certain that many of my 
colleagues, particularly in the sciences area, share 
my views. It is my decided opinion that such a 
decision ought not to be taken without a complete 
understanding of the general problem and those 
particular to the physical sciences. I can frankly 
say that it seems rather incongruous to me that, in 
order to educate students, one needs 'an urban 
environment', especially since any reasonable 
non-urban' site could not be very far removed from 
the center of town. 55. 
Lederle thanked Anselme for this advice noting that/ 
Right or wrong/ the Board of Trustees has been 
proceeding on this idea of an in-town site/ 
encouraged by the thought that this is consistent 
with the original mandate of the General Court and 
has generalized approval of the majority of the 
faculty. 56. 
This was not the first time that Lederle had heard 
these negative sentiments expressed by a member of the 
Boston faculty. A year before the president had reported in 
a note to Provost Tippo that at a Boston campus faculty 
dance in Cambridge he had been approached by a number of 
faculty who expressed disatisfaction with a Boston 
location. Along with this note Lederle included a memo sent 
to him by Professor Walter Lehmann of the Chemistry 
Department presenting arguments in favor of a suburban 
57. 
site. 
Lehman argued that even under the most optimistic 
assumptions regarding the admission of high school 
graduates from Boston, 75% or more of the students of the 
new campus would come from outside Boston and that this 
fact,"points up the fallacy of focusing all our attention 
on the city of Boston". He also noted that, "considerable 
pockets of underprivileged areas will be found outside of 
Boston." Lehman stated that it was "ridiculous, in this 
modern day and age" to plan a campus without adequate 
parking facilities when it was known that 80% of its 
student body would be commuting in from outside the 
City. 58- 
Lehman then concentrated on a major concern of the 
science faculty, 
The sciences will have some difficulty with delicate 
apparatus, which traditionally are located in 
spacious basements and first floors for stability. 
The upper floors simply vibrate and sway too much. In 
a central city, however, even in the basements, there 
may be problems with the rumblings of subways and 
thru-ways. 59. 
Lederle commented in his note to Tippo that, "Some of 
his points are well taken...I suggest that we keep this 
6 0 
point of view in the backs of our minds." 
Opposition To the Copley Site By The Collins Administration 
And Local Business Interests 
An article appearing in The Boston Herald American on 
May 4,1967 reported that the University had selected a site 
near Copley Square and listed the arguments being presented 
by local business interests against selection of this site 
for the new campus. That evening the Boston 
9 
Redevelopment Authority took a formal vote to oppose the 
Copley Square site proposal. Boston's redevelopment 
administrator, Edward J. Logue, termed the proposal 
"impossible" since it would take up far too much land in an 
area which was planned for extensive tax generating 
commercial development. Property taxes had become an 
important issue in the 1967 Boston mayoral race and Logue 
was about to become a candidate for mayor. The site 
selection issue, particularly the Copley Square proposal 
gave him a badly needed opportunity to attract media 
coverage. 
62. 
The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 
threatened publicly, through the news media, to rule out 
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further consideration of its plan for a multi-mi11ion 
12. 
dollar high rise office building in the Copley area if the 
University continued to pursue acquisition of the Copley 
63. 
site. 
The following day, May 5,1967, the University issued 
a statement denying that any final decision had been made 
on a site for the Boston campus and pointing out that no 
vote had been taken by the trustees. 
Mayor Collins and BRA Director Logue were strongly 
\ 
criticized through the media by university trustee, Hugh 
Thompson. Thompson, who was also the New England Regional 
Director of the AFL-CIO, complained that, "Every time we 
try to get a site in Boston, as the General Court decided 
we should, we find opposition not only from the mayor but 
Mr. Logue." Thompson described Logue's suggestion of a 
Columbia Point site as "pure nonsense" because engineering 
studies had already shown it could not be used for such a 
1 • 4- 64 • large project. 
Reaction by State Political Leaders 
On May 9, Senator Kevin Harrington told a reporter 
from The Boston Record American that he still felt the new 
campus should be a suburban commuter college adjacent to a 
highway network. Harrington stated that when the bill to 
establish the Boston branch was before the Senate in 1964, 
4 
he had offered an amendment to keep it out of Boston but 
I 
he had offered an amendment to keep it out of Boston but 
that several senators from Boston had opposed the 
amendment. At the same point in 1964 university officials, 
including President Lederle and Dean Redfern, had told him 
that they didn't want to be in Boston. 65‘ 
Intervention by the Governor 
A special meeting of legislative leaders from both 
parties and nine University of Massachusetts trustees was 
held on May 11 in Governor John Volpe's office. The private 
meeting was closed to the press and centered on a 
presentation by the University of a scale model of the 
Copley site. Volpe emerged from the meeting stating that 
he was not in favor of the Copley site. A press sampling 
of the opinions of Senate President Donahue and such 
prominent senators as Kevin Harrington, John Parker, James 
Burke and Mary Fonseca, indicated that they also opposed 
the site. 
Lederle told the press after the meeting that he 
still considered the site ideal although he recognized the 
necessity for support from the governor and legislature 
since they had to provide the funds. 
In covering this meeting The Boston Record American 
reported that the John Hancock Insurance Company had stated 
that they would halt plans for a $100 million office 
building near Copley Square if the new campus was located 
there and that Christian Science Church leaders had 
indicated that they would be forced to reduce the scale of 
their $70 million expansion program. ^6. 
Opposition by the Back Bay Community 
A telegram sent to Lederle on May 13 by John A. 
Lowry, President of the Back Bay Association, expressed 
regret that the issue of site selection had become a 
matter of so much public controversy. Lowry urged Lederle 
to meet with the various community groups in the Back Bay 
as soon as possible. He expressed doubt that the Copley 
Square proposal was possible of attainment since the area 
was already at the mid-point of an economic development 
surge which had generated an estimated $500 million in 
private investment. The proposal would jeopardize this 
project and impose additional burdens on Boston taxpayers 
by preempting taxable property. 
Lowry argued that the University was mistaken in 
assuming the support of the BRA, the City Council and the 
mayor since all three had already "decisively and publicly 
opposed building the university here". He listed the 
following community representatives and groups as opposed 
to the proposal: The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, 
The Back Bay Council, St. Botolph Citizens Committee, South 
End Federation of Citizens Organizations, Greater Boston 
Heal Estate Board, various neighborhood associations of 
the Back Bay, Fenway Civic Association, Ellis Memorial 
Settlement House, The Greater Boston Retail Board of Trade, 
The John Hancock Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
prudential Insurance Company, New England Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, and the Seraton Corporation as well as 
virtually the entire legislative delegation from the Back 
67. 
Bay area. 
Rejection of the Copley Square Site by the Trustees 
At a meeting of the trustees on May 15, Frank Haigus, 
Buildings and Grounds Committee chairman, issued a 
statement explaining that his committee had been prepared 
to recommend the Copley Square site but decided to make no 
recommendation after Governor Volpe opposed the site at a 
meeting the previous week. He said that in accordance with 
the governor's wish they would set aside Copley and examine 
a dozen or more sites which had been suggested as 
alternatives and would have a report ready for the full 
board of trustees by mid-summer. Haigis emphasized that the 
trustees had not yet made a final site selection and would 
not do so until after his committee had a chance to confer 
further with the governor, legislature and community 
officials. Trustee Barney Troy criticized those who had 
brought the Copley Square issue into the public arena 
before a final decision had been made and emphasized the 
6 8 
need for more cooperation from public officials. 
On May 17,1967 the Boston Redevelopment Authority 
formally presented Chancellor Ryan with a copy of its 
Campus-By-The-Sea proposal to locate the Boston campus at 
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Columbia Point, At a news conference Logue said that he 
hoped for a future opportunity to meet with the trustees 
to try to convince them to reverse their previous rejection 
of Columbia Point. 
Logue argued that the Columbia Point site offered 
almost unlimited space for expansion. He estimated 
construction costs of only $266 million as opposed to an 
estimate of $417 million for the Copley plan. He also said 
that, if necessary, the BRA had the legal right to veto the 
Copley site since it would project into four different 
federally funded urban renewal projects which had federal 
immunity from seizure by a state agency. 
Another plus for Columbia, according to Logue, was 
that Boston would lose only $30,000 from its property tax 
base, not the estimated $11 million which would be lost 
through selection of the Copley site for the new campus. 
A final argument was that the new campus at Columbia 
Point would be the focal point for a revival of a badly 
depressed and neglected part of the City and might also 
serve as a stepping stone toward development of the harbor 
69. 
islands as part of the proposed 1976 World's Fair. 
During this period a number of newspapers across the 
state published editorials which were critical of the 
university's consideration of the Copley site and which 
praised Logue. 70' Particularly blunt criticism of the 
University came from Vict6r 0. Jones who provided strong 
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backing for Logue in his regular commentary appearing in 
the Boston Globe for May 18. Jones stated, 
The average dope who would like to be for education, 
and for progress, and who doesn't think all the 
city's largest taxpayers necessarily wear horns, will 
side with Logue on this matter. It's perfectly 
possible for a citizen to be in favor of high class 
public education without also being in favor of 
giving a state university real estate whose loss 
from the tax rolls would make it more difficult to 
support the state university. To be sure, this 
principle comes under the head of noblesse oblige - 
not fashionable these days - but perhaps not 
entirely invalid. And it's a principle which is 
particularly appropriate to the academic community. 
After all, if you enjoy, as does the academic 
community, certain privileges, you also have certain 
responsibilities. These would seem to include not 
biting the hand that feeds you, or perhaps more 
accurately, not killing the goose that lays the 
golden eggs. 71. 
The Waltham News Tribune expressed the sentiment 
which still existed in some quarters for a suburban site, 
That the trustees put themselves in a position to be 
clobbered is indicative of a lack of reliance on 
regional planning. This is precisely the kind of need 
that a metropolitan planning program was supposed to 
serve. A UMass campus of the scope outlined should be 
a part of urban renewal, in the interior suburbs, if 
not in Boston proper. Commuting students would 
benefit most from single-fare access, so the search 
would logically have to be within the suburban area 
contiguous to the core city. 72. 
Dr. Harold Case, president of Boston University, used 
the occasion and his impending retirement to once again 
publicly voice an opinion, during a Boston radio news 
program, that there was no need to build a new University 
of Massachusetts campus in Boston. As an alternative to 
this "inefficient and wasteful" move. Case suggested that 
the state begin to pay subsidies to existing colleges and 
universities . 
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The Boston Mayoral Race of 1967 
John Collins' defeat in the fall primary of 1966 was 
followed by his decision in the late spring of 1967 not to 
seek another term as mayor. A review of the succession 
struggle which followed reflects clearly the current 
political climate in Boston and suggests why the University 
was having little success in gaining approval for a core 
city campus. During the week following President Case's 
attack on the need for a Boston campus Boston newspapers 
published speculation that Ed Logue would enter the 1967 
mayoral race. In adding to this speculation, Richard Daly 
of the Boston Traveller stated, 
Logue,meanwhile,is moving into position as the man 
with all the answers about the New Boston. He will 
not run against his boss, it is assured, but he has 
made clear that he would like to go if Collins does 
not. He is not a Bostonian - he is dubbed, 'the 
intruder', by Mrs. Louise Day Hicks, a native 
candidate.... Yet who came forward with a fine idea on 
where to put the University of Massachusetts Boston 
branch? Everybody howled about erosion of the tax 
base when the UMass trustees eyed Copley Square. 
Logue came up with Columbia Point, offering visions 
of an in-town 'campus by the sea' on land now vacant. 
Other candidates talk about potholes in the streets, 
but Logue - with Collins and the Chamber of Commerce 
- comes up with a $400 million plan for a new 
downtown of skyscrapers and malls that,if ever 
realized, would be the best thing for Boston since 
the British left town. The BRA and cooperating 
agencies have been playing with plans for years, but 
it is now-as the mayorality race takes shape-that 
Logue produces a dream site for a local UMass and a 
dream plan for a new downtown. 74. 
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In announcing her candidacy for mayor, Louise Day 
Hicks placed great emphasis on her campaign theme of 
"Boston for Bostonians" and made oblique reference to the 
UMass controversy stating,"It is high time we stopped 
giving away city land and city services to private schools 
7 5. 
and universities. 
By 1967, there was no longer strong popular support 
for urban renewal in Boston. The reign of the "little 
people" in local politics had begun. 
During the Chicago site selection process there was 
one politically strong mayor, Richard Daley, in office 
throughout the site selection process. In Boston there was 
a change of leadership mid—way through the site selection 
process which signified the end of an era of emphasis upon 
rapid economic growth and dynamic urban renewal in the core 
city and the beginning of an era of empowerment of 
community action groups. 
Boston's Mayor Collins, who had been soundly defeated 
in his home city and across the state in the race for U.S. 
Senator in 1966, decided to retire from politics. This 
happened in the spring of 1967 just as the debate on a core 
city site was becoming most intense. 
Collin's political retirement gave rise to a struggle 
for succession. Among the field of ten candidates was 
Boston's redevelopment director who made the site location 
for the new campus a campaign issue. Logue had taken strong 
public positions in opposition to certain site choices 
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proposed by the University and used these occasions, and 
his own proposal to locate the new campus at Columbia 
Point, as an opportunity to showcase his own administrative 
skills and vision for the future development of the city. 
Logue enjoyed considerable early support from the Boston 
business community. 
The 1967 race included other candidates who were at 
least partially expressive of an attitude of hostility to 
the location of the University in Boston and particularly 
towards its plans for a permanent site in the core city. 
Most notable for this attitude among the other candidates 
were Louise Day Hicks and Albert "Dapper” O'Neil. 
Both publicly expressed suspicion and criticism of 
the area's college students and professors along with a 
general anti-liberal, anti-intellectual attitude. Their 
positions centered on the issue of busing to achieve racial 
balance in the City's schools, fear of possible racially 
motivated violence in the city, and a generalized fear by 
the City's white working class that their city was being 
rapidly snatched from their grasp by meddling "outsiders". 
A large segment of the Boston electorate was encouraged by 
these candidates to fear interference and a "takeover" by 
"outsiders" who would disregard and ignore what "Dapper" 
O'Neil described as "Boston's little people 
Hicks struck a responsive cord with her slogan of 
"Boston for Bostonians", which enabled her to finish first 
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in the September 
a distant third. 
mayoral primary 
Hicks' campaign 
race while Logue finished 
platform demanded an end 
to involuntary busing, an end to property tax exemptions 
for private institutions, including 
universities, and a payroll tax for 
who earned their paycheck in Boston 
colleges and 
non-Boston residents 
76. 
Kevin White, a moderate who had finished second in 
the primary, emerged as the new mayor after narrowly 
defeating Hicks in a two person final run-off contest in 
November. Building on his political base as Secretary of 
the Commonwealth, White tapped into the same voter 
sentiments as Hicks but with a more positive program. 
During the 1967 race White stated, 
Obviously, the people of the city judge Boston not 
only by its skyline but also by its services. They 
are not different from people anywhere, they want 
what they are entitled to - a decent environment. 
They rightly believe that a city capable of 
attracting hundreds of millions of dollars to 
revitalize downtown Boston where people work is 
equally capable of attracting private and public 
funds to influence new life into the neighborhoods 
where people live. Boston^eeds people programs to 
match building programs. 
White won with the- help of a considerable portion of the 
Boston business community, who feared the results of a 
Hicks victory, and through skillful application of this 
more positive statement of the same basic theme being used 
by his opponent. 
White would go on to dominate city politics as mayor 
for almost two decades and became, like Daley of Chicago, 
4 
one of his era's most prominent urban mayors. His 
considerable political talent, charisma and style enabled 
him to win the Democratic Party nomination for governor in 
1970. 
He began office in 1967, however, as a mayor in a 
position to lead the city only if he paid considerable 
public allegiance to the strong feeling that a City of 
Boston administration should seek first to serve and fight 
tenaciously for the particular interests and desires of 
Boston's residential neighborhoods and calm the fears 
which were reflected in Hick's rhetoric. 
During an interview conducted as part of this case 
study, Mayor White reflected on the mayoral race of 1967. 
He said that the number one issue in the race was not 
taxes, or concern with a reduction in the city's tax base, 
but concern with racial tensions in the city stemming from 
series of violent incidents. A second important and related 
concern was how to bring the city government closer to the 
residents of Boston. Mrs. Hicks skillfully exploited both 
of these issues and as a result dominated the primary race. 
The task for the White campaign was, therefor, to defeat 
Mrs. Hicks by promoting a better approach to the same 
issues. Mayor White was clearly committed to community and 
neighborhood concerns and objectives and was prepared to 
act forcefully to address these issues to protect his 
political base. 
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The University's Growing Concern With Its Negative Public 
Image 
In a memorandum to Messrs. McCartney, Redfern, Ryan, 
Johnson and Tippo on July 24,1967 Lederle expressed 
concern about negative public reaction in Boston and 
reported the following incident, 
As I passed the 25-cent Allston toll gate on my way 
back to Amherst on July 21 at 2 P.M., the toll 
collector asked: 'Where have you decided to locate 
the college?' I responded: 'It is really quite a 
problem.' He then responded: 'It can't be in Boston. 
Taxes are too high. We pay $130 a thousand now and 
we can't stand any more universities.' We had a 
similar conversation with another ticket taker a 
month or so back. Query whether our sample is 
representative of general Boston citizen attitude? 
If so, we have real difficulty ahead. 
McCartney, Secretary of the University, replied three 
days later stating that there did indeed seem to be a 
problem developing which required watching given the recent 
anouncement of the $130 tax rate for Boston. As a possible 
solution he suggested, 
An interpretive news story would be very much in 
order, and quite easy to arrange if we had a definite 
idea at this time of what direction our tax relief 
measures might take in terms of establishing the new 
UMass in Boston campus. In-lieu payments, use of air 
rights and 'piggy backing' a campus on top of 
commercial property which would return tax payments 
are all in the wind but nothing has become 
sufficiently definite to make a firm commitment at 
this time. 79. 
Later comments by President Lederle concerning his 
frustration in confronting this attitude of the Collins and 
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White administrations suggest that Lederle and his staff 
did not fully understand the dynamics of Boston politics in 
the summer of 1967. In his oral memoirs Lederle stated, 
I take great exception to the way mayors and others 
in positions of responsibility in Boston, such as the 
MBTA have operated. They are 'losers'. If we had run 
the University of Massachusetts like that we'd still 
be about 6,000 out here in Amherst. They don't live 
up to the responsibilities of their job, in my 
opinion. Well, at any rate, looking for a site, Logue 
sicced us on North Station, Highland Park, any number 
of sites...I had some idea that we might be able to 
work with urban renewal. I explored all these things 
with Logue, but found that we came along just a wee 
bit too late. It was no longer possible. No city 
council, no mayor, would move a single black. Logue 
himself didn't quite get the score on this, despite 
the fact that he's thought to be one of the great 
housing experts. He led us down the primrose path 
and then found from his mayor and city council, that 
they weren't going to mgjje a black, they weren't 
going to move anybody. 
The fact that he chose to characterize the two mayors 
of Boston as weak "losers", incapable of making decisions 
and taking strong action, suggests that President Lederle 
appears to have failed to fully understand the local Boston 
political context of the period 1966-1968 in which Collins 
and White were operating. What emerges, instead, is the 
strong suggestion that the University and Boston Campus 
leadership had failed to convince these key leaders of the 
necessity for locating the new campus in the core city. 
They had also failed to communicate their vision of how 
the university could provide unique and tangible assistance 
in dealing with the very urban issues which were at the 
forefront of the 1967 mayoral campaign. 
A 1967 Consultant's Report On The Public Image Of The 
Boston Campus 
A growing concern with public image led the 
University to employ the services of Science and University 
Affairs, a consulting group headquartered in New York City. 
The consultants conducted a study of the institution's 
university relations and public affairs responsibilities 
during the fall of 1967. In their report, released on 
December 2,1967, they stated that, 
The first dominant truth is that the long-range 
viability of a public university in the City of 
Boston is in fact far from established, either in 
terms of the political leadership of the state, or, 
indeed, to a much lesser degree in the (University 
of Massachusetts) administration itself. Secondly, in 
terms of circumstances of geography, tradition, and 
socio-political trends,*UM/B's long-range 
establishment is subject to a rather particular set 
of potential hazards. An important facet of this 
deeper difficulty relates to the fact that the 
Commonwealth, more so than most other Eastern states, 
has only of late recognized the value of a viable 
public system of higher education. Its low per capita 
investment in this area of social enterprise clearly 
bears out this incontrovertible fact....The cold 
evidence remains, we believe, that neither the 
Governor, the General Court, nor the University of 
Massachusetts has come to a final conviction that the 
successful establishment of a Boston campus is a 
top-priority objective. Until such time as all three 
of the decision-makers arrive at this final 
conclusion—hopefully at the same time--the Bog^on 
institution will continue to operate at risk. 
A key point among the consultants' findings was the 
observation that there was very little public awareness of 
the University of Massachusetts at Boston. They interviewed 
several local newspaper reporters and editors and concluded 
that, "it is still very much isolated, still very much 
82. 
unknown 
Regarding the stagnated search for a site the 
consultants stated, 
The prolonged uncertainty of a site poses a 
continuing dilemma in terms of the public impression 
...For political, psychological and purely survival 
reasons, it has become vital to announce a site 
decision, even if this threatens to burst out into 
large public controversy. But the University and its 
trustees must act in a forthright and well 
thought-out manner, so that the whole enterprise can 
impress the larger public with a strong sense of 
direction--and future. The first public unveiling of 
a proposed urban campus, whether in its final 
conceptual state or preliminary stage, will do 
wonders for morale and will produce public awareness 
of the institution's intentioned performance. From 
here on out, one needs to be particularly sensitive 
to the public implications of planning procedures and 
actions, and to be prepared to deal with them ahead 
of such actions, and not after. 83. 
The recommendations of the consultants centered on 
the establishment and development of a public relations 
office at the Boston campus and consideration over the next 
several years of moving the University's Amherst based 
public realtions staff to a separate Boston location along 
with the University president's office itself. The report 
concluded, 
Under the particular circumstances of UM/B, the 
development of a broad and operational university 
relations function in Boston represents not a 
peripheral and desirable activity, but an absolutely 
essential and perhaps pivotal function. It may well 
turn out that the flowering or demise of this campus 
rests on the degree of success with which it grapples 
with these public questions. Institutional 
investments in such activities, therefore, represent 
no idle self-titulation for the institution, but, 
instead, a cold necessity of survival. 84. 
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Resumption Of The Search And Analysis of Remaining Options 
At a meeting of the trustee Buildings and Grounds 
Committee on November 1, 1967, Sasaki, Dawson, DeMay 
Associates was asked to provide a detailed analysis of the 
15 possible sites currently under review. They provided 
this report on November 20. Out of the 15 sites, seven were 
recommended for further consideration. 
In making this recommendation the consultants 
reviewed the criteria which had been previously agreed 
upon by the trustee committee. 
They identified four location zones and developed 
different assumptions concerning building density for each 
of these four zones with building density becoming less as 
the sites moved further away from the core city area. 
The planning assumptions built into the site 
selection review included the following: 
A total campus population of 15,000 students and 
3,000 faculty and staff. 
A requirement for 3,500,000 gross square feet. 
Minimum acreage required would range from 30 acres in 
the core city to 145 acres at a site on the Route 128 
Corridor. 
Building height would range from an average of 7 
levels in the core city area to an average of 5 at Route 
128. 
The maximum total land coverage by buildings would 
range from 50% in the core to only 30% at Route 128. 
There would be no requirement for dormitories since 
all students would commute to the campus by automobile or 
public transportation. Parking requirements, therefor, 
would vary by site location and availability of public 
transportation from a minimum of 2,250 spaces in the core 
city to a minimum of 9,000 at a site on the Route 128 
Corridor. 
Availability of adequate public transportation would 
be a critical consideration since it would be an 
all-commuter student campus. 
The sites under consideration are identified on the 
map within the appendices of this case study. The seven 
sites recommended for further consideration were: 
In the Core Area: The Copley Square Site and a site 
adjacent to North Station., 
In the Core Fringe: Highland Park, 
In the Intermediate Zone between Core City and 
Suburbs: Columbia Point and an additional location labeled, 
"The Governor Shirley Site". 
In the Inner Suburbs Near Route 128: West Roxbury 
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Marshes and Woodland Country Club. 
The Copley Square, North Station, Highland Park and 
Columbia Point sites are described and discussed at length 
elsewhere in this paper. The remaining three sites, 
"Governor Shirley", West Roxbury Marshes, and Woodland 
Country Club, were briefly reviewed in late 1967 and early 
1968 and rejected. The following is a brief discussion of 
these sites. 
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The Governor Shirley Site 
The Governor Shirley Site was located at the lorthern 
edge of the Dorchester section of Boston on sixty acres of 
fully developed land bounded by Massachusetts Avenue, 
Hampden Street, Norfolk Avenue and the New Haven Railroad. 
It had been originally proposed to the University by local 
community groups eager to bring about a revitalization of 
the area. The site's label was drawn from the fact that it 
included the former home of one of Massachusetts' colonial 
governors. The community groups suggested that the Shirley 
Mansion could be restored as an historic shrine and used as 
86 . 
the official residence of the current governor. 
The consultants noted that the site encompassed 143 
buildings and 371 local residents. It was a generally 
depressed area with an unattractive appearance in a period 
of transition from residential use to commercial and 
industrial uses. 
There were some important limitations. Any future 
expansion of the new campus would cut heavily into the 
existing residential areas or already intensively 
developed industrial area. The University would, therefor, 
have to make an early and final decision on the amount of 
acreage reguired and then live with this final decision in 
the years to come. The site had been specifically identifed 
by the BRA as part of th <ir "Model Cities" urban renewal 
proposal and thus would probably not be available 
for several years due to the complex development process 
which they had established. Construction of the campus 
would result in the elimination of an estimated 2,000 jobs 
and 110 residential units and a significant loss of tax 
base to the city. The nearest access to the public transit 
system was nearly a mile from the site. These factors 
caused the University to discontinue consideration of the 
site in early 1968. ^* 
The West Roxbury Site 
The West Roxbury Site consisted of about 250 acres of 
marshland lying along the banks of the Charles River at 
the extreme southwest corner of the City of Boston. It was 
completely undeveloped and its development would result in 
the dislocation of no homes or businesses but would result 
in a very insignificant reduction in the City's property 
tax base. 
The site would require the construction of one or 
more very expensive new connecting roads to Route 128, 
which was about one mile south of the site. The site would 
straddle a proposed extension of the Forest Hills MBTA 
rapid transit line. The campus could potentially expa id 
along the banks of the Charles River into suburban Newton 
and be linked with future recreational development of river 
frontage by the Metropolitan District Commission. The 
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nearby attractive suburban towns of Needham and Newton 
would be likely to attract faculty and staff. 
Problems might result, however, from the fact that the 
site would be located in from two to as many as four 
different municipalities depending on the size of the site 
taken. Because the site was primarily marsh land and a 
former land fill, site preparation costs would be higher 
than normal. Although the site was the nearest Route 128 
site to downtown Boston, it would still have been a 20 to 
25 minute ride to the core city by the proposed rapid 
transit line. Although technically within the legal limits 
of Boston it was actually an isolated location far out 
from the core city and totally at odds with the concept of 
an urban university developed in the campus' mission 
statement. This factor caused it to be abandoned by the 
8 8 
University in early 1968. 
The Woodland Country Club Site in Newton 
The Woodland Country Club was a 130 acre site located 
in a predominantly residential section of the northwestern 
part of the suburb of Newton directly adjacent to Route 
128. The Riverside line of the MBTA rapid transit system 
passed through the center of the site terminating in a 
massive public parking lot at its western terminus directly 
northwest of the site. Further expansion would be possible 
onto either the adjacent Brae Burn Golf Course or the 
nearby warehouse area of the Jordan Marsh Company. The site 
offered immediate access to the rapid transit system and to 
Route 128 and would have required virtually no dislocation 
of residents or businesses. There would be a minimum of 
site preparation costs. The choice suburban location would 
be likely to prove attractive to faculty and staff. The 
site would, however, be some 25 to 30 minutes from the 
core city by public transportation and a 20 to 25 minute 
ride by automobile. Although somewhat more accessible by 
rapid transit, it suffered from the same sense of 
isolation from the city and city life as did the West 
^ -i. 89. Roxbury site. 
Both the West Roxbury and Woodland sites offered an 
attractive prospect to faculty and students willing and 
able to commute some distance by automobile. The mission 
statement of the campus, however, called for an 
institution which would specifically provide access to the 
financially disadvantaged youth of the inner city who could 
only afford to commute by public transportation. It called, 
too for immediate access to the cultural riches of the 
inner city. These objectives and similar concerns could not 
be achieved at West Roxbury or Woodland. They would only be 
selected as an alternative if a core city site turned out 
to be an impossibility 
CHAPTER VII 
THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE UNIVERSITY 
OF MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON: 1968 
The Negative Impact of Continuing Delay In Site Selection 
By January of 1968 the new campus began to 
experience serious negative consequences stemming from the 
three and one half years delay in locating a permanent 
site. These consequences would include growing 
disillusionment on the part of the legislature, continued 
delay in the expansion of Boston Campus enrollment and 
in academic programs, the resignation of a very talented 
but deeply discouraged chancellor, increased community 
resistance to a core city location and the revival of a 
proposal to scrap the Boston campus in favor of a totally 
different plan. Decisive action was now long overdue. By 
year end a final decision would be made but as the year 
opened it was not at all clear that the long search was 
now nearing a final resolution. 
Growing Concern by the Legislature 
As yet another year began with no decision on a site 
for the Boston campus, the legislature was becoming uneasy 
about the long delay and concerned as well about the 
increase in anti-war protest activity by the University's 
students and faculty in downtown Boston. Early in February 
the Massachusetts Legislative Joint Committee on Education 
passed a resolution calling for an investigation of Boston 
faculty who had allegedly been overtly contributing, 
aiding, and encouraging acts of civil disobedience 
committed by some students at the University. On February 
12,1968 a hearing was conducted by the Joint Committee on 
House Bill No. 1798 presented by the Boston Teacher's Union, 
Local 66, AFL-CIO, requiring the location of a permanent 
campus for The University of Massachusetts within Boston's 
city limits. The bill was adopted by the House and sent on 
to the Senate. Both measures eventually died during the 
session without any action being taken but they clearly 
reflect the growing impatience and concern with the Boston 
Campus on the part of the legislature. 
Resignation of Chancellor Ryan 
Boston Campus Chancellor Ryan had become totally 
frustrated by the failure to locate a site coupled with a 
lack of adequate financial resources. Ryan submitted a 
formal letter of resignation to President Lederle on 
February 25 stating that his resignation would be effective 
on or before August 15,1968. Ryan suggested that his 
decision be kept confidential until at least April or May 
so that he could continue to fully address the many 
problems of the Boston Campus. Ryan listed personal 
family considerations as his primary reason for leaving, 
but also stated that, 
The professional reasons are very nearly as grave... 
There is every indication that all of my effort has 
been insufficient to produce the public support 
needed to translate our objectives for this 
University from the pious words of platform speeches 
into the splendid reality of academic resources and 
physical plant. We are at best marking time. Not one 
single measure of improvement has been made in the 
budgetary support of the Boston campus since my first 
day on the job. Instead of calling for high quality 
educational opportunity, the Governor has forced us 
to take more and more students into an understaffed, 
iii-housed, inadequately financed Boston campus, with 
sub-minimal library and equipment resources. 1. 
A Second Attempt by the University 
to Win Approval of a Copley Site 
Intervention by Student Leaders 
During the second week of December a mass rally of 
more than 1500 students was held in the lobby of the 
temporary facilities in Park Square. A student leadership 
group including Paul Pierce, president of the 27,000 member 
Massachusetts Student Association, a representative of the 
University's Amherst campus and several Boston campus 
student leaders, announced a campaign of support for the 
proposal for the 30 acre Copley Square/South End campus. 
Dennis McKinley, public relations director for the new 
Boston Campus student coordinating committee said that a 15 
member student visiting committee would begin paying visits 
to legislators, civic and political groups in hopes of 
gaining wide spread support. The students listed convenient 
commuting as the number one reason for a core city site and 
also cited the importance of being located "where the 
action is" and the better possibility of meaningful 
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cross-cultural exchanges between the student and the core 
city. State Representative David Vigneault of Springfield, 
a full time student at the University's Amherst campus, 
spoke to the crowd stating that it would be a violation of 
legislative intent to locate the new campus anywhere but in 
the core city and promised to argue this point on the floor 
2 . 
of the legislature. * The Student Council at UMB sent a 
letter to Chancellor Ryan in early January announcing their 
resolution calling on the Governor, State Legislature and 
University Trustees to immediately take steps to acquire 
the Copley Square site for the permanent site of the Boston 
Campus. ^ * 
In early 1968 the Boston Campus faculty leadership 
began a renewed effort to win approval of a smaller Copley 
Square/South End area site. In a letter to Lederle dated 
February 19,1968, Hale Champion, who had replaced Ed Logue 
as Development Administrator of the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority within the new White administration, summarised 
the discussion which had taken place at a meeting between 
the BRA and representatives of the University on February 
16. The BRA recommended Columbia Point as their first 
choice and noted that it was the only site approved 
officially by the Authority. Both groups agreed to 
explore the possibility of a smaller site on a 14 acre 
area in the South End section of downtown Boston bounded 
by Huntington Avenue, Stuart Street, Dartmouth Street, the 
New Haven Railroad and Follen Street but there was no 
commitment by either party. The staffs of both groups were 
instructed to arrive at a decision within 30 days as to 
. 4 
whether the site was feasible. 
On March 8,1968, an informal association of Boston 
Campus students identifying themseleves as the "Student 
Copley Site Committee" sent a memorandum to the trustees 
reporting that through their efforts massive community' 
support had been gathered in support of the Copley site 
including 10 state senators and 42 state representatives, 
who were listed by name, and a number of Boston area 
community groups and labor unions such as the civic 
associations of the Brighton-Allston, Jamaica Plain,and 
South End sections of Boston and the Boston Teachers 
Union, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. The students also 
included copies of a petition signed by 98 members of the 
faculty at the Boston campus endorsing the choice of the 
Copley site. Conspicuously absent from this petition were 
5 . 
the signatures of any faculty from the hard sciences. 
In a letter to Dean Gagnon, dated March 28,1968, 
Daniel P. Moynihan, then the Director of The Joint Center 
For Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University, expressed 
his satisfaction at learning that Gagnon and the faculty 
leadership were still determined to fight for a core site 
for the new campus. He reported to Gagnon on a 
conversation with BRA chief, Hale Champion, 
recent 
...who is particularly concerned to see that 
everyone understand the basics for the BRA rejection 
of the Turnpike site. It was not a rejection on the 
basis of land use. To the contrary. Hale Champion and 
the Mayor are entirely willing to see that area used 
for educational purposes. The problem, as you suggest 
in your letter, was exclusively one of design. The 
staff of the BRA simply felt that the Sasaki design 
would be altogether inappropriate to the pattern they 
are developing in that area and further concluded 
that no satisfactory design could be developed so 
long as the present student density, as it were,is 
maintained. Hale put it to me that if you could cut 
down the number of students from 15,000 to 10,000, 
with a comparable reduction in the number of cars, 
etc., that the site could be managed and would be 
made available. He wonders whether or not in phasing 
into a second institution needed in Boston something 
couldn't be worked out. In any event, be clear on 
the point that the BRA and the mayor want you in 
Boston and want to see if they can't make it possible 
to get you....A second point which Hale made is 
Mayor White is prepared to take the political heat 
that will arise from using this property for an 
educational purpose. I think it is extremely 
important to understand that what defeated us was the 
problem of design, not the question of use. 6. 
Meanwhile the BRA and White administration continued 
to pursue the possibility of Columbia Point. On April 3 
the BRA met with the Columbia Point Community Development 
Council to present local residents with an overview of its 
plans for locating the Boston campus at Columbia Point. 
Most of the approximately 150 residents in attendance 
* 
indicted approval by a show of hands. Representatives from 
the mayor's office promised that no existing apartments 
would be taken from the Columbia Point public housing 
complex. Francis O'Brien, the University's director of 
development, indicated that selection of Columbia Point was 
still only a remote possibility but that the University 
would be a good neighbor wherever it went. House Speaker 
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Robert Quinn, who represented the area in the legislature, 
was in attendance and stated that selection of Columbia 
Point seemed to be only a remote possibility and that he 
had faith in the University Trustees to do what was right 
^ 4.4. 7. in the matter. 
In a letter sent to the University on April 22, H. 
Brown Baldwin, Vice President of Boston Gas told Dean 
Gagnon, 
I've been in touch with Jim Kelso (Executive Vice 
President of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce) 
who had a lengthy discussion with John Ryan and 
others and has been keeping me informed of events. It 
seems that there is still some confusion within the 
University...As I understand it, it was left that 
Ryan would develop with the Board, a clear 
statement of just what it is the University wants. 
and where they want it and I have suggested to Eli 
Goldston (Chairman of the Board of Boston Gas and a 
DirGetor of the First National Bank of Boston) that, 
until that rather basic matter is cleared up, we 
can't really proceed in a supporting role. 8. 
It is clear that the faculty leadership was working 
closely with local business leaders and the Greater Boston 
Chamber of Commerce on the revised proposal for a smaller 
Copley site. In a May 3 letter to James Kelso, Executive 
Director of the Chamber, H. Brown Baldwin stated that he 
had been in touch with Dean Gagnon relative to the new 
proposal and that the campus administration and a majority 
of the trustees were definitely ready and willing to move 
forward on the proposal. Gagnon had told him that he hoped 
to set up a meeting with Hale Champion to discuss the plan 
and had left a copy of the plan with Kelso to be shared 
9. 
with various leaders in the business community. 
160 
Opposition by Back Bay Business and Community Leaders 
Erwin Canham, President of the Back Bay Federation 
for Community Development, senior editor of the Christian 
Science Mointor newspaper, and moderator of a televised 
weekly panel discussion by local newspaper editors on 
current events entitled "Starring The Editors" had become 
deeply concerned over the site selection issue. Canham sent 
a letter on May 6,1968 to Joseph Healey in which he stated 
that the community objections made so strongly against the 
Copley Square site also applied to the Park Square - South 
Cove site as well. Canham asked for an opportunity for 
community input stating, 
Since last Summer, the Back Bay leadership and civic 
organizations have remained silent ana patient on 
this matter, even while administrators, faculty, and 
students of the University were conoucting public 
relations, mailing and lobbying campaigns for the 
Copley Square site. We waited until the time when the 
University would consult us and divulge their plans. 
However this did not happen. We would hope in the 
present situation that you would be willing to meet 
with leaders of the Back Bay at the earliest possible 
date to discuss all aspects of this subject. 10. 
In a response to Canham, Healey stated that a 
majority, but not all of the trustees had concurred in a 
decision to attempt to locate the new campus as close as 
feasible to the core city area and that. 
They have accepted as a viable educational 
philosophy the concept that the modern urban 
university should be related in fact to.the economic, 
cultural and social life of the inner city. T 
view is shared by the overwhelming majority of the 
faculty and students at UMass-Boston who<have 
strongly favored a core city permanent site. 11. 
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Healey stated that the trustees had attempted to 
cooperate with Mayor Collins and Mayor White and the BRA. 
He added that the trustees had now begun to discuss a much 
smaller 14 acre site over the turnpike interchange which 
would accomodate not more than 15,000 students. The site's 
feasibility had been approved by Sasaki and Associates and 
had been reviewed by D. Patrick Moynihan and David Riesman 
of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center of Urban Studies who had 
expressed the view that this new proposal would be their 
preferred site for an urban state university in Boston. The 
plan was then submitted to Hale Champion of the BRA and his 
staff for review and they asked for further study of such 
things as architectural concepts, traffic patterns and 
12. 
transportation facilities. * Healey stated that, 
During this period I and other members of the Board 
talked with a number of the leaders of the Boston 
business community about the modified air rights 
proposal. Much of the reaction was unfavorable. The 
strong opposition to the plan of the various 
associations in the Back Bay was well known ana 
recognized. On March 21,1968 the trustees were 
notified that the air rights location was not 
acceptable to the city administration. At the 
meeting on March 22,1968 the trustees dropped this 
site from active consideration. 13. 
Healey said that the University was now limiting its 
consideration to Columbia Point, the North Station area, 
Fenway Park, which had been suggested by Speaker Quinn, the 
Watertown Arsenal, and the South Cove redevelopment area 
adjecent to Park Square. He said that conversations were 
still going on with the BRA and the Chamber of Commerce 
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about the South Cove area and that the trustees would 
welcome comment from Canham and others in the Back Bay 
Associations although they did not realize in beginning 
these discussions that there would be strong interest from 
4 A 
these groups in the South Cove area. 
A Final Proposal to Scrap the Boston Campus in Favor of 
Boston State College 
As he announced his retirement in late May, Dr. 
Looney, president of Boston State College suggested 
that a "solution to the chaotic condition of higher 
education in the Boston area" could be reached through the 
merger of Boston State College, The Massachusetts College 
of Art and the Boston Campus of the University of 
Massachusetts into a new state university, autonomous and 
separate from the University of Massachusetts, designed to 
serve 20,000 commuting students in the Boston area. He 
pointed out that money was being wasted through the 
provision of three separate libraries and other facilities 
and suggested that the new university be built on the 
present site of Boston.State College augmented through the 
purchase of 10 to 15 more adjecent acres along Huntington 
Avenue. Responding to Looney's suggestion in an editorial 
the Boston Globe noted that the standards and purposes of 
the three institutions were different but suggested that it 
might possibly be a good idea for them to share facilities 
15. 
even if they didn't merge. 
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Reconsideration of a North Station Area Site 
On June 28 the trustee Building and Grounds Committee 
met with Charles Hilgenhurst of the BRA and it was agreed 
to request the BRA in co-operation with Sasaki and 
Associates to again review the feasibility of the North 
Station area. Hilgenhurst and representatives of the Chamber 
of Commerce stated that they would support the University 
on this site provided that it stayed north of the 
commercial stores in this area. 
In a final letter to Lederle on July 30, 1968 John 
Ryan summed up his frustration as chancellor with the site 
selection problem. Ryan noted that in December,1965 he had 
presented a paper at an informal meeting of the trustees 
listing the question of a permanent site as his first 
priority and a decision which could be made by April of 
1966. He stated that he was now convinced that the Copley 
Square site was not available and that the site in Boston 
most nearly meeting criteria was Columbia Point. Ryan 
stated, 
This is not a recent conclusion, and should not come 
as a surprise to anyone... Nothing has happened to 
change any of the facts which applied in October, 
1967. Copley Square vicinity is not available; Park 
Square vicinity is not available; Highland Park is 
out of the question. 17. 
He concluded that although the North Station site was 
adequate in terms of size it was also congested, noisy and 
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unsightly and did not offer the potential for an ultimately 
beautiful setting which was present at Columbia Point and 
ended by suggesting to Lederle that it was of critical 
importance that an immediate decision be reached on one of 
, . , 18. 
these two sites. 
In a similar letter to Joseph Healey dated August 8, 
1968, Ryan made the same points, stated his preference for 
Columbia Point, and recommended that a choice of either 
North Station or Columbia Point be made as soon as 
19. possible. 
Appointment of a New Chancellor for the Boston Campus 
The appointment of Dr. Francis L. Broderick, former 
dean of Lawrence and Downer Colleges at Lawrence University 
in Appleton, Wisconsin, was announced in the Boston Globe 
on August 18. The Globe noted that, 
Broderick appears to be the superman needed to save 
the struggling urban experiment from a city that has 
no space, a state that has no money, and a jealous 
academic community already suffering from too much 
competition and too little support. 20. 
In an August 20 letter to the trustee Buildings and 
Grounds Committee the Chairman of the Massachusetts Board 
of Regional Community Colleges stated that he had noticed 
reports in the press of the University's possible interest 
in the North Station site and since the Community Colleges 
were planning a new community college nearby at the site of 
the old state prison in Charlestown, he could forsee. 
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"infinite possibilities 
institutions" and hoped 
favorable factor in the 
21. 
site. 
for collaboration between our two 
that these possibilities would be a 
University's consideration of the 
Description of the North Station Site 
The North Station site had been passed over by the 
consultants and the Buildings and Grounds Committee in 
prior reviews. It was a flat site consisting of old 
railroad yards directly adjacent to the northeastern edge 
of the downtown commercial district. It consisted of 15 
acres directly behind North Station and the Boston Garden 
sports arena and another 60 acre tract beyond this area and 
across the Charles River which was presently in use as a 
railroad yard. No information had been developed on 
availability, exact ownership, the required timing for 
acquisition, or acquisition costs. The area offered an 
in-town location with convenient access to highway and 
public transportation which could be developed with 
virtually no requirement for dislocation of residents and 
businesses. The site had been previously passed over 
because of uncertainty about when it would cease operating 
as an active railroad yard, the fact that much of the land 
was on filled tidal flats which might necessitate higher 
construction costs, and the "visually overpowering" 
existing and proposed elevated highway structures which 
would both surround and physically divide the site. Further 
complications would be caused by the fact that the site was 
located in three different cities and might be subject to 
complicated regulations concerning tidelands leasing. ^ ^ * 
Opposition to the North Station Site 
Up to this point no one appears to have seriously 
considered the possible negative impact of a campus located 
in the North Station area on the operation of the adjacent 
Boston Garden sports arena. By early September/ officials 
at Boston Garden were expressing grave concern over the 
impact of over 15,000 day and night students on the 
already congested public transportation system which was 
the life blood of their business. 
In the September 6,1968 edition of The Herald 
Traveller, sports writer, A1 Hirshberg predicted that 
anything as big as the new campus of the University of 
Massachusetts would strangle the Boston Garden with "the 
greatgrandfather of all traffic jams, with students, 
faculty and commuters getting into the way of sports 
followers. Hirshberg quoted Boston Garden Chairman Weston 
Adams as telling him in an interview, 
I'm Boston, My father was Boston. My roots and my 
family life are Boston. There's nothing in the world 
would make us move the Bruins away from Boston if we 
didn't have to. But if this thing goes through we'd 
have to. With a university here we'd die. I don't 
know what brilliant mind conceived this area as a 
university site, but I can't think of a worse 
one. 23. 
The Boston Globe for Friday, September 6 reported 
that the mayor was prepared to,"do everything possible to 
prevent a UMass-Boston campus from swallowing the Boston 
Garden." White was quoted as stating, 
The city can fight a location decision but actually 
it is up to the state. Back in my first days as mayor 
I spent 4 1/2 hours with UMass. President John 
Lederle discussing the problem. The city would like 
to be able to provide a location for an urban 
institution but we have a real land use problem. This 
has hampered us both with the stadium project and the 
UMass intown campus. One of the last things I want to 
happen is to have one desirable addition to the city 
cancel out an existing healthy situation. 24. 
The University Responds to Opposition 
The Globe guoted a spokesperson for President Lederle 
as stating that no decision had been made on the North 
Station site and that the University was giving it 
reconsideration only because Mayor White, the BRA, and the 
Boston Chamber of Commerce has asked them to reconsider 
it. The same University spokesperson is quoted as saying 
that the North Station1 reaction was becoming a repetition 
of the Coply Square controversy and stating, "We look at an 
area and the people in the area immediately get up in 
arms. " 
The same edition published a letter by Dean Paul 
Gagnon answering critics of the North Station plan. 
Gagnon stated that the University had no intention of 
taking Boston Garden and instead would be improving the 
situation in the area by working to improve public 
transportation and expanded public parking garages. Gagnon 
went on to castigate Adams for his public reactions, 
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I am sorry to see him (Weston Adams) and others join 
those Boston business and political spokesmen who do 
not seem to know what a public municipal university 
means to a city in the 20th century. They can think 
only of segregating the university and its students 
at Columbia Point, out of sight and out of mind. We 
do not believe in an isolated segregated campus, but 
in university buildings in a city, for city people of 
all ages and incomes easily reached on foot or public 
transit at all hours of the day. They should meet and 
learn together on common ground in the middle of the 
city they are going to live in, work in, and take 
pride in after they graduate. 25. 
Reaction By The Legislature Leadership 
The publicity over opposition to the North Station 
site and the prospect of additional serious delay and 
uncertainty regarding a site, prompted strong reaction from 
some of the legislative leadership. House Speaker Robert 
Quinn, representing the districts of South Boston and 
Dorchester, sent President Lederle a telegram on 
September 9 expressing his personal opposition to the 
North Station site and recommending Columbia Point as the 
appropriate site since it offered "a tremendous future 
for our young people and their education". He warned that, 
"continued inaction will prompt legislation naming 
2 6 Columbia Point as the site." 
Speaker Quinn emerged from a private meeting with 
Governor Volpe on September 10 and told reporters of an 
ultimatum he had given the University trustees through the 
governor, "The trustees have had enough time to select a 
site. Personally, I believe they should settle on the 
Columbia Point proposal." He said that the governor had 
► 
told him that the trustees had the most information on the 
subject and that he was going to rely on their judgement on 
27 . 
the matter. 
Quinn followed this news report up with a letter to 
Lederle on September 11 stating that because of the 
publicity concerning his telegram he felt compelled to 
write again to clarify his position. He reminded the 
president that he had always taken the position that the 
site selection was a matter to be decided by the trustee's 
but that now when ,"choices are narrowing and the time for 
action is fast slipping by", he felt that the advantages 
of Columbia Point far outweighed the disadvantages which 
could be eliminated with imaginative planning. Quinn closed 
with the statement. 
As one who has many times expressed his willingness 
to you to wage your fights in the political arena, I 
urge you to end the inaction and indecision and 
settle upon the Columbia Point site. 28. 
Professor James Ryan sent the trustees a letter on 
September 11 on behalf of the Executive Committee of the 
Faculty Senate asking that the trustees postpone a decision 
on a site until the new chancellor had time to complete a 
review of alternative sites with the faculty. Responding to 
the publicity surrounding Quinn's telegram, they stated, 
We also want to express our full support for the 
trustees in their efforts to choose a site because of 
its positive advantages for the educational and urban 
goals of the University of Massachusetts at Boston. 
We hope that recent partisan, well—publicized 
attempts to influence the trustees will not be 
allowed to affect this irrevocable decision. 29. 
The unfavorable reaction 
In an editorial entitled,"The 
broadcast on September 13, the 
Station WEEI warned that Quinn 
continued to Quinn's move. 
Dictates of the Speaker", 
management of Boston Radio 
s. 
inordinate pressure on the trustees is the opening 
wedge to what we consider to be blatant and 
uncalled-for legislative interference in the affairs 
of the state university. The last thing we need is 
for the University of Massachusetts to become a 
political football in the legislature. Beyond that, 
there's the incredible amount of presumption in 
Speaker Quinn's demands. Is our legislature so docile 
that on the demands of its Speaker it will 
automatically mandate the University Trustees to 
locate the campus just where he wants it? 30. 
In mid-September the Salem Evening News published an 
interview with Senate Majority Leader, Kevin Harrington in 
which he advanced a new explanation for the long delay in 
the site selection for the Boston campus. According to 
Harrington, 
The University doesn't want a Boston branch. It's 
never wanted one. It wants everything centered in 
Amherst. History has shown that whenever you have a 
geographical split, eventually you're going to have 
a power split. The university doesn't want that. 
They're afraid of that. 31. 
Harrington stated that Chancellor Ryan had resigned 
once he began to recognize this attitude on the part of the 
Lederle administration and saw the Boston campus operating 
budget requests being cut back by Lederle year after year. 
Harrington said that the University of Massachusetts had 
been compelled by circumstances to establish a Boston 
branch when the Willis—Harrington Commission began drafting 
a blueprint for the state's expansion in higher education. 
The clause which concerned the University was that which 
would have prevented any state institution from undertaking 
an expansion program without prior approval of the new 
Board of Higher Education and its chancellor. Since the 
University of Massachusetts had no way of knowing whether 
the balance of power on this new board would tilt toward 
UMass or the state college system, it decided to act on a 
Boston campus before the Wi11is-Harrington Commission, 
completed its work. Now, by Harrington's estimation, the 
University had effective control through the strong support 
of a majority of the members of on the new Board of Higher 
education and could block expansion by the state colleges. 
As a result they were intentionally proposing sites which 
were,"calculated to fail under the weight of opposition." 
The Copley Square and North Station proposals were 
suggested in full knowledge that they would be opposed and 
were about to suggest Columbia Point after learning from 
test borings that the site was virtually unbuildable. 
Harrington also expressed concern about the changing power 
dynamics between the University of Massachusetts and the 
state college system. He claimed that since the University 
was now in a position to push an expansion of its own 
budget and cut the state college system to the bone, the 
legislature would have to intervene on the part of the 
state college system. He would fight for Salem State 
College, House Speaker Quinn for Boston State, House Ways 
and Means Chairman, Anthony Scibelli of Springfield for 
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Westfield State College, and Senate Ways and Means Chairman 
James Burke of Brockton for Bridgewater State College. The 
legislative leadership would provide this support through 
increasing the state college budgets but not by cutting the 
University's budget. ^’ 
This interview was so disturbing to President Lederle 
that he wrote to John Ryan, now a vice president at Indiana 
University,stating, 
Wendell Woodman is bad enough, but couple him with 
Kevin Harrington and it becomes really vicious. I 
would appreciate it if you could see your way clear 
to write Kevin saying you have seen the article and 
that there is no truth to the claim that you quit 
because I did not support you and the Boston campus. 
Indeed, it would be useful if you could go further 
and state that I was always a strong and dedicated 
supporter of rapid and vigorous development of the 
Boston Campus. 33. 
Ryan wrote to Harrington on October 15 stating 
For the record, I did not resign because I learned 
of sabotage by 'Amherst' of the Boston campus 
requests. I do not believe any such sabotage ever 
occurred in my years of service. You are quite right 
to blow the whistle on the unconscionable budgetary 
neglect of the Boston students, but I am sure you 
want to put the blame where it belongs. Year in and 
year out, since 1965, I prepared the most prudent and 
frugal budget possible for a nascent University, and 
year in year out my experience would be the same: 
the President would approve it, the trustees would 
adopt it, the Board of Education would endorse it, 
and the Governor, on the advice, presumably, of his 
budget 'experts', would slash it 40%, 30%, 25%. Every 
year, Boston students were saved from academic 
disaster by the General Court through supplemental 
appropriations and once by actually increasing the 
executive request. 34. 
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The Final Effort By Faculty And Student Leaders to Secure 
A Core City Location 
On October 3 a special meeting of the Committee on 
Buildings and Grounds was called at the Sheraton Plaza 
Hotel for October 14 to brief state and city leadership on 
the final stages of the site selection process. In a letter 
inviting Governor Volpe to this meeting, Trustee Chairman 
Boyden described it as,"...a private briefing session prior 
to expected Board action later that day on selection of a 
35 permanent site...". 
The Faculty Reguest Delay on a Decision 
On the same day, October 3, the faculty of the Boston 
campus met with President Lederle, Trustees Healey, Hagis 
and Crowley and representatives of Sasaki in a three hour 
session to review the site selection process to date. On 
October 8 the faculty met agian and passed a resolution 
stating their continuing commitment to a core site and 
asking the trustees to delay a final decision for one month 
so that they could offer other proposals. They also voted 
to create two ad-hoc committees one on "The Goals of An 
Urban University Education" .which would, "prepare position 
papers on the cultural, social and intellectual goals and 
advantages of an urban university education" and "begin a 
meaningful dialogue with the trustees on the nature of 
these goals and advantages" and a committee on "Mutiple Use 
174 
Structures" which would "report on the legal, 
architectural,and economic feasibility and advantages of 
multiple-use structures for UMB in the core area" and 
"develop a sketch, plan or model of at least one university 
stucture designed for multiple uses." A notice of these 
votes was mailed to President Lederle and the members of 
o c 
the Board of Trustees on October 9. 
Meanwhile Trustee Vice Chairman Healey, acting'for 
Chairman Boyden, contacted several of the other trustees 
during the first week of October and together they decided 
that no postponement on a decision was warranted. He met 
informally with Mayor White and Chancellor Broderick on 
October 9 to discuss the site and to inform them of the 
37 . 
trustees' decision to go ahead with Columbia Point. 
An article in the Boston Globe for October 10 
indicated that the Trustee Building and Grounds Committees 
had reached a decision on Columbia Point during a meeting 
in Mayor White's office the day before and that no further 
delay would be granted. According to this report it was 
expected that the site would be approved at a trustee 
3 8 
meeting later in October. 
In an editorial on October 11 the Globe gave warm 
approval to the Columbia Point decision stating that it 
was simply not practical to build in Copley Square or at 
North Station because of the loss of tax revenues involved. 
The Boston faculty met again on October 11 and voted 
to send the trustees a telegram expressing their shock at 
the apparent failure of the trustees to honor their request 
for a delay and repeating their request for such a 
, . 40. delay. 
Student And Faculty Demonstration At The Statehouse 
As the faculty were meeting, a group of students 
estimated at 2500 staged a mass rally in front of the 
campus building at 100 Arlington Street near Park Square 
to voice strong support for an intown, core city site and 
to condemn the decision to select Columbia Point. The 
students then marched across the downtown section to the 
capital building on Beacon Hill where they resumed their 
rally while one student attempted to fasten a copy of their 
demands to the door of the State House. Faculty leaders, 
including Dean Gagnon, marched with the students and 
addressed the group calling on the trustees to grant a 
41 delay so that further study could take place. 
In a stiring speech on the steps of the statehouse, 
Dean Gagnon repeated once again the arguments for an 
in-town site and then concluded by stating, 
I don't have time to repeat all of our arguments 
for an intown site but it has always been cheaper, 
and better, to build an efficient, no-frills city 
university in a few high-rise buildings. And we 
have always been ready to make payments in lieu of 
taxes to the City. All we need are 10-12 acres: 
Hunter does it. University of London does it. 
Brooklyn does it—and we are already doing it with 
3,500 students in less that two acres of space! We 
do not need more. We do not want more. We are not a 
Boston University, or a Norteastern University! we 
would and are ready to sign a solemn covenant with 
our surrounding community, and share equal power with 
them on a governing board. But we need time. I myself 
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cannot yet believe that the political business and 
religious leaders of Boston will not try again to do 
for their university, what the leaders of New York 
City, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, New Orleans, 
Philadelphia, and even Washington D.C. have done for 
theirs—find 10 or 12 acres for a core city site.... 
In closing, then, I would say that this is not a day 
for denunciation, or even a day for presenting all 
the arguments to convince people, but rather a day 
in which we ask for a decent amount of time to do 
what we feel still remains to be done. I do not see 
but that.fair-minded men will support us in this 
effort. i 
i 
i 
The Trustees Meet to Consider Columbia Point 
October 14 would be a full and busy day for the 
board of trustees. In the morning the Trustee Buildings and 
Grounds Committee met privately with a group of student 
and faculty leaders. This was followed by a full open 
meeting of the Trustee Building and Grounds Committee 
followed in the afternoon by a full meeting of the board 
of trustees. 
By the time of their meeting the trustees had reason 
for concern. Over the weekend student groups had sent 
telegrams to each of the trustees demanding a decision in 
favor of an in-town site and told reporters that they 
planned to attend the meeting in force on Monday to try to 
delay the selection of Columbia Point. About 2000 students 
attended the meeting. As they entered the meeting, however, 
they were admonished not to demonstrate. Globe reporter, 
Nina McCain described student leader Steven Berkowitz as 
standing at the door urging students,"No matter what 
decision is made please don't react violently." The 
Trustee Building and Grounds Committee met privately with 
student and faculty leaders earlier in the day to listen 
to their opinions. Despite some occasional loud applause 
at the open meeting, the student attendees did nothing to 
43 disrupt the meeting. 
Governor Volpe attended the trustee meeting on 
October 14 along with House Speaker Quinn and personal 
representatives of Mayor White and the Senate President. 
During this period of time it was a common practice for 
Trustee Chairman Boyden to ask Vice Chairman Healy to 
preside at meetings and perform other duties of the chair. 
Vice Chairman Healey addressed the meeting stating that the 
meeting had been called on the assumption that the trustees 
were now prepared to vote in favor of Columbia Point and so 
the governor, mayor and other legislative leaders had been 
called to provide them with a full briefing on the site. 
Mr. Sasaki of Sasaki, Dawson, DeMay Associates 
presented an in depth review of the long search process 
and the reasons why the Columbia Point site had been 
i 4. * 44, selected. 
Description and Relative Advantages of Columbia_Point 
The Columbia Point site was located in the extreme 
northeastern portion of the Dorchester section of Boston on 
a peninsula extending out into Boston Harbor. The western 
end of the peninsula was occupied by a public housing 
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project while the eastern end contained a former city 
dump which was now closed. The area provided panoramic 
views of the harbor and harbor islands. The actual site 
proposed for location of the campus consisted of 
approximately 100 acres of open undeveloped land resting 
on top of fill resulting from 70 to 80 years of trash, coal 
cinder and rubble disposal. There was significant 
potential for the development of the area's shorelines for 
scenic and recreational use by the general public which 
would provide an important opportunity for positive contact 
with the local community. The site was located along the 
direct air access routes into Boston's Logan Airport. 
Building profiles would have to remain relatively low and 
allowance made for some insulation from aircraft noise. 
This noise factor, however, was not viewed as being any 
worse than the traffic noise present at any of the down 
town sites. 
There were no people, businesses or ongoing public 
uses which would be displaced. Construction could begin 
almost immediately. Most of the land was owned by the city 
of Boston. There would be a loss of only $300,000 in 
assessed valuation from the city’s tax base from the one 
section which was in private hands. 
Columbia Point offered the best automobile access of 
any of the core sites which had been considered. Most 
people would be coming to the site from the north, away 
from the city, and thus would not be caught in the daily 
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morning rush hour traffic congestion. Local stations on 
the MTA rapid transit system were only a eight minute ride 
from the downtown commercial district. Although these 
stations were over three guarters of a mile from the site 
a shuttle bus system from the campus to the rapid transit 
line could greatly reduce the negative impact of this 
limitation. 
The site possessed certain of the environmental 
qualities of the suburban sites. At the same time it was 
closer to the urban core than any other site then 
available. The large amount of land area avaialable and 
relative ease of access to the urban core were compelling 
assests in land scarce Boston. It was the one remaining 
potential site presenting the best combination of 
favorable factors when measured against the original site 
45 . 
selection criteria. 
In the discussion which followed, Speaker Quinn 
indicated that the decision on a site was up to the 
trustees and that he would support any choice they made. He 
said that he had originally favored a core city location 
but thought that this was now impossible and that Columbia 
Point would be the next best thing. Quinn noted that the 
Columbia Point site would not displace any housing or 
industry and would not eliminate any of the city's present 
tax base and represented a far more attractive site than 
the North Station area. He expressed his full support of 
the choice of Columbia Point and urged them to ignore the 
requests being made by the faculty and students for a 
thirty day delay and to take quick decisive action instead 
since the search had now dragged on for four years. Other 
legislators present expressed support for Quinn's position. 
After brief discussion the trustee subcommittee voted 
to recommend the rejection of the North Station site. In a 
second vote they gave tacit approval to the request for a 
30 day delay by voting to recommend to the full board that 
Columbia Point be the only site under active consideration 
and that a final decision be made on this location at the 
next trustee meeting on November 22. 
At the meeting of the full board of trustees which 
followed, Sasaki made the same presentation on the case for 
selection of Columbia Point. The trustees then voted to 
formally reject North Station and then voted to accept 
Columbia Point as the only site under active consideration 
with a final decision to be made at their next meeting. In 
closing the meeting Vice Chairman Healy advised the faculty 
and students in attendance that, "This Board does not see 
any other viable alternative than Columbia Point, but, we 
are willing to listen." The faculty and students had won 
_ , , _ . 46. 
a one month delay. 
On October 21 Quinn spoke at UMB and stated that any 
decision on a final site location made by the trustees 
would receive the full support of the Democrats in the 
House and Senate. The speaker voiced support for the 
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Columbia Point site since an "ideal" in town site has not 
. . , 47. been located. 
On November 12,1968 in an interview with the Mass 
Media, Professor H.P. Mahon of the Physics department, and 
a member of the in Town Site Committee, warned that because 
of an emotional commitment to an in town site, some people 
on campus had blinded themselves to the problems which a 
scattered in-town site might entail. 
The Scattered Site Proposal 
On November 15, Chancellor Broderick presented a 
proposal to the Trustee Buildings and Grounds subcommittee 
for a scattered site, in town space proposal. He proposed 
that the new campus be located in three "close but 
separate" sites within the core city. 
Park Square: The Campus would retain its present 
location at 200 Arlington Street and search for other 
rented space in adjacent buildings which would be shared 
with other users such as restaurants, offices for 
businesses and retail stores. 
South End; The University would develop 1,500,000 
square feet of usable space within an urban renewal 
district located approximately \ mile from the Park Square 
site. Most space would be in buildings shared with business 
firms and ligh industry, although the campus would also 
occupy five or six acres devoted exclusively to the use of 
the university. None of the current residents of the area 
would be displaced. 
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A_i_r—Space: The University would share space in a 
variety of multiple use buildings to be built on 
approximately 10 acres of "air rights" over the depressed 
portion of the Massachusetts Turnpike located approximately 
three blocks south of the Park Square location. 
As enrollments continued to grow in future decades 
the university might decide to branch out further along the 
public transportation lines into such core city locations 
as South Station, the "hinge block" at the intersection of 
Tremont and Boylston Streets, the Quincy Market area behind 
the government center, the banking district, and the air 
rights over rail yards behind North Station. 
Broderick's report presented three central concepts which 
guided the proposal, 
UMass/Boston created as an urban university alert to 
the needs of the late 20th century, needs to plunge 
itself into the midst of the city, into the variety, 
the vigor, the restless movement that make our 
society primarily urbanThe University is not a 
haven for withdrawal, but a center for learning, a 
meeting place, a forum, that operates in the middle 
of things, encouraging integration, association, and 
mutual education amoung students, faculty, and all 
people of the city. 
The desire to add to, not subtract from, the city 
...add to the cultural and educational resources 
of the city without causing any loss to the city - 
no loss of tax revenues, no loss of commercial 
development, no loss of actual or potential housing 
...We are not asking the city to deprive itself of a 
site that now produces revenue, or of a large acreage 
that might produce revenue in the future...We want to 
avoid moving residents who want to remain, for we 
want the university to be threaded through and around 
the life of the city. 
The need to create a physical setting that will 
aliow the university to adapt to Innovation in 
education. The university will change as it grows - 
las£adLeVSn 33 mUCh 38 Boston has changed in the 
. ~ because society will change... 
other t^n a k Wlth the City' that is something 
other than an urban architectural monument to 
current notions of education, will be adaptable... 
academic units of 2,200 students allow change to 
occur,as needs are perceived. A smaller 
administrative unit can experiment with new programs, 
even at risk of failure, without endangering the 
whole university. Smaller units, with their greater 
intimacy, serve another purpose as well - they 
remind the whole academic community that no matter' 
ow largeithe university may grow, it may not lose 
sight of its central responsibility to the 
individual students... 49. 
Following the meeting, Trustee Healey told reporters 
that he saw a basic conflict in educational philosophy 
between those who felt that an urban university ought to be 
woven into the life of a city and those who felt it should 
be a separate integrated whole located in one place. He 
added, however, that that it was still possible that the 
trustees might decide to further pursue the scattered 
50 
site concept. 
Community Support for the Scattered Site Proposal 
At this point various other groups within the 
community, responding to lobbying efforts from the student 
groups at the Boston Campus, contacted the trustees on 
behalf of the scattered site proposal. The board of 
directors of the 25,000 member University of Massachusetts 
Alumni association sent a letter to the trustees stating 
that they would view the choice of Columbia Point with 
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"total disapprobation" and charging that the "political and 
mercantile arguments favoring the location are specious". 
They asked the trustees to give serious consideration to 
51 
the scattered site proposal. 
Boston's Roman Catholic Archbishop, Richard Cardinal 
Cushing decided to take a eleventh hour stand on the issue 
In a letter to President Lederle dated October 16, the 
cardinal offered the university use of the diocese's 
cathedral located in the South End area of Boston along 
with other land and buildings nearby. Cushing stated that 
he wished to add his voice, 
to those who feel the university should be close to 
the heart of the city. It should not be off in the 
suburbs or on the dreary acres of Columbia Point, but 
in the heart of things where the life of the city and 
the life of the university can serve each other. I 
cannot immagine a less desirable site for a large 
university than the unused acres at Columbia Point. 52 
Dolores Mitchell, chairperson of the Massachusetts Chapter 
of the Americans for Democratic Action contacted the 
trustees on behalf of the ADA urging them to postpone 
53. 
action. 
Opposition By President Lederle 
site 
President 
approach. 
Lederle was unimpressed with the 
In recalling the final stages of 
scattered 
the site 
selection controversy, he stated, 
Well,before he started, the very day that he took 
over, I said, 'Frank, this is one to stay out of. 
You cannot win on this. You haven't been around long 
enough. Whichever way you jump you're going to 
alienate the other half.'...But Broderick didn't get 
the message, and at the final meeting for the 
decision of the site he came up with what I call the 
'scatteration theory' of a university....The Board 
bought my concept—and I hated to do this at the very 
first public meeting where Broderick was taking the 
position--namely, that a university requires a 
certain critical mass. The very nature of a 
university is the bringing together of people from 
various professions, from the various disciplines; 
they rub off on each other. If you scatter them 
around, you don't have enough in one place, you've 
got all the problems of the wear and tear of going 
back and forth. You're missing the point of what a^ 
university is I said, 'It's all right to build 
community colleges this way. It's all right to 
scatter state colleges with a limited mandate that 
way, but a university by its very nature is a 
conglomerate and requires a certain critical 
mass.' 54. 
The Final Decision For Columbia Point 
The major item on the agenda at the trustee meeting 
on November 22 was a final decision on the location of the 
permanent site. First to speak was Trustee Haigis, 
Chairman of the Committee on Buildings and Grounds. Haigis 
announced that after three years of discussion, the review 
of over fifty different possible sites, and careful review 
in recent weeks of the latest proposal for multi-use 
structures on scattered sites the Committee was now 
recommending Columbia Point. Trustee Gordon, a prominent 
Boston attorney, spoke for the minority on the Committee 
opposed to Columbia Point. He noted possible legal problems 
with the scattered site proposal as it was presently 
formulated but suggested that they were not insurmountable 
given enough time and argued,. 
This new, extended perimeter concept means breaking 
out of the 'fortress concept' rejecting the 
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physical boundaries that represent the University as 
a closed system...One of my reasons for dissenting 
is that while we can establish what could be a good 
to- possibly a great university at Columbia Point, 
we are probably talking about something that may 
already be obsolete. I would be remiss if five to 
ten years from now, with a commitment of taxpayers 
dollars there, we find the Cleveland States and 
others of this country doing that which Boston and 
Massachusetts did not dare to do....Again, I as a 
dissenter to this report do not negate the 
possibility that Columbia Point can become a good, 
if not a great urban university, but it will take a 
great deal more imagination and money and interest 
on the part of people who show no interest in this 
university to make this a good to great urban 
university. It seemingly is easier to locate an 
incinerator in the city of Boston than it is to 
locate an educational institution. 55. 
Chancellor Broderick then presented essentially the 
same proposal which he offered at the previous meeting of 
the Buildings and Grounds Committee. He was assisted in 
this presentation by two representatives of the Ford 
Foundation, Flansburgh and Clinchy, who had helped 
Broderick, Gagnon and the members of the faculty in 
preparing the proposal. In closing Broderick called 
attention to the fact that the faculty had voted the 
previous evening indicating that Columbia Point was 
unacceptable for the type of university being described in 
this "new, radical, dynamic, *alternative" and noted that 
students and alumni had also expressed their opposition to 
Columbia Point. The chancellor asked for a further delay 
until January 30,1969 so that the new concept could be 
56. further explored. 
Professor James Ryan expressed the strong opposition 
of "95-98%" of the faculty to Columbia Point. Student 
187 
leader, Stephen Berkowitz then expressed the 
dissatisfaction of the student body with what he described 
as a lack of consideration by politicians and the Board of 
Trustees. He said that in the event of a Columbia Point 
decision the students would carry the fight to the 
Legislature and an effort would also be made to obtain a 
separate board of trustees for the Boston campus made up 
of persons from many diverse areas in greater Boston and 
exclude residents of Western Massachusetts. Daniel Angert, 
a representative of the Students for a Democratic Society 
then read a long and angry statement condeming the trustees 
57 for their choice of Columbia Point. 
President Lederle spoke against Broderick's proposal 
stating that if major facilities were separated physically 
it would result in the destruction of the very concept of 
a university which needs an internal cohesion and an 
identity and integrity as a university and a community of 
scholars. Such a community could not be built under the 
"splintering concept." He also pointed out that, instead 
of solving relations with the city, the concept of 
continuous and repeated movement to multiple sites would 
aggravate relations because, 
• i 
On the multiple campus basis, you go through 
continual travail, moving from one parcel to another. 
In lieu of tax problems multiply for a city with 
existing serious tax problems. Inevitable attempts 
to enlarge sites would lead to continual troubles 
with neighbors every time the University needed to 
move. 58. 
Vice Chairman Healy then concluded the debate 
stating that, along with President Lederle, he found the 
scattered site concept unacceptable. He spoke of the need 
to secure Columbia Point, the only large piece of land 
adjacent to the city which was still available, as soon as 
possible and of his personal conviction that a truly great 
university could be build at the site. In the roll call 
vote which followed fourteen trustees voted in favor of the 
immediate selection of Columbia Point and four voted 
59. 
against. 
Reaction By Faculty and Students 
On November 26,1968 the angry Intown Site Coalition 
issued a statement saying that their priorities now will be 
to send delegations of students and faculty to discuss the 
negative features of the Columbia Point site with the 
legislature, to work to change the charter of the 
University of Massachusetts to allow for more trustees from 
Greater Boston, and to organize a new "Friends of U.Mass.- 
60. 
Boston" support group. At a special meeting on campus 
on December 2,1968 Chancellor Broderick told faculty and 
students that he now accepted the choice by the trustees of 
Columbia Point and that he would work to make the new site 
61 . 
a success. 
Lederle later summed up the search as follows, 
Eventually, it became clear that no feasible site in 
downtown Boston and in the highly built up area was 
going to be available. We also were under the gun to 
make a final decision. After all, years had elapsed, 
« 
and we were still fiddling around on site. I 
attribute this primarily to the tenacious, continued, 
push by Gagnon and a few faculty members. I never was 
certain that it was as many as 50%, by the way, but a 
few faculty members and Gagnon kept insisting it must 
be downtown. It became apparent to me and many others 
that we weren't going to get a downtown site. I must 
say also that faculty are very naive. 62. 
The long search process and debate was over. It was 
now time for the University to turn its attention to the 
specific plans for construction of the new campus facility 
and to begin to address the substantial concerns which were 
beginning to be expressed by representatives of the 
communities immediately adjacent to the Columbia Point 
CHAPTER VIII. 
DORCHESTER/SOUTH BOSTON COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
FOLLOWING THE SELECTION OF COLUMBIA POINT 
Now that the University trustees and administration 
had made a final decision on a permanent site for the new 
campus, they entered a new phase of community relations. 
Interaction with the neighborhoods adjacent to the Columbia 
Point site would become of critical importance. The 
residents surrounding Columbia Point had become deeply 
concerned regarding the possible negative impact of the 
new campus. To some extent their concerns are common to 
any urban residential neighborhood faced suddenly with the 
incursion of a college campus or research center of major 
proportions. Their concerns are very well stated in the 
January 1973 Report of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task 
Force, a group established to act as liason between the 
community and the University. Their words are included 
here in order to provide a context to the chapter 
which follows. 
The University buildings are huge, dwarfing the 
housing development, and they loom larger day by day 
as construction progresses. The communities began to 
sense the size of the University community that would 
suddenly move in among them. How many people would 
fill the buildings? Where would they come from and 
how would they get there?...The newspapers have been 
full of the sad statistics of low income families 
displaced from their homes by landlords who could 
charge groups of students twice and three times the 
previous rent. The housing shortage in the Boston 
area has been well documented over the years, and 
the greater purchasing power of students and faculty 
have created increasingly critical shortages of 
decent housing for 1ow and moderate income residents 
wherever the students and the faculty have chosen to 
live. The people of Dorchester are afraid that they 
are next in this sequence. So are the people of the 
Columbia Point Housing Project development. Both fear 
that they will be displaced to make way for 
students. 1. 
This chapter continues the case study by providing a 
narrative of the key events which occurred during the 
period 1969-1974, relative to Boston Campus/community 
relations, as final detailed planning and construction of 
the new campus took place at Columbia Point. This review 
reveals the important role which local community relations 
played in shaping major long range policy decisions 
regarding the new campus. It also reveals significant 
differences in the approach to local community relations 
adopted by the new administration of President Robert Wood. 
Reaction of Community Leaders Following 
the Selection of Columbia Point 
Local community groups began to express concerns 
almost immediately following the selection of Columbia 
Point. In mid-May of 1969, mimeographed flyers were 
distributed among the residents of the Columbia Point 
Housing project warning that the University would soon move 
to acquire all of the public housing on the penninsula for 
student dormitories. At a .meeting of the Boston Housing 
Authority, the planning director of the Boston Campus, 
Frank O'Brien, attempted to calm these fears by stating 
that the University had absolutely no interest in acquiring 
2. 
any of the housing. 
On March 11,1970 a news conference was held at the 
statehouse to unveil plans for the construction of the 
campus at Columbia Point. An address was made by both 
Chancellor Broderick and Governor Sargent. A group of 
Columbia Point residents suddenly interupted the 
conference to protest the fact that, to date, they had not 
3 
been adequately consulted by the University. 
The University Establishes a Community Liaison Office 
By April the situation had improved considerably as 
the result of a decision by the University to hire a 
community liaison person to work with the residents of 
Columbia Point. Representatives of Governor Sargent's 
office, the University, local labor unions and contractors 
had been meeting to draft contract clauses that would offer 
Columbia Point residents first preference on construction 
jobs and would include minority hiring and training 
programs. Mrs. Ann Stokes, who had lived in the project 
with her ten children for several years and who was now the 
executive director of the Columbia Point Health Association 
told a Boston Globe reporter, 
I believe the UMass people are sincere. They have 
already promised us the first 100 construction jobs 
and we're talking about jobs for our people when the 
University starts functioning. 4. 
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Community Demonstrations at the New Campus 
By late July,1970, actions taken by the construction 
contractors at the site caused residents of the housing 
project to decide to confront the University once again. 
Approximately 40 residents formed a human chain to hault 
trucks which had been filling the lagoon in front of the 
site with refuse and fill from the construction project. 
The University quickly agreed to suspend the dumping and 
set up a mechanism whereby the residents could provide 
5. input on design of further development of the lagoon. 
Dissatisfied with the lack of progress on this 
agreement, the residents returned again on August 17 and 
blocked the access road to the site for four hours while 
representatives hammered out an agreement with University 
spokespersons which allowed the continued filling of the 
lagoon on the eastern end of the site in exchange for a 
promise that a new lagoon would be constructed on the 
northeast portion of the site which would include boat 
marinas, stores, a restaurant and recreational areas. Vice 
Chancellor Roy Hamilton warned the residents, however,that 
a final decision on the agreement was the perogative of 
the trustees. 
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The New Wood Administration Responds to the Community 
At a meeting on September 14, President Wood warned 
the trustees that there was an inevitable conflict between 
a concern with building a campus to provide "desperately 
needed education" for young people in the state as a whole 
and a concern with "being a good neighbor" to the Columbia 
Point residents. He recommended that a task force be 
established to study how cooperative planning, community 
consultation, and employment program for local residents 
could be better integrated into the University's planning 
7. 
process. The trustees unanimously adopted his proposal 
Robert Wood announced the appointment of a special 
Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts at his 
formal inauguration as President of the University on 
December 9. The committee, a broadly based group of 
business leaders, students, alumni, and faculty from the 
University and some prominent education professionals from 
outside the University, would advise the president and 
trustees on the nature and direction of the future 
g 
University of Massachusetts. 
The University's new vice president for development, 
L. Edward Lashman, addressed the issue of Dorchester and 
Columbia Point community relations in a July 26,1971 
memorandum to President Wood. Lashman identified issues 
which the new campus would have to address in developing 
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effective relations with the neighboring communities. The 
quality of life at the Columbia Point Housing Project 
needed upgrading. The University needed to develop 
positive ways in which to provide access to jobs and 
special University services for the residents of Columbia 
Point's public housing. Lashman warned that all relations 
with the community should be judged by the standard of how 
well they contributed to the central purpose of the campus 
which was to provide university level education to 
residents of the Boston metropolitan area. He pointed out 
that , 
In order to deal effectively with these issues, the 
University will have to play varying roles in a. 
number of enterprises, both private and public in 
character, which are not strictly educational and 
which are not, in themselves, central to its mission. 
In many instances the University faculty and staff 
are not trained nor equipped to cary out such 
functions. 9. 
Lashman recommended that the University attempt to 
act as a catalyst within the Boston Community to develop 
support for conversion of the public housing on Columbia 
Point into a tenant owned and managed cooperative with 
funding coming from H.U.D. and the major initiative from 
the Boston Housing Authority. To develop opportunities for 
common activity between the surrounding communities which 
he said, "have relatively little in common", and to better 
respond to their needs and demands, Lashman suggested the 
creation of a Chapter 180 non-profit corporation governed 
by a board comprised of campus faculty, students and 
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administrators, local residents and 
community and business leaders. The 
seek federal funding to develop and 
recreational facilities, expansion 
Greater Boston 
corporation would then 
plan use of the campus 
of existing community 
health services, business enterprises employing community 
residents and serving the needs of the new campus, day care 
centers and other service centers, limited partnerships 
with private investors to develop new housing, and other 
appropriate activities and enterprises. In these efforts 
Lashman saw the University as an innovator and catalyst for 
improvement and change but not as the prime actor. The 
University should bring appropriate groups together and 
^ . • • , , 10. then back away from continuing involvement. 
In a report, presented in December,1971, the 
Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts spoke 
of the special obligation of the University to its 
neighbors in Boston, 
It is the Committee's impression, based on meetings 
with residents of Columbia Point and Dorchester, that 
the University has not up to now sufficiently 
involved the residents of these areas in its planning 
processes. There is much suspicion and mistrust, and 
people feel they are not being consulted. These 
feelings must be overcome before the University can 
succeed in establishing a productive relationship... 
Adeouate high-level staff must be developed to enable 
policy planning in conjunction with the people of 
Columbia Point and Dorchester on the full range of 
issues of mutual concern. The neighborhoods need to 
know they are dealing with people who can come up 
with answers to guestions. They will not be convinced 
until the relationship is clear and direct. 11. 
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The DorChester-Columbia Point Task Force 
During the next few years the spirit of Lashman's 
recommendations, although not all of his specific 
proposals, would guide the new campus in developing 
relations with its neighbors. In November of 1971, a 
coalition of twenty six community action groups in 
Dorchester joined together as the Dorchester-Cobumbia 
Point Task Force and approached the University to speak 
jointly about their fears of the impact of the new campus 
on their neighborhoods. The University agreed to provide 
$30,000 for an independent consultant, Justin Gray 
Associates, to assist the community groups in organising 
and conducting a study of the impact of the new campus on 
the demand for housing in the surrounding community. 
A three-way agreement was developed and ratified 
on May 3,1972 under which the community groups would work 
with the consultant. While the University would provide the 
funding to pay the consultant's fees, the community groups 
would have authority to approve or disapprove payment of 
specific bills presented by the consultant. This gave the 
community a considerable amount of control over the scope 
and direction of the consultant's study. No public funding 
was involved. The University administration raised the 
required amount through donations from a group of major 
Boston business firms such as The Boston Gas Company, The 
Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, and New England Telephone. 
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It was agreed that the study would develop a profile 
of the future student body at the new campus, attempt to 
identify the impact of these students on the demand for 
local housing, and develop alternative strategies to 
provide additional housing for the students if that was 
deemed necessary to protect existing low and moderate 
income tenants in the area from loosing their rented homes 
and apartments to more affluent students. The community 
task force was given the exclusive right to terminate the 
work of the consultant if they became dissatisfied for any 
12. 
reason. 
Contemporary Media Reports Reflect Heightened Local Concern 
In the summer of 1972, local concern about the 
University's impact on housing prompted a major review by 
Peter Cowan of the Boston Globe. According to Cowan, 
families renting apartments comprised more than two thirds 
of the 177,000 residents in the neighborhoods adjacent to 
Columbia Point. Rumors had been circulating for months 
among these residents of coming mass-evictions and rent 
hikes as students and faculty began to arrive and compete 
for housing. The article reported that even many of the 
small landlords who might benefit from a boom in demand for 
apartments were deeply saddened by the thought that the old 
neighborhoods would be broken up and long time friends 
forced to move out to the suburbs or other areas of the 
city. 
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Rumors of mass evictions to make way for students 
also circulated at the Columbia Point Housing project. 
Mary Thompson, assistant manager at the project, stated 
that most of the residents were skeptical about the 
intentions of the University. Elderly residents were 
especially fearful about a takeover by students. 
Throughout the area there was widespread concern and 
pessimism about the devastating impact of a massive 
13 . 
increase in traffic. 
A follow up article by Cowan in August reported that 
the University was insisting that their impact on local 
housing would be minimal but repeated a warning from Sam 
Mullins, president of the Columbia-Savin Hill Civic 
Association, 
Mullins known for his flamboyant assertions,predicts 
a 50 percent increase over the next three years in 
the value of homes near the campus. He also forsees 
acts of vigilante violence directed against students 
who move into Dorchester and threaten to disrupt the 
stability of old neighborhoods. 'We'll burn them 
first,' he says, 'Damn right we will. You know, we 11 
fight honestly as long as we can and as long as we 
have to, but if we have to resort to civil 
disobedience its not beyond our realm.' 14. 
Hearings By The Boston City_Council 
In early October of 1972 the Boston City Council 
conducted hearings on the impact of the new campus on 
nearby neighborhoods. Councilman John J. Moakley of South 
Boston presided at these meetings since he was chair of the 
special subcommittee established to study the problem. The 
hearings quickly disolved into an unpleasant political 
debate between Moakley, who was running for the Ninth 
District's Congressional Seat, and Councilman Patrick F. 
McDonough, a strong supporter of the incumbant, 
Congresswoman Louise Day Hicks. McDonough stormed out of 
the meeting after shouting that Moakley's questions 
were, "irrelevant and a lot of bull". Fred Pillsbury who 
was covering the meeting for the Boston Globe agreed in his 
column that it was obvious that Moakley was using the 
hearings to promote his candidacy but then asked if this 
wasn't a legitimate tactic given the enormous impact the 
l s 
new campus was likely to have on the Ninth District. 
Margaret Mitchell, appearing at this meeting as 
spokesperson for the Dorchester- Columbia Point Task Force 
presented the coalition's purpose and their fears. 
We, the residents of Dorchester and of the Columbia 
Point housing development, are seriously concerned 
with the impact the opening of the University of 
Massachusetts' Columbia Point campus will have on 
the housing resources in our community. We have 
joined together, homeowners and tenants, poor and 
not-so-poor, black and white in the Dorchester- 
Columbia Point Task Force to try and deal with this 
impact.... There has been little preparation made for 
our children to go to this university; there has 
been no preparation made to house or to transport 
the children of people who do not live close to 
Columbia Point. Neither in the seven years since the 
decision was made to move to Columbia Point to see 
that the transportation and housing needs of 
students, faculty and staff would be met. We know 
how they will be met. Students even from Boston, 
unable to commute in a reasonable time to campus, 
will move into Dorchester, rents will go up, and 
long term residents will be forced out. Cars will be 
parked all over our neighborhood. And our community 
will bear the main cost of the education of the 
state's children. 16. 
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To address these fears the task force demanded that 
the University make sharp cuts in the projected enrollment 
for the new campus, expand its recruitment effort in the 
Boston public school system, develop specialized remedial 
and advising programs within Boston's high schools to 
enable more students to qualify for admission, develop a 
thirteenth year program on campus to assist those who were 
not fully prepared for college, and consider building 
student housing on campus through use of the space which 
17 
would be saved by limiting enrollment. 
Fred Pillsbury followed up on the hearings in late 
October with the comment that the "disruptions" by 
McDonough and others had led Moakley to postpone further 
hearings until after the national election in November. 
Pillsbury closed with the comment, 
A major planning effort should have been launched 
five years ago. Perhaps if the Legislature had been 
a bit more imaginative that might have occurred. It 
is too late for that nowithe project has gone too far 
and it is too near completion. All that can be 
provided is rushed, makeshift planning and belated 
coordination. But is even that going to come 
about? 18. 
Moakley won the congressional seat in November 
putting an end to the political career of Louise Day Hicks. 
Report Of The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force 
In January of 1973 The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task 
Force presented a formal report to the University. The 
findings of the surveys conducted by the consultant 
revealed the possibility that the worst fears of the 
community might be realized. It was determined that 40% of 
UMB students where living away from their parents 
including 15% who were married. The surveys also suggested 
that 30% to 35% of the student body planned to seek new 
housing accomodations closer or more accessible to the new 
campus once it opened and that the majority of the students 
in this group would use on campus housing if it became 
available. It was determined that few if any of the support 
staff or faculty would change residence. It was determined 
that, to date, no effective plan had been developed to deal 
with increased traffic or to provide expanded public 
transportation. The task force presented several pages of 
specific detailed proposals and recommendations. They can 
be summarized as follows: 
The constructive relationship between University and 
community evidenced by the work of the Task force must be 
continued and strengthened through the establishment of 
permanent University neighborhood field offices in 
Dorchester and Columbia Point. 
An adequate amount of housing for students must be 
constructed on campus in order to protect the surrounding 
neighborhoods from excessive housing demand. 
The City of Boston must move immediately and 
forcefully to enforce existing buildings codes and rent 
control to protect the area against excessive real estate 
speculation. 
The City must also develop an effective traffic and 
parking control program in the surrounding neighborhoods. 
Both the City and the State must work together to 
develop and put in place an enhanced public transportation 
system for the area before the opening date for the new 
campus. Student use of private automobiles should be 
strongly discouraged as a matter of administrative policy 
aimed at the drastic reduction of on-campus parking spaces 
and the active encouragement of use of car pools and 
public transportation. 
To reduce the number of students coming into the 
community for classes and perhaps competing for housing, 
the University should reduce its enrollment targets to 
10,000 students and do its utmost, through the design of 
collaborative efforts with community high schools, through 
an open enrollment program and through a "thirteenth year 
program of developmental studies, between high school and 
college, for Boston students, to ensure that 50% of UMB 
students in future classes would be drawn from Boston 
neighborhoods and the Boston school system. 
Specific numerical goals should be established for 
the hiring of Dorchester and Columbia Point residents in 
the various new support positions which would become 
available at the campus. 
To expedite the achievement of these quotas, a 
branch personnel office should be established in the 
Dorchester and Columbia Point field offices as well as 
basic skills training programs to help local residents 
qualify for the new jobs. 
Finally the University should, through use of its 
unique role and public image within the state and nation, 
itself become an innovative partner and public advocate in 
addressing the many peculiar needs of the urban 
neighborhoods surrounding the site of the new campus. The 
University would thus become the catalyst for growth and 
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development in the urban community. 
As an outgrowth of this report the Columbia 
Point-Dorchester Task Force provided the impetus and 
strong support for a series of bills which were introduced 
into the 1973 session of the legislature calling for a 50% 
cut in projected enrollment at the Boston Campus, a $20 
million appropriation for student housing, and relocation 
allowances for Dorchester residents forced out of their 
homes by UMass students. Despite prolonged debate and 
considerable lobbying by Dorchester residents and their 
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supporters these measures failed to pass. 
Formal Demands by the City of Boston 
In March 1973, Mayor White presented the trustees with 
a formal statement of the City administration's position 
on The new campus at Columbia Point. The report stated that 
the single most important contribution that the University 
could make would be to provide access to quality higher 
education for thousands of city residents who had 
previously been excluded from college because of economic 
constraints. The City would recognize this service as a 
significant contribution in lieu of taxes. In order to 
ensure that the new campus would indeed be a real asset to 
the urban community the City made the following demands: 
The campus must restrict its service area to 
communities within easy commuting distance and should do 
everything in its power to ensure that at least half of its 
students are graduates of Boston hign schools. 
The University must make every effort to ensure that 
a majority of its students come from families with low or 
moderate incomes. 
The Columbia Point campus should become the nucleus 
of an urban university system dispersed throughout Boston 
in order to promote "physical accessibility of learning and 
the possibility of community service." 
To reduce transportation and parking problems the 
University should attempt to schedule no classes or 
functions prior to 10 a.m. 
In its role as a state sponsored agency the University 
should work directly with the MTA in developing expansion 
of the public subway system and direct shuttle bus links. 
The mayor also proposed that the Boston Housing 
Authority and the University work together to rehabilitate 
300 vacant housing units at the Columbia Point project for 
the use of students. A final recommendation was that the 
Board of Trustees be expanded to include representatives of 
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the communities in the area impacted by the new campus. 
The University's Policy Statement On Columbia Point 
On June 6,1973 the University trustees adopted a 
formal set of policies relative to the Dorchester and 
Columbia Point community concerns which contained the 
following major points, 
(1) The primary mission of the University of 
Massachusetts at Boston is to provide high quality 
educational opportunities to the residents of Boston 
and surrounding communities, particularly those whose 
opportunities have been limited by income or race. We 
recognize a special responsibility to provide maximum 
educational opportunity to residents of Dorchester, 
Columbia Point and South Boston. 22. 
To reach this objective the University pledged to 
develop an explicit admission policy which emphasized 
outreach in area schools and flexible techniques for 
identifying qualified applicants, continuation of existing 
pre-college programs and cooperative efforts with the 
Boston schools, increased financial aid and responsive 
academic counseling and support services. 
(2) The University of Massachusetts at Boston will 
remain a commuter institution, with a strong 
commitment to encouraging the use of mass transit 
rather than automobiles. 23. 
To reach this objective the University pledged to 
develop a system through which parking fee revenue was used 
to fund an expanded public shuttle bus service to the 
campus, adjust class schedules as necessary to minimize 
traffic congestion, cooperate with local neighborhoods in 
the enforcement of parking regulations, lobby for a new 
Dorchester station on the Quincy to Boston rapid transit 
line which presently passed, non-stop, through the 
community on its daily commuter runs, and lobby for the 
long-range development of a direct rail or monorail link 
between the campus and the rapid transit system. 
(3) The University is committed to minimizing 
student housing impact on adjacent communities. 24. 
To reach this objective the University pledged to 
actively assist students who had formed their own 
households to find housing outside of the high impact 
neighborhood areas,exclude housing allowances from 
financial aid calculations unless a student could 
demonstrate the necessity for establishing his residence 
the high impact area,work with the community and city to 
actively discourage conversion of local family dwellings 
student apartments and to support the creation of 
additional low income non-student housing. 
(4) The University is deeply concerned with the 
social and economic well-being of neighboring 
communities and the city as a whole, and is 
committed to furthering this well-being in all 
ways consistent with its skills, missions, and 
resources. 25. 
The University promised to support maximum 
opportunities for locally owned businesses to bid on 
supplies and services for the new campus,provide maximum 
job opportunities for local residents,share recreational 
facilities with neighborhood groups,and establish a 
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cooperative and consultative process between the campus and 
local residents. In conclusion the trustees stated, 
Common work with the neighborhoods as partners, 
not as adversaries, is essential. We foresee 
substantial opportunities for student, faculty, and 
staff involvement in community based activities and 
projects. We hope that the campus will energetically 
respond to these opportunities with all the talents 
at its command. As Trustees, we are ready to do our 
full share. 26. 
A Final Community Protest 
A final attempt was made by a tenants group, The 
Dorchester Tenants Action Council in late July. Following a 
demonstration and brief confrontation with building 
security in an attempt to storm President Wood's downtown 
offices, they conducted a brief news interview on the 
sidewalk and announced that they would bring suit under a 
1971 state environmental protection law designed to curtail 
air, water and noise pollution in an attempt to block the 
University from opening until transportation and housing 
problems were resolved to their satisfaction. Their legal 
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efforts were not successful. 
By 1974 much of the initial resistance of local 
residents to the presence of the new campus had abated 
because of the strong pro-active stance of the University 
towards community relations in Boston which had been 
adopted by the new administration of President Wood. 
CHAPTER IX. 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BOSTON EXPERIENCE 
WITH ROSEN'S FINDINGS IN CHICAGO 
How does the Boston experience compare with other 
site selection processes or university/community conflicts? 
In regard to other universities and states, the most 
direct comparison can be made with the experience of the 
University of Illinois and the site selection process for 
the Chicago campus. Both cases involved major state 
universities and major urban centers. 
As reported in the review of the literature, Rosen 
studied the site selection process for the University of 
Illinois Chicago campus. He identified four approaches to 
decision making and to understanding the dynamics of 
decision making: the economic approach or cost/benefit 
analysis; the organizational structure approach or analysis 
of the nature of the organization in which the decision is 
made; the science and technology approach which applies 
scientific method to the decision making problem; and the 
community power approach which assumes that decisions are 
ultimately made as the result of pressure brought to bear 
by dominant groups within the community. Rosen asked five 
important questions concerning the site selection process 
for Chicago which can also be asked of the Boston 
experience. Paraphrasing Rosen, these questions were: 
Was there a single dominating decision maker who 
made the choice among alternatives or were there many 
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decision makers whose conflicting views with respect to 
objectives and values were resolved so that all agreed on 
a compromise in the end? 
Were the various constituent groups affected by the 
site selection process able to exert political power to 
influence and modify the outcome? 
Did the organizational structure of the University 
or other decision making groups influence the final 
outcome? 
Was the decision influenced in any important way by 
purely technical considerations which were determined by 
applying scientific techniques of analysis to the problem 
of site selection? Were these used to develope solutions 
which were free of political or bureaucratic bias? 
Can any aspects of the experience at Chicago or 
Boston be generalized to apply to similar policy decision 
making at other urban public universities? 
This chapter will first seek to answer Rosen's 
questions for Massachusetts and thus compare the site 
selection proceses in Massachusetts with those in Illinois 
It will then use Rosen's approaches to decision making as 
a lense through which to analyze the site selection process 
in Boston. 
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The Role of Key Decision Makers 
The City's Mayor 
The positions taken by the core city's mayor were 
important factors in both the Boston and Chicago site 
selection processes. Boston's Mayor Collins raised 
objections to proposals for a site in the core city and 
argued that the new campus should be located in the 
suburbs. His successor, Mayor White, appeared unconvinced 
of a critical need for a public university within the City 
of Boston and concerned about possible negative impacts. 
Along with Collins, White strongly opposed any site which 
would disrupt established neighborhoods, businesses or 
institutions or which would result in a reduction in the 
city's property tax base. In an interview, conducted as 
part of this case study. White said that, as mayor, he 
viewed the proposal to place the new campus in the Copley 
Square area as "impossible and ridiculous" given the value 
of the commercial property which would be lost and the 
crowding and "traffic nighmare" which would result. He and 
his director of urban renewal. Hale Champion, were not 
convinced that the University would be content to stay on 
a small crowded downtown site indefinitely. They would 
eventually expand outward acquiring more and more property 
in the same pattern that had been followed by Harvard and 
Boston University. White supported the location of the 
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campus at Columbia Point, but only after some major 
concessions by the university which addressed neighborhood 
and city concerns. 
In Chicago the situation was reversed. Mayor Daley 
had been a long time advocate of an urban university 
campus for Chicago and fought hard at the beginning of the 
urban renewal process to locate the new campus in the core 
city. Concerning Mayor Daley's attitude Rosen states, 
While the mayor always had to be conscious of the 
political reasons for and cost of his actions,his 
interest in establishing a public university in 
Chicago preceded his mayorality and transcended 
politics. He considered education one of the most 
important means of economic and social improvement. 
His father had been a business agent in the Sheet 
Metal Workers' Union, and his mother had strongly 
encouraged his own efforts to reach an important 
position by completing studies in a private college 
and law school, which he had done while working. He 
felt others should have the same opportunity but at 
a public institution." 1. 
Daley demonstrated this strong support at the point 
at which the University was considering locating the new 
campus in a suburban location, Riverside Golf Club. In 
order to attract the University towards a core city site, 
Daley pledged that Chicago would make up the difference 
between the cost of the suburban site and the higher cost 
of purchasing land for a core city site. 2’ The attitude 
of the mayor caused the site selection process in Chicago 
to differ quite markedly from the experience in Boston. 
Rosen states, 
Mayor Daley's statement to the University in 
February,1959, in which he offered to pay the 
extraordinary costs of land acquisition within the 
city beyond the costs of a suburban site, changed 
the conditions of negotiation between Chicago and 
the University. Until that offer was made, the 
University was taking the initiative on the site 
selection, and its preference had been for a "green" 
site, one with abundant land and expansion 
possibilities... But the initiative had changed. It 
was now up to the city to make available the land 
upon which the university could build a campus of 
adequate size...The key figure for the city in 
making the site decision would be Mayor Daley. 
Combining within himself the chief political 
position in the city as chairman of the Cook County 
Democratic Central Committee and the city's chief 
administrative position as mayor, he was the most 
important political figure in the city. 3. 
The mayor was the one key decision maker in both 
Boston and Chicago. What differed was the local context. 
Mayor Daley wanted a public university within the core city 
and saw this as an integral part of the urban renewal 
effort. He sought out and fought for a downtown location. 
Collins and White saw no real need for a public university 
in Boston and sought to keep it out of the core city so 
that its physical presence would not impair their efforts 
at economic revival. Columbia Point was the first 
preference of both the White and Collins administrations 
and became the ultimate choice. The mayors were no less 
strong leaders or key decision makers because of their 
ambivalence towards the need for the new campus. Although 
the mayor in each of the two cities had quite different 
agendas, they both achieved their objectives. 
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The Importance of Local Political Context 
If the core city's mayor is a key decision maker 
an important consideration is the political strength 
of the mayor and the source of the mayor's political 
influence because this, as much as the mayor's personal 
opinions, will contribute to formation of the city 
administration's position on site selection. In Chicago 
there was only one, politically strong, mayor, Richard 
Daley, throughout the site selection process. During this 
period Daley grew in terms of his political influence over 
Chicago, the surrounding Cook County, and within state and 
national political affairs. In Boston there was a change of 
leadership mid-way through the site selection process which 
resulted from a decline in mayor Collin's political 
popularity and which signified the end of an era of 
emphasis upon rapid economic growth and dynamic urban 
renewal in the core city and the beginning of an era of 
the empowerment of community groups acting on behalf of 
the "little people". Mayor Daley of Chicago, operating at 
an earlier point in a considerably different political 
climate, was in a position to provide strong positive 
support for the location of the new campus. 
Rosen did not comment extensively on the local 
political context and its impact on the relative strength 
and influence of the mayor because Mayor Daley remained in 
a solid dominant role throughout the site selection 
process. The issue becomes more important in Boston 
because of the decline in popularity of Mayor Collins, the 
change of mayors and the growing influence of community 
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action groups on policy development by the city 
administrations. 
One similarity between Boston and Chicago is the 
fact that in both cases the final site selected was a 
compromise among all of the key players, was identified 
publicly as the preferred choice of the mayor, and quite 
possibly was the only viable choice which could be made at 
that point given timing constraints and the need to move 
on to a final decision following a very long site 
selection process. 
The difference is found in the local context. Boston 
was different because of the ambivalent attitude of the 
mayors and much of the general public about the need for 
more public higher education in the midst of the "Athens 
of America". A secondary issue in the Chicago vs. Boston 
context is space. There was far less in Boston and it was 
very expensive both in terms of tax revenues which would be 
lost to the city and in terms of development opportunities 
which would be lost to the business interests. A third 
issue is timing. The University of Illinois campus site 
selection process occured much earlier in the urban renewal 
cycle for Chicago than did the University of Massachusetts 
site selection process in Boston. In Chicago it also 
occurred somewhat before the blossoming of the community 
power movement in the late I960's which was at a peak 
during the Boston process. In each situation, however, the 
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mayor was a powerful decision maker but in a different 
local political context. An important finding of this 
paper, fully supported by the data presented in the case 
study, is that the immediate local political context 
surrounding an urban public university will have a profound 
impact upon policy decision making for the university. 
This impact is much greater on the public university than 
on the private because of the nature of the source of 
funding and the appointment process for the trustees for 
the public university. The power and influence of the 
mayor, the trustees, community influence groups, and a 
business community will vary according to the local 
context but their influence will always be present to 
some degree in major policy decisions. 
The Importance of Community Interest Groups 
The material presented in the case study suggests 
that Collins and White tended to react to pressures from 
community interest groups, more than did Daley, during both 
the site selection process and the negotiations with the 
niversity regarding specific policies for the development 
of the urban campus. In Boston, the need for a city 
administration to be more responsive to neighborhood 
concerns became the key.issue in the 1967 mayoral campaign 
and a primary theme during the subseguent White 
administration. In Boston the mayor's position tended to 
support the positions taken by community action groups 
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while in Chicago expressions of opposition by the local 
community groups were largely ignored because they were at 
varience with the mayor's position of strong support for a 
campus location in the core city. In Chicago the local 
business interests supported a core city campus location 
while in Boston they opposed such a location. 
The Boston experience seems to differ from Rosen's 
conclusions about the importance of community interest 
groups. Rosen saw them as relatively unimportant. In Boston 
they loom large in the decision making process. The 
Harrison-Halstead community groups had almost no impact on 
the decision in Chicago. In Boston the Highland Park 
residents, the Back Bay interests, and the 
Dorchester-Columbia Point community groups had a strong 
impact on the mayor's position and university policy. 
The Role of the Board of Trustees 
In both cases, the board of trustees had ultimate 
formal responsibility for the decision on a site. One 
difference between the University of Massachusetts and the 
University of Illinois during this period was the manner 
in which trustees were selected. In Illinois the trustees 
were elected by popular vote from Republican and Democratic 
Party slates of candidates nominated during biennial state 
elections. Because the board consisted largely of 
University of Illinois alumni who followed their own 
personal views, Rosen did not view party affiliation of 
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individual trustees as an important factor influencing 
consideration of the location of the Chicago campus. 
Instead this group of alumni with a strong affiliation with 
the Urbana campus, 
...saw a permanent campus in the Chicago area as a 
secondary need and as a possible threat to the main 
campus but by 1955 accepted the desirability of such 
a campus, initially for a two year program but 
expandable to four years in response to mounting 
pressure from student enrollment. Among most 
members of the board, the desirable campus was as 
much like that at Urbana as possible-i.e., a green 
campus with lots of land. 4. 
In Massachusetts, the University's board of trustees 
were appointed by the governor for renewable terms of five 
years and tended to be persons who had distinguished 
themselves in some manner in the broader community. The 
governor had the theoretical right to make a change at the 
end of each trustees term but during the period in 
question the trustees tended to serve for several years. 
The result was the relatively stable, non-partisan 
board during the site selection process. Twelve of the 
seventeen trustees remained on the board during the entire 
period. 
As in Illinois, there is no evidence of an influence 
of partisan politics in the site selection process. Unlike 
Illinois, however, most trustees accepted the desirability 
of an urban campus and some argued passionately for its 
location in the heart of the core city up through the 
final debate preceding the decision. Because of the strong 
of both mayors and other groups, the University 
opposition 
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of Massachusetts trustees had a far stronger incentive to 
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opt for a suburban location than did their counterparts in 
Illinois and yet they remained committed to an urban 
location. 
The reason for this commitment by the University of 
Massachusetts trustees appears to have stemmed in part 
from a genuine concern for the future welfare of the low 
and moderate income people of Boston and from a concern, 
shared by many of the trustees with President Lederle, 
that Boston had to be secured for the University in order 
to stop potential expansion of the State College at Boston 
into a rival state university much closer to the decision 
makers in the capital city. The trustees displayed acute 
sensitivity to the concerns and opinions of the mayor, the 
governor, and the leadership of the Boston business 
community. At the same time, despite their rejection of the 
final scattered site proposal, they appear to have been 
strongly influenced in their basic decison decision to 
pursue an urban rather than a suburban campus site by 
input from the leadership of the Boston campus faculty and 
students. 
The Influence of the Business Community on Trustees and Ke 
Decision Makers 
The site selection process for Boston revealed many 
complex networks of Individuals and connections between 
members of the business community, university trustees and 
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political leaders in the city. Rather than trace all the 
relationships between business leaders and community 
leaders/ this chapter will attempt to show some sense of 
this inter-relationship of the leadership groups through 
a closer look at the career and network of professional 
associations of the University of Massachusetts Board of 
Trustees vice chairman during the site selection process. 
Joseph P. Healey, Vice Chairman and presiding officer 
at most trustee meetings throughout the site selection 
process, was an important and highly respected figure 
within the Boston business community during the late 
1960's. He received strong support among the legislative 
leadership. 
Maurice Donahue, the State Senate President from 
1964 to 1970, expressed his high regard for Healey in 
an interview conducted as a part of this case study in 
September,1988. Donahue stressed that Healey held the 
respect of the legislative leadership because of his 
professional background and because he appeared to be an 
experienced, highly capable, "top drawer individual” who 
was involved in public service out of a strong desire to 
serve the public interest and not from a motivation of 
personal gain. The legislative leadership decided to allow 
the University trustees to exercise a wide latitude in 
picking a site because of their confidence in Healey and 
other members of The Board of Trustees, They did not want 
the process to become a devisive political process in 
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which various senators and representatives vied with each 
other to locate the campus in their home district. Governor 
Volpe, who was governor during almost the entire site 
selection process, appears to have had the same confidence 
as Donahue toward the Board of Trustees and their ability 
to make an appropriate site selection. 
A community leader such as Healey, performing in a 
public service role as university trustee, does not 
operate in a vacuum isolated and uninfluenced by the 
external community and does not act on the basis of 
personal whim or bias. By 1968, Healey had made his mark in 
Academe, Law, Politics and Business. Through his 
involvement in these activities Healey came into frequent 
contact with major decision makers in the greater Boston 
community and was in a position to act as a two way 
conduit of information and ideas between this community 
leadership group and the University of Massachusetts Board 
of Trustees. A review in some depth of the nature of this 
group of contacts will illustrate how such a network can 
operate. 
Healey was President and Director of the Middlesex 
Bank, N.A. at the time of the final decision on the 
Columbia Point site in 1968. This position brought him into 
frequent contact with the membership of the "Boston Vault". 
This group of key Boston financial and business leaders 
earned the nickname the "Vault" from their practice of 
222 
meeting in monthly closed sessions in the board room of the 
Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company. Preferring the 
name, "The Boston Coordinating Committee", the group kept 
no minutes of its meetings and allowed no substitutes to 
attend for an absent members. No outsiders were allowed to 
attend. In 1967 their membership included the chairman of 
the board, president or senior vice president of most of 
Boston's leading businesses and financial institutions. Of 
the fourteen members in 1967, twelve were graduates of 
Harvard, Dartmouth or Yale. Through its economic power, 
prestige in the community, and especially through 
interlocking business relationships, the Vault wielded 
enormous influence in Boston. 
Initially formed in 1959 in an attempt to keep the 
City from fiscal insolvency, they supported John Collins's 
opponent, John Powers during Collins' initial race for 
mayor. Following his upset victory they soon became staunch 
supporters of Mayor Collin's administration and of BRA 
chief, Ed Logue's urban renewal efforts. Officially 
neutral in the 1967 mayoral primary race, they provided 
strong support to Kevin White in the final two person 
runoff against Louise Day Hicks, a candiate whose political 
views were anathama to the Vault. 
The Vault was strongly disposed to support the 
suggestion of Logue that the new campus of the University 
of Massachusetts be located at Columbia Point. Since they 
were among the city's largest property tax payers and thus 
their balance sheets were likely to be directly affected by 
higher tax rates stemming from the city's shrinking tax 
base,it is logical that they would have viewed proposals 
to place the new campus in the urban core as a totally 
unnecessary eradication of scarce, valuable, taxable 
commercial property. The loss of this scarce downtown 
property would also tend to foreclose possibilities for 
their own expansion at later dates. As the downtown area's - 
principle "landlords", they would have been concerned as 
well by the prospect of ever larger hordes of students, 
student protest marches and student automobiles clogging 
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the streets. 
The network through which the Vault and similar 
formal and informal associations shared influence and 
opinions can be seen though a closer examination of Trustee 
Healey's group of business associates in the late 1960 s. 
During this period, for example, Mr Healey's many activitie 
and interests included a position as a member of the board 
of directors of the Boston Edison Company. Other directors 
of Boston Edison included:. 
Charles F. Avila, who was also a director of the 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, a trustee of 
Northeastern University, a member of the Citizens Advisory 
Committee on Urban Redevelopment, and a member of the 
Committee for the Central Business District, 
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0. Kelley Anderson, Chairman of the Board of New 
England Mutual Life Insurance Company and also a trustee 
of Boston University, and a director of the Ritz-Carleton 
Hotel Company; 
Roger C. Damon, Chief Executive Officer and Director 
of the First National Bank of Boston, also a trustee of 
Boston College, a member of the Northeastern University 
Corporation, a member of the executive committee of the 
New England Colleges Fund, and a director of the New 
England Mutual Life Insurance Company; 
Byron K. Elliott, also Chairman of the Corporation 
and Trustee of Northeastern University; 
Frank L. Farwell, President and Director of Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, who was also a member of the 
investment committee of Northeastern University; 
Edward B. Hanify, also a director of John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, and a trustee of Tufts 
University. 
Corporate headquarters buildings for The John 
Hancock, Liberty Mutual and New England Mutual Life 
Insurance Companies were all located in the vacinity of 
Park Square and Copley Square. 
During this period Healy was also a director of the 
Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. Other directors of 
this company included: 
Thomas M. Joyce, also a member of the board of 
directors at Boston College; 
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John I. Ahern, also director of the General Alumni 
Association at Boston University, and a trustee of Regis 
College. 
This list indicates, clearly, that Healey came into 
frequent contact and conversation with many individuals who 
had major business interests in the Back Bay area and other 
commercial areas in downtown Boston as well as a number of 
individuals with direct ties to the area' S' private colleges 
and universities. Altogether, Healey served on at least 
one board of directors with three different members of the 
Boston Vault. Other members of the Vault sat at the hub of 
similar networks of key business and community leaders. 
The Vault was not a malevolent oligarchy, despite its 
rather fearsome nickname, but rather the Boston version 
of a quite common form of association amoung business 
leaders which can be found functioning in almost any city 
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m America. 
Direct evidence of the way in which this network of 
associations could and did work to influence decisions by 
the University was provided by President Lederle in 
recalling the controversy over the Copley Square site, 
We had. a big session (concerning the.Copley Square 
site proposal) in the Governor’s Office with 
Kevin Harrington, who was Majority Floor leader 
later; he wasn't at that time. We were just raked 
over the coals for coming in with this proposal. 
What really was happening was that on that 
particular proposal we "hit" the "Establishment" in 
Boston... Then I got a call one day from Erwin 
Canham. A year or two earlier we had given Erwin an 
honorary degree....He called me up and asked me what 
we were doing and why we were doing this. And I 
explained and he gave me the impression that he 
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thought we were out of our minds. And I made some 
reference to the opposition of the Hancock, only to 
find that he was on the Hancock Board. Then I found 
that they were concerned about the student load in 
the area, and it turned out that he was the Vice 
President, I think, of the Back Bay Association. 
Then, knowing that the universities in Massachusetts 
live poor in terms of library resources, he 
expressed concern about abuse of the Boston Public 
Library adjacent to the site and suddenly I 
discovered that he was a member of the Library 
Board, and then, I learned what was really eating 
him, mainly, as a pillar of the Christian Science 
Church, he and the Church had certain thoughts about 
a big construction program, office buildings and 
other things in the same area which would be harmed 
by our project. Needless to say, we got nowhere with 
that proposal. 7. 
Trustee Healey was very much a member of the Boston 
business "establishment”. It would appear likely that their 
opinions and concerns regarding the site selction for UMB 
would have some influence on Healey. 
Virtually all of the other members of the Board of 
Trustees had similar networks of connections to business 
and political leadership groups both in Boston and within 
other areas of the state. Trustee Healey is used here as 
an example, not as a unigue case, of how these networks can 
affect the decision making of a board of trustees. The 
evidence suggests that through Healey, as well as other 
trustees with close ties to Mayor Collins and Mayor White 
and the Boston business community, those who perceived a 
negative impact to their interests if UMB were located 
downtown had an influence on the site selection process 
which essentially blocked a downtown site. 
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community was relatively unimportant in the site selection 
g 
process. * One key difference, however, was that the 
Chicago business community was generally delighted at the 
prospect of the inclusion of plans for an urban university 
campus in the urban renewal process for their core city. 
They were not competing with the University for land and 
key locations. It is possible to speculate that their role 
would have been far different had they perceived a strong 
adverse impact from the location of their new campus. 
Unlike Chicago, the Boston business community appears to 
have played a strong role in keeping the campus out of the 
core city. They may well have been the deciding influence. 
Again, the local context was different. This fact 
seems to have been unrecognized for a time by some of the 
Boston Campus leaders as they asked publicly why Boston 
did not react with the same enthusiastic welcome as 
Chicago. 
The Role of Governor John Volpe 
John Volpe, a republican in a state dominated by the 
Democratic party, was first elected governor in 1960. In 
1962 he was defeated in a very close race by Endicott 
Peabody. Peabody was defeated in the Democratic Party's 
fall 1964 primary election by his own lieutenant governor 
and Volpe was able to take advantage of the resultant split 
in the opposition party to regain the governor s office. 
He remained governor until early 1969. Volpe was, therefor. 
governor of Massachusetts throughout almost the entire site 
selection process. 
Governor Volpe appears to have left selection of a 
specific site for the campus to the discretion of the 
trustees except for a brief personal intervention at two 
periods, the spring of 1967, when the business interests 
of the core city were threatened, and again when the 
scattered site proposal emerged as a serious consideration 
in the fall of 1968. In these cases, public interest and 
concern was at a peak and indicated the political need for 
some public show of action. There appears to have been 
little or no direct discussion or negotiation on the issue 
between the governor and the mayor and very little between 
the governor and the trustees. 
A factor which may have influenced Volpe's decision 
to intervene and attempt to influence the trustees to 
reject the scattered facilities approach for the Boston 
Campus and to move forward decisively to a final decision 
on a permanent site, was the patronange value inherent in 
a public construction project which would require a very 
large capital outlay. The potential patronage value 
inherent in such a huge public construction project is 
suggested by evidence provided within the final report of 
the Special Commission Concerning State and County 
Buildings, popularly referred to as the Ward Commission. 
The Ward Commission was created through action of 
the Legislature in 1978 with the specific charge of 
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investigating allegations of corruption in the awarding of 
state building contracts including the new Boston campus 
at Columbia Point. The Chairman of the Commission, Dr. 
John William Ward, was an historian and a former president 
of Amherst College. In describing their findings regarding 
the period 1960 - 1970 the Commission's report states, 
In the award of contracts for the construction of 
state and county buildings, corruption^has been a way 
of life. For a decade at least, across Republican and 
Democratic administrations alike, the way to get 
architectural contracts was to buy them....The name 
of the game is cash. 8. 
The Commission provided an overview of a system 
under which political contributions were solicited in 
return for favors, 
A list is made of those who do business with the 
state: architects for design services, contractors 
for construction, engineers for consulting services, 
lawyers who may wish to be considered for judicial 
appointment. One can take a walk through the Yellow 
Pages to make up the list. An individual receives a 
call that the Governor would like to meet him. The 
innocent feels a flush of pride; the practiced feel 
for their pocket-book. The appointment is at a suite 
of three rooms in a Boston hotel. The outer room is a 
large waiting-room where one discovers one's peers 
and fellow-practitioners in uncomfortable numbers; in 
the second room sits the Governor, usually making 
up time over soup and a sandwich; the audience lasts 
no more than two or three minutes. In the third room 
is the fund raiser who with records at hand, reminds 
the individual of work done in the past, of profits 
received on state work, and suggests the time has 
come to help the Governor and the party by a major 
contribution...What is not said is what is important. 
No one is so bold as to suggest if you do not 
contribute you will not do business in the future: 
that would constitute extortion....Instead there is 
the tacit understanding between public servants and 
private professionals that this is how business is 
done in Massachusetts. 9. 
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The Ward Commission report was particularly concerned 
with documenting the relationship between the Peabody 
and Volpe campaign organizations and the firm of 
N 
McKee-Berger-Mansueto, (MBM) architectural consultants, 
who served as project managers for the construction of the 
Boston Campus at Columbia Point. Excerpts from the 
testimony gathered provide a description of a political 
fund raising and patronage system at work in the period 
1963-1968. 
The report states that MBM began to actively solicit 
state contracts in Massachusetts in 1963 and continued this 
activity through the point in December,1969 at which it was 
selected as project manager for the Boston Campus. MBM 
eventually was paid a total of $5,488,913.55 for this 
. . 10. proj ect. 
The report described early efforts by Anthony 
Mansueto in 1964 to gain access to the Massachusetts 
market through the Worcester based architectural firm of 
Frank R. Masiello,Jr. Inc., 
Mansueto and Frank Masiello quickly developed a 
close personal friendship. Masiello was a doner 
and fundraiser for then-Governor Endicott Peabody, 
and one of the first introductions that Masiello 
provided was to Sherwood J. (Woody) Tarlow, Peabody's 
chief fundraiser. It was the policy of the Peabody 
administration to give preference to firms whose 
principals contributed to the Peabody campaign, 
and Mansueto was quickly apprised of this. 
Mansueto's calendar reveals that he was introduced 
to Tarlow by Masiello on February 25,1964. Less than 
a week later, Mansueto's diaries contain the entries: 
"Money to Masiello, $1,000" and "Check to Masiello." 
"On March 15,1964,Mansueto and his wife,along with 
Frank Masiello and his wife, attended a birthday 
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party for Governor Peabody on the 11th floor of the 
Statler Hilton Hotel (now the Park Plaza) in Boston. 
According to Peabody campaign records, Mansueto paid 
$1,000 for tickets." 11. 
\ 
The report states that with the return of John Volpe 
to the governor's office in 1965, Masiello switched to 
becoming a doner and fundraiser for the Republicans. 
Initial contacts began during Peabody's unsuccesful 
re-election bid in the fall of 1964. He soon was in a 
position to introduce Mansueto of MBM to Albert 'P. 
("Toots") Manzi, a very influential and powerful political 
figure within the Volpe campaign organization. The 
Commission's report states that a number of contacts and 
meetings took place between Manzi and Mansueto in 1967 and 
1 2 
throughout 1968. * The nature of Manzi's relationship 
with contractors and architects such as Mansueto and 
Masiello might be suggested by the following extract from 
Masiello's testimony before the Commission, 
Q. - What was your discussion with Mr. Manzi in 
his market on that occasion? 
A. The substance of the conversation was essentially 
I agreed to financial support or assisting Governor 
Volpe, and the deficit that they were attempting to 
overcome. I would purchase tickets to the fundraising 
activity, but it would be on the premise or on the 
assurance that if I did undertake these activities 
that I wanted a firm promise that we would be allowed 
to continue on our existing contracts we had in 
effect at that time, new contracts we had received, 
and hopefully be assured that when another capital 
outlay program came out in the future that we would 
be favorably considered for possibly another 
project. 13. 
The conversation quoted below is alleged to have 
taken place between Masiello and Manzi, 
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Masiello further testified that, "within a day or 
two prior" to the interview, he, Smith and Manzi met. 
At this meeting, DMJM agreed to pay Manzi $22,000 in 
cash over a period of time for the Holyoke Community 
College contract, and Manzi agreed to make certain 
that DMJM was selected as the designer. 14. 
The Ward Commission Report presented evidence that 
suggests that influence peddling and corruption in the 
awarding of contracts may have been present to a very 
serious degree in Massachusetts state government during the 
period under discussion. If this was the case, then all ^ 
major capital projects were likely to have been seen not 
just as initiatives aimed at meeting public needs, but, 
also as important potential sources of essential campaign 
funding. In such an environment it would be difficult for 
an incumbent governor not to conclude that if he failed to 
exploit these opportunities, his political opposition 
would, and quite likely drive him from office with the 
campaign funds provided. 
While this study found no evidence of any attempt by 
the officers of an architectural consulting firm or 
construction company to improperly influence the decision 
on a site location for UMB, or any evidence of any attempt 
by Governor Volpe or anyone else to improperly influence 
or force a decision by the trustees to accept a particular 
site proposal, there is much suggestion within the Ward 
Commission's report of continuing contacts between such 
firms and the Volpe administration throughout the period 
1965 - 1969 involving the discussion of state construction 
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projects and the solicitation of political contributions. 
It appears unlikely that the Volpe administration 
would have allowed the important decision on the location 
and physical size of such a major project as the new Boston 
Campus to drag on any longer than necessary. It would 
appear likely that Governor Volpe would never have taken 
seriously the suggestion that such a major capital budget 
project be scrapped in favor of a proposal to rent a 
scattered group of buildings in downtown Boston. Such a 
decision would have involved the setting aside of a major 
potential patronage opportunity as well as an opportunity 
to boost the number of construction jobs available in the 
Boston area just as the critical election year of 1968 was 
reaching a climax. 
The Impact of the Internal Organizational 
Structure of the University 
Three factors concerning the organizational structure 
of the University caused problems during the site selection 
process: the lack of an adeguate public relations effort/ 
the remoteness of the city of Boston and the new campus 
from the University president in Amherst/ and the lack of 
resolution on the degree of autonomy to be exercised by the 
Boston campus administration. 
Other factors strengthened the University during this 
difficult period. These included: the diversity of 
234 
background and the prestige of the University Trustees, 
the establishment of effective legislative relations by 
the president and the prestige of the University, itself, 
as the "flagship" institution within the state system of 
higher education. 
The issue of the independent authority of the Boston 
Campus leadership was a clear problem area which had a 
negative effect on the site selection process. President 
Lederle's publicly stated decision early in the process to 
give as much autonomy as possible to the new campus worked 
well in getting many of the internal administrative and 
decision making processes off to a good start at the Boston 
campus. However, it had a negative impact on the site 
selection process. Given the political context, Columbia 
Point was ultimately selected, out of necessity, by the 
University's president and trustees despite strong public 
objections of the Boston campus leadership. 
During a review of the site selection process a 
question frequently occurs concerning which official of 
the University was, actually, leading the effort. It becomes 
unclear from time to time, who, at a given point in time was 
charged with the role of spokesperson for the University 
regarding the search. 
Various persons seemed to fill this role from point 
to point. The initial proposal for a site, for example, was 
made by State Senate President Maurice Donahue. He 
235 
suggested in the Amherst Newman Club speech that it should 
be located in the suburbs. Much of the subsequent media 
coverage concerning the new campus kept reflecting this 
assumption for at least the next year. The actual 
legislation which followed was ambiguous on the question. 
The trustee buildings and grounds committee, who 
were charged by action of the University trustees with 
responsibility for reviewing all possibilities and 
recommending a final site, began with an assumption of the 
desirability of a suburban location. They late accepted 
the assumptions contained in the campus' initial mission 
statement reflecting the views of the New Departures and 
New Concepts Committee who had assumed from the first the 
absolute necessity of a core city location. 
The Boston campus' first chancellor, John Ryan seemed 
at times to present a posture of ambivalence, suggesting 
at first in his public statements that the site would be in 
the urban core and then drifting toward the possibility of 
a suburban site when nothing else seemed possible. 
This problem of a lack of clear definition of 
authority issues is reflected, too, by Ryan's decision to 
move ahead with direct open meetings with the residents of 
Highland Park in the absence of clear direction from 
Lederle followed too late by clear written instructions 
from Lederle discouraging such direct meetings between the 
Boston campus leadership and community representatives. 
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Toward the close of his incumbency/ Ryan indicated 
acquiescence with the inevitability of Columbia Point, a 
choice of site proposed by the city. Ryan's sudden 
resignation reflected frustration with this lack of 
clear definition of authority and with a lack of strong 
support by the governor. Despite his written statements to 
the contrary, it is not completely clear that Ryan felt a 
sense of total support from the university president. 
Senator Harrington's frank statements to the press 
identifying such a rift leave one wondering where this 
legislative leader got such an impression and why he would 
choose to totally fabricate such a report. Kevin Harrington 
failed to respond to requests to be interviewed for this 
study and thus direct follow up was not possible. 
An interpretation which can be drawn from the data 
presented in the case study, despite the later written 
denial by Ryan, is that Ryan's sudden resignation in 
1968 left many persons, including a key legislative leader, 
Senator Harrington, with the distinct impression that 
serious tensions had developed between the president and 
the Boston chancellor over authority issues. 
Ryan's resignation at a critical time for the campus 
left a power vacuum which was then filled in part by the 
academic dean and other senior faculty leaders. The 
academic dean, serving as acting chancellor, frequently 
appeared as a spokesperson for the campus in the months 
which followed and continued to do so even after the 
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appointment of a new chancellor. This culminated in the 
academic dean's dramatic speech on the steps of the 
statehouse in the fall of 1968. Throughout the process, 
and especially during this power vacuum, it was the 
academic dean, not the university president, who acted, 
w ith strong support from the majority of the faculty and 
student leaders, as the primary public spokesperson for the 
campus. He was the leader who persisted in an insistance 
on not just an urban location but a core city location in 
the face of opposition by almost every leader within the 
external community. 
The campus' second chancellor, arriving in the fall 
of 1968, immediately adopted the highly innovative proposal 
by the academic dean and faculty leadership for a scattered 
site proposal despite clear signals from the president, the 
trustees, the mayor, the governor, and key legislative 
leaders that such a proposal was unacceptable and that the 
decision had by the time of his appointment been 
essentially already made. This position by the new 
chancellor suggests the existence of consioerable ambiguity 
regarding authority over decision making for the Boston 
campus. The result of this general confusion in the period 
1965 - 1968 was more delay and embarrassment for the 
University. 
The physical distance between the University 
president and the local Boston chancellor and academic dean 
238 
appear to have exacerbated the difficult site selection 
process. The lack of clear internal lines of authority for 
negotiation with the external community concerning various 
site proposals throughout the site selection process appear 
to have added to the problem . 
It is clear, from his public statements, that Lederle 
considered the Boston campus faculty and administration to 
be naive and inexperienced and that he was determined to 
make the decision himself in consultation with the 
trustees. It may have been a mistake, therefor, for the 
president and trustees to authorize a delay and more study 
of the scattered site proposal in the fall of 1968 in order 
to present the appearance of Boston campus participation 
in the final decision. The board of trustees would seem to 
have been organized in such a way that they had adequate 
communication with key people within the Boston community 
and within the state's political framework. It appears, 
however, that they lacked effective channels of 
communication with the Boston campus administration and 
faculty. Throughout the process there remained the 
impression that the primary focus of the trustees, the 
president and the central university staff was towards the 
parent campus in Amherst. There is the clear indication by 
Lederle in his narrative that one primary purpose of a 
Boston campus for the University was to protect the mother 
campus in Amherst from loosing resources to expansion moves 
by the State College at Boston. This approach had to result 
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in a confusion of loyalties and priorities which was not 
healthy for the new urban university. Throughout the 
period covered by this case study the University was 
unable to clearly resolve the question of whether the 
Boston campus was itself a fledgling urban university or 
simply a local extension program of a university 
headquartered in Amherst. President Wood addressed 
this issue in part by moving his office to Boston in the 
early 1970's. This move clearly identified the president 
as head of a multi-campus university system whose 
headquarters was no longer at Amherst. However, in doing 
this President Wood also opened further questions 
surrounding the authority relationship between the 
university president and the Boston campus chancellor. 
Now there were two University of Massachusetts 
spokespersons on the Boston scene. 
The Role of Faculty Participation in the Site Selection 
Process 
Given the problems identified above it is important 
to note that the faculty did play a major role in the 
decision reached concerning the location of the Boston 
campus. This happened because the faculty, with the 
exception of many of those in the "hard sciences", were 
strongly supportive from the beginning of a core city site 
for the university. The choice of residence of a number of 
the founding faculty appears to reflect this commitment 
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and may have added a personal and practical incentive to 
their determination to secure a core city site. Table II 
indicates the choice of residence of members of the faculty 
during these formative years. Data was obtained from campus 
telephone books for,the years indicated. In comparing this 
data to that on student residence presented earlier in 
Table I it is interesting to note that in the early years 
the faculty of the Boston campus were slightly more "urban" 
in terms of their choice of residence than the student 
body. 
By taking an early, strong and well articulated stand 
on the necessity for an urban location the faculty 
leadership group effectively prevented the choice of a 
suburban location. This point was won and won early. 
Time and again throughout the process suburban sites which 
met many of the other technical requirements were set aside 
because they were too far from the core city. Seen at 
first as a public university which would be located in the 
suburbs, the new campus developed a unique urban character 
in its first quarter century because, in the first few 
years of planning, the faculty insisted that it must be 
urban in character. What they failed to develop effectively 
was impeccable arguments as to why, at great public expense 
and the sacrifice of very scarce space, the campus must sit 
at the very core of the urban area rather than nearby on 
its inner fringe. 
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TABLE 2. 
home address of faculty in selected academic years 
- Academic Year Academic Year 
1966 - 1967 1968 - 1969 
Core Area of Boston 26 17% 57 21% 
Other Boston Address 10 6% 11 4% 
Sub-Total 36 2 3% 68 25% 
City of Cambridge 36 23% 54 20% 
Town of Brookline 18 12% 18 7% 
Other Communities 
Bordering on Boston 9 6% 20 7% 
Sub-Total 63 41% 92 34% 
Other Address Within 
10 Miles of Boston 48 31% 77 2 8% 
Other Mass. Address 6 4% 31 u% 
Outside Massachusetts 1 . 6% 3_ 1% 
Total 154 100% 271 100% 
(Source: University of Massachusetts at Boston Campus 
Telephone Directories for Academic Year 1966-1967 and 
Academic Year 1968-1969.) 
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The Role of Technical Consultants 
During the public debate in 1964 concerning whether 
there should be a Boston campus and during the vary early 
stages of the site selection process, the University 
appears to have suffered from a lack of competent 
assistance by technical consultants. During these early 
stages various site proposals were being advanced by 
political leadeu and university administrators with 
virtually no experience in the identification and analysis 
of the many relevant technical considerations which must 
form a part of such a decision. 
It seems, today, almost incredible that the 
Commonwealth's political leadership and the University 
would embark on such a complex and expensive venture 
without technical assistance. The decision on creation of 
a Boston campus was reached quickly in June,1964 despite 
the fact that Senator Kevin Harrington, the co-chairman of 
The Willis Harrington Commission, the professional/ 
technical group charged with studying higher education in 
Massachusetts, objected that his group was still hard at 
work and would not complete its report for several months. 
The lack of professional technical consultants contributed 
to the false starts and long delays during the first year 
of the site selection process. 
The consultants finally employed by the University, 
Sasaki and Associates, had a strong influence on decisions 
by the University regarding specific sites. Their reports 
present a thorough treatment of such technical factors as 
topography, minimum site size, nature of the surrounding 
community, the composition of subsoils and bedrock, traffic 
patterns etc. Their planning documents display a general 
technical competence and many bold and innovative concepts 
which unfortunately were not used effectively*by the 
University in presenting the various site porposals to the 
external community. There is no evidence that this 
technical excellence, or any aura of prestige they may have 
accrued as experts in the field of architectural design, 
was of any assistance to the University in selling their 
proposal to the external community. This was due in part to 
a tendency for the consultants and the University's 
planners to work on their own in a vacuum rather than in 
close contact and effective cooperation with the city's 
technical experts, Edward Logue, Hale Champion and the 
staff of the BRA. In each of the conflicts between the 
University and the city over specific sites, these two 
groups of experts were also in conflict. Obviously the 
University would have been in far deeper trouble without 
the competent assistance of Sasaki and yet the prestige of 
Saskai's reputation for excellence counted for very little 
in the effort to gain support in the external community. 
Rosen, it should be recalled, concluded that the 
analysis of organizational structure provided the best 
approach to understanding the Chicago experience but 
expressed concern that a particular organization's internal 
structure and the interplay between a particular mix of 
competing organizations might be unique to a particular 
time and place. He also found that the University of 
Illinois used its prestige as a research university, and 
the aura of reports generated through a scientific and 
technical approach to site selection for its Chicago 
campus, to gain support for the university's position. 
Sasaki's work was excellent from the standpoint of 
thoroughness and the technical accuracy of research 
and analysis. The University was unable to use Sasaki's 
work effectively to support their position on site 
choices such as Copley or Highland Park because of the 
extensive local political opposition to these locations. 
This suggests that the technical approach is useful only 
in a subordinate way to support policy decisions which 
are either politically popular with major groups of 
constituents or at least neutral in their impact. 
It is significant that Rosen did not identify faculty 
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leaders as playing a significant role in the choice of the 
site for the Chicago campus. In Boston they played a major 
role in developing the unique mission statement for the 
campus which, in turn, dictated a strong orientation toward 
a core city location. The Boston context was different. 
CHAPTER X. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS DEVELOPED FROM THE CASE STUDY 
Although the passing years would gradually provide a 
vastly improved prospect, from the perspective of 1968, 
the site selection process for the University of 
Massachusetts - Boston had taken much too long and resulted 
in a conclusion which was a disappointment to the campus 
leadership. The frustrating early years had brought a 
premature end to the promising leadership of the campus' 
first chancellor. A serious delay had occured in the 
campus' ability to achieve its full mission of service to 
metropolitan Boston. A public educational institution 
which had been founded in 1964 with great public 
anticipation and acclaim had now been pushed into a 
position of relative obscurity at a site which much of the 
public at the time would identify as highly undesirable 
and potentially dangerous given the notorious reputation 
of the adjacent housing project and the relative 
difficulty in reaching the site via public transportation. 
It is appropriate to ask how these disappointing 
outcomes might have been avoided and what implications the 
site selection process for the Boston campus of the 
University of Massachusetts might have for institutions 
facing similar major policy decisions. 
The end result of this case study is a series of 
conclusions that emerge from a review of this particular 
site selection and decision making process. A suggestion 
for further research is that others who conduct similar 
studies use these conclusions, and perhaps Rosen's, as a 
point of focus to see whether these conclusions about the 
important factors affecting such processes will hold across 
other site selection processes and major policy decision 
making concerning other urban public universities. 
It is suggested that this be done following similar 
methods of historical treatment and in—depth review of the 
actors and processes as used in this case study and in the 
study by Rosen. Only by telling the full story of what 
occured that can one capture and understand the underlying 
dynamics and decision making processes. The findings of 
this case study can be summarized into several broadly 
stated conclusions which are presented in the remainder 
of this chapter. 
The Importance of Adequate Institutional 
Research and Planning 
The decision to establish a public institution at 
the university level in the Boston area was a sudden 
political decision reached in the spring of 1964 with a 
minimum of public debate and virtually no prior planning 
and analysis. This left the University with virtually no 
road map as it began to quickly throw together an 
operating plan in the summer of 1964 which would enable it 
to find a temporary site and open a new campus by the fall 
°f 1965. The case study reflects the disappointing results. 
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One gets the impression that the University of 
Massachusetts at Boston was created in 1964 almost entirely 
as the result of the sudden accidental discovery of 
sufficient political support for a public university in the 
Boston area. A major factor behind the decision that the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst should take the 
leadership in providing a new public university in Boston 
appears to have been the personal opinion held by the new 
president of the state senate that Boston State College 
had inadequate space and insufficiently experienced 
faculty leadership to develop into a state university. 
The decision was definitely not the logical, 
carefully phased result of sound long range planning for 
growth within a carefully balanced state system of higher 
education. It was a victory won by the University of 
Massachusetts in the political arena with detailed planning 
and actual public needs assessment issues left to be 
addressed later on. The lack of statewide coordination and 
the absence of adequate assessment of needs and of 
comprehensive planning prior to the enactment of enabling 
legislation left the University with no clear case to make 
for a core city vs. suburban location. It also left them no 
v 
basis on. which to make an informed objective choice of site 
which would be acceptable to the host community. 
State-wide coordination of the development of higher 
education in Massachusetts in the 1960's and thorough 
prior planning for a public university for Metropolitan 
Boston would have eliminated much of the difficulty 
reflected in this case study. The prolonged debate and 
decision making process on a site would have taken place 
during the years before passage of enabling legislation, 
not for years after the campus opened its doors in 
temporary quarters. The strong arguments of the city 
administration and business community against a core city 
location, and other difficulties involved with the 
selection of any site in metropolitan Boston, would have 
surfaced very early, have been resolved, and would have 
been key determinants in a decision on possible sites 
before the legislation was passed. The enabling 
legislation would have almost surely been site specific. 
The Importance of a Central Statewide Coordinating 
Agency for Public Higher Education 
In the spring of 1964,there was no state-wide 
coordinating agency, such as today's Massachusetts Board of 
Regents, charged with planning and coordinating the 
development of the state's system of public higher 
education. The result was a condition of intense and 
unbridled political competition for legislative support 
among the various segments of public higher education. In 
this wide open environment, it appears that the university 
saw itself as threatened by the possible creation of a 
rival state university located closer to the center of 
political power. 
President Lederle was able to use the greater 
prestige of the University of Massachusetts, to advantage. 
He was also able to capitalize on the sudden opportunity 
for strong political support in the legislature occasioned 
by the resignation of Boston's Senator John Powers, a 
strong ally of President Looney of Boston State College, 
from the presidency of the State Senate and his replacement 
by Maurice Donahue, a strong supporter of The University of 
Massachusetts from the western part of Massachusetts. 
President Looney and his senior staff might have been 
able to create the equivalent of the Boston campus of the 
University of Massachusetts, or an even a stronger 
institution, within the same time frame, given the same 
resources and political support or a merger might have been 
possible which included Boston State College as a college 
of education within the new urban university. The merger 
of the two institutions, the Boston campus of the 
University of Massachusetts and Boston State College, did 
finally take place as the result of a legislative mandate 
in 1982. This could have been accomplished in 1964 and it 
is possible that the result would have been a stronger 
public university for Boston. It seems certain that this 
approach would have eliminated some needless duplication 
of resources and programs. This dia not happened in 1964 
because the conflicting positions of the University of 
Massachusetts and Boston State College concerning the 
future direction of public higher education in Boston 
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were not offset by a counterbalance provided by a 
strong state coordinating agency directing the development 
of public higher education. 
In this vacuum each institution sought to win a 
political victory in the legislature. The University 
emerged from this conflict with a mandate to build and 
control the new urban public university, but, Boston State 
emerged still intact and able to maintain its separate 
status for several more years. 
The Importance of Strong Community Relations 
Based on an Understanding by the University 
of the Local Political and Economic Context 
The University leadership, most notably President 
Lederle, displayed a surprising lack of understanding of 
the local political and economic context within the Boston 
community. Most surprising of all is the fact that they 
appear to have had few, if any, discussions with the 
Collins administration prior to passage of enabling 
legislation in 1964. Several more months elapsed before 
a meaningful dialogue was established at which point the 
mayor discovered that the University intended to locate in 
the core city and the University discovered that the mayor 
had assumed, and strongly preferred, the choice of a 
suburban location for the new campus. 
In the initial stages of the site selection process 
the University was unable to convince Collins and White of 
the desirability of locating the new campus within the core 
city or of any important benefits to be derived by the 
city. The University also appears to have not fully 
understood the political and economic milieu into which 
they were attempting to introduce a new campus. They seem 
to have underestimated the importance of the fierce 
competition for the very limited available space in the 
core city. In the early years they virtually ignored, in 
their public statements and actions, the growing concern 
in the Boston community about the loss of property tax 
base to tax exempt institutions. 
They seem to have assumed that a strong base of 
support for the location of a public university campus in 
the core city would develop as a matter of course in the 
Boston community as it had in Chicago and other major urban 
areas. This strong base of support simply wasn't there and 
as late as the fall of 1968 Dean Gagnon was expressing 
publicly his dismay and amazement that Boston would not do 
what other major urban areas had done for their public 
university. 
The later part of the case study suggests that the 
administration of President Robert Wood had a far better 
understanding of the importance of positive dialogue 
between the university and the community during the 
development of a new campus. He used this understanding 
in positive ways to successfully resolve potential 
university/community conflicts during the crucial final 
stages of planning for the new campus. 
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This case study has important implications for 
planning for university-community relationships. The 
community will not automatically accept the presence of a 
university and its programs as an unqualified benefit. The 
university must make the case for its benefit to the 
community and before it can do that it must be certain 
that it has fully articulated and fully understands, 
itself, the case to be presented. This requires a thorough 
examination of the nature and needs of the host community. 
It also requires productive communication. 
This case suggests that in the early years of the 
site selection process, the University was not at all adept 
at community relations. Their plans might have caused 
serious harm to the Highland Park Community, to the efforts 
of the city to revitalize its core business district, and 
to the tenant residents of Dorchester and Columbia Point. 
It was not until various constituent groups within the host 
community expressed strong resistance that the University 
began to listen and yield to the concerns of the community. 
The review of the literature suggests that the University 
of Massachusetts was not alone in this error. 
This case study also suggests that community relations 
did improve. The University of Massachusetts' subsequent 
work with the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force and its 
formal statement of policy regarding community relations, 
stands as a model of what "town/gown" relationships can be. 
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The University of Massachusetts at Boston exists today as a 
model of university community relations largely because of 
this recognition which took place under the Wood 
administration in the early 1970's. 
These observations about the Boston site selection 
process suggest the negative consequences of the lack of an 
adequate community relations effort with the capacity to 
analyze, understand and make recommendations on how to 
deal with the complex political and economic environment 
in Boston adequate to support the very difficult task of 
locating a totally new satellite campus one hundred miles 
distant in the heart of the state's capital city. Had this 
capability been in place in 1963, it is possible that much 
of the controversy and delay surrounding the debate on a 
core city site would have been avoided. 
The Accidental Impact of Timing 
Timing, within a given local political context, is 
an extremely important consideration during the 
introduction of a major new publicly supported higher 
education institution. It worked both for and against the 
University. 
Support for a public university in Boston could not 
be mustered until a wave of new college bound students 
engulfed the public and private institutions. President 
Lederle, who had been thinking about a Boston campus for 
some time, skillfully chose the moment when public concern 
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was growing about the lack of space at Amherst and he had 
the support of a new State Senate president to launch 
his campaign for expansion of the University. 
The new campus of the University of Illinois arrived 
in Chicago' early in its urban renewal program as the 
result of a wave of enthusiasm for an urban public 
university spearheaded by a very popular and powerful 
mayor, Richard Daley. The University of Massachusetts' new 
campus arrived in Boston towards the close cf the urban 
renewal process and at the crest of a wave of xenophobia 
spearheaded by a woman who almost became mayor, Louise Day 
Hicks and a more restrained but heightened concern by the 
local business community with the amount of property tax 
base which had already been lost to colleges and other 
non-profit institutions. 
The Lack of a Single Voice for the University 
The lack of a single University voice, described at 
length in the previous chapter, clearly hampered the site 
selection process in Boston. The fact that President 
Lederle, Chancellor Ryan, Dean Gagnon, and to some extent 
the members' of the Trustee Buildings and Grounds 
Committee, and Vice Chairman Healey, all at one point or 
another represented themseleves as the voice of the 
University, and all in fact had differing points of view, 
r 
left outsiders never sure what was the position of the 
University at any given point in time on the suburban vs. 
core city site question, or on any particular site. 
255 
The City and the Urban University as Neighbors 
A key finding of this research is that the 
immediate local political context surrounding an urban 
public university will have a profound impact upon 
policy decision making for the university. The local 
political context must be known and understood by 
decision makers within the urban public university. It 
cannot be ignored. This finding dramatically underscores 
the need for effective public relations by the urban public 
university. It suggests that the near neighbors of such an 
institution will view its presence in terms of the 
immediate impact on their daily lives and not in terms of 
its broader long term benefit to society. The prestige of 
the university, and support for its presence within the 
the broader society, count for very little in such 
relationships. The urban public university must 
interact in a positive two way working relationship which 
yields direct tangible benefit to its local neighbors. 
Planning and decision making are more effective when 
representatives of the community are involved. At the 
beginning of the site selection process the University 
of Massachusetts had not built into its structure a 
mechanism through which it could foster positive two-way 
dialogue with the Boston community. During the Wood 
administration the University introduced a carefully 
planned program designed to adress this important need. 
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The Importance of a Clear Mission Statement 
for Urban Public Universities 
A clear understanding of the dynamics of what occured 
during the long site selction process for this particular 
urban public university speaks directly to the nature of 
the essential mission of all urban public universities. 
In the case of the University of Massachusetts-Boston this 
definition of mission took place within the crucible of the 
site selection experience not before it. It can be argued, 
perhaps, that because it was formed in this manner the 
definition is clearer and more valid and yet it would 
certainly seem that much of the difficulty and delay 
related by this case study could have been avoided by the 
clear definition of a valid mission statement in the fall 
of 1963, not ten years later. The narrative of this 
difficult and costly experience should serve as a caution 
to those who may be charged at a future point with the 
enormous task of begining an urban public college or 
university from nothing. 
As a result of this experience, the University of 
Massachusetts at Boston can be said to have entered into a 
compact with the city in which it chose to locate as an 
alternative to other locations. The city did not invite 
the university, it came of its own choosing. One might even 
say, at its own insistence. In order to gain acceptance by 
the city, it agreed to bend its own agenda, finally, to 
better fit that of the city. Its programs would be 
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developed and operate with this premise clearly in mind. 
The city administration and the campus' immediate neighbors 
would be fully participating partners in defining the 
nature of the urban mission of the university. This 
agreement upon a symbiotic relationship between city and 
university cannot be abrogated at some future point by the 
university. The relationship must of its nature remain 
symbiotic so that the university may function as a logical 
part of the whole fabric of urban life and continue to 
return to the city services of tangible value to replace 
those resources which it has taken away. This necessary 
facet of the university's relationship to the city will 
remain as both a unique opportunity and a constraint in 
the years to come. 
The "Hiding Hand" and Institutional History 
During a review of the site selection process for 
Boston, and a comparison of this process with the similar 
experience for Chicago, it is possible to develop a feeling 
of "inevitability", a sense that a final solution to the 
issue is just waiting all along to be discovered as the 
only feasible political compromise at least minimally 
acceptable to all parties and meeting, at least in a 
minimal sense, basic technical and cost requirements for 
such projects. Hirshman's "Hiding Hand" comes strongly to 
mind as perhaps the best way to describe such popular 
impressions of the processes of planning and decision 
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making. Many random direct and indirect environmental 
factors and events came together finally to form a decison 
which few, if any, forsaw at the beginning and with which 
none were totally satisfied or disatisfied at the end. 
Years later when the decision is long made and 
subsequent events and adjustments have gradually shaped 
the decision into a functioning reality with which most 
are satisfied and many totally delighted, some will look 
back and wonder how anyone could have forseen any other 
possible course. 
Recently, over lunch, a six year veteran of the UMB 
faculty commented, "But, there were never any other sites 
for the campus ever seriously considered besides Columbia 
Point were there? Where else could we have been in this 
city than here?" One can see this tendency taking place in 
the closing lines of President Lederle's recollections of 
the Boston campus search process which were recorded in 
1975, seven years after the decision was made for Columbia 
Point, 
There was no question but that certain members of 
the Boston faculty were critical of me and critical 
of the Board because we didn't stand up to Hancock 
and some others. I might have stood up to them if it 
was the ideal site. I didn't happen to think being 
on a cloverleaf with fifteen acres and building a 
ribbon-strip university was really in the long run a 
good thing. But if I had thought so I might have 
assessed very carefully our strengths and gone ahead 
to fight it....Now, I understand that most of them 
are terribly enthusiastic about Columbia Point, they 
like it out there. They've got a little space, it's 
a beautiful view out onto the harbor. 1. 
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The interviewer, Robert McCartney, agreed with 
Lederle. He responded, "In fact, they've renamed it the 
Harbor campus and are going to put in a little marina in 
there, and everyone seems happy. They are delighted with 
From the perspective of 1989 it is even easier 
to gain the impression that the choice of Columbia Point 
was the purposeful and deliberate outcome of a carefully 
designed and executed planning process. It is not difficult 
to develop the assumption that it was the best of all 
possible alternatives. The data presented in the case 
study suggests quite different conclusions. 
In addition to being an analysis of a major decision 
making process by an urban university, this study is also 
a partial history of the first ten years of a specific 
urban university, The University of Massachusetts - Boston. 
In consideration of this dual purpose a special effort has 
been made to present the data in as stark and objective a 
manner as possible. 
As the case unfolds the actions and opinions 
expressed by key participants both within and outside the 
university appear at times as confusing, indecisive and 
ambiguous. External factors intervene which could never 
have been forseen at the beginning of the episode causing 
further delay and indecision. As time passes key decision 
points are reached and decisions are made even though they 
Nay be simply a decision to postpone a decision. Multiple 
choices are possible but, ultimately, only one is selected. 
There is never a guarantee that the direction taken 
was a "best choice". It was simply a choice. There is no 
providence, no "hiding hand" directing the evolution of 
colleges and universities only an ongoing complex series 
of decisions which must be faced in a continuum of one 
academic year following the next. 
Decisions made in the past and the forces which 
impelled them remain as the foundations for the very 
problems and issues wrhich confront the institution at the 
present moment. An institution which has no clear 
understanding of the reality of its foundations and its 
past is at a greater risk of blundering forward into the 
future. This risk is heightened when there is a false 
sense of an institution's past and its historic mission 
and role within the community. 
With this in mind, it is of critical importance that 
those who endeavor to write histories of colleges and 
universities endeavor to be as complete and objective as 
possible in presenting the evidence of what has occured in 
the past even though that evidence may at times present a 
picture which is stark, bleak, ambiguous and not altogether 
pleasant and flattering. To do otherwise is to ultimately 
do a serious diservice to the institution which is the 
subject of the study. 
Epilogue 
Technical problems in the construction of the new 
campus caused a postponement of the original plan to open 
for the fall semester. The new facility was finally opened 
for classes on January 28,1974. The worst fears of the 
community were never realized. The University lived up to 
its commitments. No massive traffic jams resulted. No 
significant dislocation of Dorchester residents occured as 
the result of an influx of student tenants. In the early 
1980's local community groups and individual residents 
began the shared use of recreational facilities in the 
newly opened, Catherine Forbes Clark Athletic Center. The 
Clark Center was named to honor the memory of a former 
trustee and Dorchester community activist who had been 
specifically selected by Governor Sargent to fill a new 
trustee position created to enhance communication with the 
neighboring communities. 
Visitors to the campus, today in 1989, are often 
impressed by the spectacular scenic ocean views, the 
innovative architecture of the building complex, the 
proximity of new Columbia Point neighbors such as the 
Kennedy Presidential Library, the Massachusetts State 
Archives and "Harbor Point", the beautifully refurbished 
luxury apartment complex which has recently opened on the 
reconstructed site of the former public housing complex 
which was almost totally abandoned by the Boston Housing 
Authority by the mid-1980's. 
A recent mass mailing from this apartment complex 
invited University of Massachusetts students to consider 
becoming one of the new residents. Future plans include a 
waterfront park with picnic areas, biking and jogging 
trails, tennis courts, swimming pools, clubhouse with 
fitness center, a day care center, health care center and 
18 hour per day shuttle bus service. All of this can be had 
for rents ranging from $700 to $1,400 per month. "Harbor 
Point", the mailing assured the students, "is truly ' 
Boston's best value and lifestyle for apartment living and 
a great alternative to the pricey, congested inner city." 
Finishing touches are being made on a refurbished 
multi-million dollar public transit terminal adjacent to 
the campus which provides a more effective link to the two 
rapid transit lines which pass near the campus. 
Many visitors are struck as well by the remarkable 
cultural, racial and economic diversity of the campus' 
the 13,000+ students, all of whom commute to classes each 
day from their homes throughout the Greater Boston area 
and beyond. 
Paul Gagnon and Francis Broderick, along with a 
number of the founding faculty of the late 1960's, remain 
as highly valued and respected senior faculty. The campus 
administration building was recently named in honor of 
a former speaker of the house and state attorney general, 
Robert Quinn, who recently completed service as the 
chairman of the University's board of trustees. The campus 
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library was recently named in honor of 
chairman of the board of trustees, the 
In virtually every respect, the 
image of a public university carefully 
sited to best meet the specific needs 
population without harmful intrusion i 
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